Maria Leonor Dubon De Bustamante v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARIA LEONOR DUBON DE
BUSTAMANTE,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 20-72536
Agency No. A209-988-748
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted October 12, 2021**
Before: TALLMAN, RAWLINSON, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
Maria Leonor Dubon de Bustamante, a native and citizen of El Salvador,
petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order
dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying her
application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
OCT 14 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 3 --

2 20-72536
Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We
review de novo the legal question of whether a particular social group is
cognizable, except to the extent that deference is owed to the BIA’s interpretation
of the governing statutes and regulations. Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238,
1241-42 (9th Cir. 2020). We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual
findings. Id. at 1241. We deny the petition for review.
The agency did not err in concluding that Dubon de Bustamante failed to
establish membership in a cognizable particular social group. See Reyes v. Lynch,
842 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2016) (in order to demonstrate membership in a
particular social group, “[t]he applicant must ‘establish that the group is (1)
composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined
with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question’” (quoting
Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014))). Substantial evidence
supports the agency’s determination that Dubon de Bustamante otherwise failed to
establish she was or would be persecuted on account of a protected ground. See
Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (an applicant’s “desire to be
free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang
members bears no nexus to a protected ground”). Thus, Dubon de Bustamante’s
asylum and withholding of removal claims fail.

-- 2 of 3 --

3 20-72536
Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because
Dubon de Bustamante failed to show it is more likely than not she will be tortured
by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to El
Salvador. See Aden v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009). We reject as
unsupported by the record Dubon de Bustamante’s contentions that the agency
ignored evidence or otherwise erred in its analysis of her CAT claim.
We do not reach Dubon de Bustamante’s contentions regarding the IJ’s
adverse credibility determination. See Santiago-Rodriguez v. Holder, 657 F.3d
820, 829 (9th Cir. 2011) (review limited to the grounds relied on by the BIA).
The temporary stay of removal remains in place until issuance of the
mandate.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

-- 3 of 3 --