Edwin Samuel Galdamez-Serpas v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
EDWIN SAMUEL GALDAMEZ-SERPAS,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 20-70982
Agency No. A206-496-253
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted September 14, 2021**
Before: PAEZ, NGUYEN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Edwin Samuel Galdamez-Serpas, a native and citizen of El Salvador,
petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing
his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
SEP 28 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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(“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial
evidence the agency’s factual findings. Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1184-
85 (9th Cir. 2006). We deny the petition for review.
The record does not compel the conclusion that Galdamez-Serpas
established changed or extraordinary circumstances to excuse his untimely asylum
application. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(4)-(5). Thus,
Galdamez-Serpas’s asylum claim fails.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Galdamez-
Serpas failed to establish he suffered harm that rises to the level of persecution.
See Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Threats standing alone . . .
constitute past persecution in only a small category of cases, and only when the
threats are so menacing as to cause significant actual ‘suffering or harm.’” (citation
omitted)). Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s determination that
Galdamez-Serpas failed to establish that the harm he fears would be on account of
a protected ground, including membership in his proposed employment-based
social groups. See Ayala v. Holder, 640 F.3d 1095, 1097 (9th Cir. 2011) (even if
membership in a particular social group is established, an applicant must still show
that “persecution was or will be on account of his membership in such group);
Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (a petitioner’s “desire to be
free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang

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members bears no nexus to a protected ground”).
In his opening brief, Galdamez-Serpas does not challenge the agency’s
determination that he failed to establish a clear probability of future persecution on
account of an actual or imputed political opinion. See Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder,
706 F.3d 1072, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2013) (issues not specifically raised and argued
in a party’s opening brief are waived).
Thus, Galdamez-Serpas’s withholding of removal claim fails.
In light of this disposition, we do not reach Galdamez-Serpas’s remaining
contentions as to withholding of removal. See Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532,
538 (9th Cir. 2004) (courts and agencies are not required to decide issues
unnecessary to the results they reach).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because
Galdamez-Serpas failed to show it is more likely than not he would be tortured by
or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to El Salvador.
See Aden v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009). We reject as
unsupported by the record Galmadez-Serpas’s contention that the IJ erred in its
analysis of his claim.
The temporary stay of removal remains in place until issuance of the
mandate.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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