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20-16746•Pamela Valin; James Valin v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC
20-16746Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitOct 22, 2021
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PAMELA VALIN; JAMES VALIN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC; U.S.
BANK, N.A., as Trustee, Successor In
Interest to Wachovia Bank, National
Association, as Trustee for GSR Mortgage
Loan Trust 2004-11, Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2004-11,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 20-16746
D.C. No.
2:19-cv-01785-GMN-DJA
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Gloria M. Navarro, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 20, 2021**
San Francisco, California
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
OCT 22 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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Before: WATFORD and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and BAKER,*** International
Trade Judge
A Nevada statute of repose, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 106.240, requires a party to sue
on a debt secured by real property within ten years after it becomes wholly due. The
defendants-appellees recorded three notices of default on a home owned by Pamela
and James Valin because payments on a promissory note were delinquent. The first
two notices were rescinded. Because the first notice was recorded in 2009, and the
creditors did not bring suit within ten years thereafter, the Valins claim their debt is
discharged under the Nevada statute of repose. The district court dismissed the
complaint, holding that under Nevada law the rescission of the 2009 notice also
rescinded any acceleration of the debt. We affirm.
Under Nevada law, because the 2009 notice of default was rescinded less than
ten years after it was issued, the acceleration of the debt was also rescinded, and
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 106.240 is inapplicable. See Glass v. Select Portfolio Servicing
Inc., 466 P.3d 939, 2020 WL 3604042, at *1 (Nev. July 1, 2020); Bank of Am., NA
v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, 849 F. App’x 211, 212–13 (9th Cir. 2021). That the deed
of trust gives the borrower a right to reinstate after acceleration makes no difference,
as the deed of trust does not limit that option to the borrower. See Johnston v. U.S.
*** The Honorable M. Miller Baker, Judge of the United States Court of
International Trade, sitting by designation.
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Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 466 P.3d 945, 2020 WL 3832873, at *2 (Nev. Ct. App. July 7,
2020) (stating that a loan document need not explicitly give a lender the right to
decelerate a loan obligation).
AFFIRMED.
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