State of Hawaii, by its Office of Consumer Protection v. ROBERT L. STONE II, Esquire, DBA Gah Law Group, LLC

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
STATE OF HAWAII, by its Office of
Consumer Protection,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ROBERT L. STONE II, Esquire, DBA Gah
Law Group, LLC,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
CYNTHIA A. STONE,
Defendant,
CHESTER NOEL ABING; et al.,
Intervenor-Defendants.
No. 21-15210
D.C. No. 1:19-cv-00272-DKW-RT
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
Derrick Kahala Watson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 12, 2021*
Before: TALLMAN, RAWLINSON, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
FILED
OCT 21 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Robert L. Stone II appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in this action filed by The State of Hawaii’s Office of Consumer
Protection (“OCP”) alleging Stone violated various federal and Hawaii consumer
protection laws. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo. Lindsey v. SLT L.A., LLC, 447 F.3d 1138, 1144 (9th Cir. 2006). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because OCP
demonstrated there was no genuine dispute of material fact that Stone violated the
statutes at issue. See 12 C.F.R. § 1015.5(a) (forbidding mortgage relief service
providers from collecting payment from clients in advance of executing a written
contract); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 480E-3, 480E-4, 480E-10(a)(9)-(10), 481A-3, 487-13
(forbidding distressed property consultants from collecting compensation before
performing services or in excess of a client’s annual real property tax, requiring
certain disclosures in contracts, forbidding deceptive practices inducing a person to
do what they would not otherwise, and requiring those who provide services to
register to do business in Hawaii); S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d
885, 888 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding summary judgment is appropriate when a party
“establish[es] beyond controversy every essential element” of its claims (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
We reject as without merit Stone’s contention that the district court’s grant
of summary judgment violated his Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. See

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Johnson v. Neilson (In re Slatkin), 525 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[A]
summary judgment proceeding does not deprive the losing party of its Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial.”).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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