Roseline Choh Ngwe v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROSELINE CHOH NGWE,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 20-72586
Agency No. A201-759-541
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted August 5, 2021**
Anchorage, Alaska
Submission Vacated August 17, 2021
Resubmitted October 5, 2021
Before: WARDLAW, MILLER, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
Roseline Choh Ngwe petitions for review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals’ (BIA) decision affirming an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of her
application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
OCT 7 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 4 --

2
Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252, and we deny the petition in part and dismiss it in part.
1. Ngwe argues that the agency failed to adequately consider two pieces
of evidence—a bail bond application and a bail bond—which she argues
corroborate her account of persecution and compel a finding of past persecution.
But Ngwe did not raise this argument before the BIA. Moreover, the statements in
her briefing to the BIA that the “IJ erred while considering the facts,” and failed to
evaluate other evidence of record were not sufficient to put the BIA on notice that
she was challenging the IJ’s treatment of her corroborating evidence. See Segura
v. Holder, 605 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding “broad statements”
insufficient to put the BIA on notice of a petitioner’s claim). Because this issue is
unexhausted, we lack jurisdiction to reach it. See Sola v. Holder, 720 F.3d 1134,
1135 (9th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
2. Ngwe argues that the agency’s adverse credibility determination was
unsupported by substantial evidence. We disagree. When evaluating an adverse
credibility finding, “we must look to the ‘totality of the circumstances[ ] and all
relevant factors.’” Alam v. Garland, — F.4th —, 2021 WL 4075331, at *5 (9th
Cir. Sept. 8, 2021) (en banc) (alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)) (overruling former precedents that “employed the single
factor rule”). There were significant inconsistencies in Ngwe’s testimony about

-- 2 of 4 --

3
her stay at a friend’s house after escaping from prison and about an anonymous
note she received, and this testimony concerned the core details of her alleged
persecution. See Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1046–47 (9th Cir. 2010)
(“Although inconsistencies no longer need to go the heart of the petitioner’s claim
[to support an adverse credibility finding], when an inconsistency is at the heart of
the claim it doubtless is of great weight.”). Moreover, the record does not compel
the conclusion that these inconsistencies were the result of a misunderstanding
between Ngwe and the IJ, particularly given that Ngwe is highly educated and a
native English speaker, and the IJ repeatedly asked her to explain the
inconsistencies. See Molina-Morales v. INS, 237 F.3d 1048, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001)
(“We must uphold findings by the BIA unless the evidence compels a contrary
conclusion.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Having considered the totality of the circumstances and all relevant factors,
we find these two inconsistencies sufficient to support the agency’s adverse
credibility determination. See Alam, 2021 WL 4075331, at *5.
3. Ngwe argues that despite the agency’s adverse credibility
determination, her country conditions evidence compelled the conclusion that she
more likely than not will be tortured if returned to Cameroon. We disagree.
Although Ngwe presented evidence of widespread violence against Anglophones,
the agency concluded that this evidence “did not establish that [she] currently faces

-- 3 of 4 --

4
a particularized risk of torture.” Ngwe points to no evidence that compels a
contrary conclusion. See Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir.
2014).1
DISMISSED IN PART, DENIED IN PART.
1 Ngwe also asserts that the IJ mischaracterized and inadequately considered
her country condition evidence, particularly a 2018 U.S. State Department Human
Rights Report on Cameroon and a news article on genocide in Cameroon. But the
IJ adequately addressed this evidence and concluded that it did not establish
Ngwe’s eligibility for CAT relief.

-- 4 of 4 --