RICARDO A. LOPEZ-MARROQUIN, AKA Ricardo Lopez v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RICARDO A. LOPEZ-MARROQUIN,
AKA Ricardo Lopez,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 18-72922
Agency No. A044-286-222
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted June 3, 2020
Pasadena, California
Before: CALLAHAN and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and KANE,** District Judge.
Ricardo Lopez-Marroquin, a native and citizen of El Salvador, seeks review
of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order affirming the denial of his
applications for relief from removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The Honorable Yvette Kane, United States District Judge for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
FILED
AUG 18 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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We review legal decisions de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence,
Budiono v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2016), and we deny the petition in
part.1
1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of withholding of
removal. Lopez-Marroquin failed to show that he would more likely than not face
persecution based on his membership in two particular social groups: “gay
Salvadoran men” and “Salvadoran males with schizoaffective disorder [who]
exhibit erratic behavior.” While there is some evidence of discrimination and
violence against homosexuals in El Salvador, the BIA reasonably found that the
persecution was not sufficiently widespread such that Lopez-Marroquin would
more likely than not suffer harm. The BIA also reasonably weighed Dr. Nickel’s
testimony. Dr. Nickels did not opine on the likelihood that Lopez-Marroquin
would be subjected to electroconvulsive therapy (“ECT”) without his consent, and
testified that a psychiatrist informed him that the National Psychiatric Hospital
(“NPH”) was implementing ECT protocols. Even assuming Lopez-Marroquin
would be committed to the NPH, the evidence is insufficient to show that he will
likely suffer persecution or be placed in the harsh forensic unit.2
1 Lopez-Marroquin also raises other issues, which we address in a concurrently
filed opinion granting the petition in part.
2 We do not reach the merits of the asylum claim, which requires only a
“reasonable possibility” of suffering persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2). The IJ
and the BIA found Lopez-Marroquin statutorily ineligible for asylum due to his

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2. Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s denial of relief under the
Convention Against Torture (CAT). We review this issue de novo because Lopez-
Marroquin argues the IJ failed to adhere to an implementing regulation that
requires consideration of all evidence bearing on the possibility of future torture.
See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3). Although the IJ did not mention Lopez-Marroquin’s
country-condition evidence in evaluating his CAT request, the IJ did discuss this
evidence in evaluating his request for withholding of removal. We infer the
agency considered and discounted this evidence for similar reasons in the CAT
context.3 See Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that
the agency must “consider the issues raised and announce its decision in terms
sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought and
not merely reacted” but need not “write an exegesis on every contention” (quoting
Lopez v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 799, 807 n.6 (9th Cir. 2004))).
3. Finally, Lopez-Marroquin’s request that we appoint government-
compensated counsel is foreclosed by Perez v. Barr, 957 F.3d 958, 965-66 (9th
Cir. 2020), in which we held that the authority to appoint pro-bono counsel in a
vehicle theft conviction. But our concurrently filed opinion concludes the
conviction was not an aggravated felony, and hence that statutory bar does not
apply.
3 We need not decide whether Lopez-Marroquin is statutorily ineligible for
withholding of removal and CAT relief for committing a particularly serious
crime. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (withholding); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2)
(CAT).

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Petition for Review does not necessarily entail the authority to order compensation.
PETITION DENIED IN PART.

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