Anush Matasakian; Anzhelika Kirakosian; Aram Ovsepovich Kirakosian; Arman Kirakosian v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANUSH MATASAKIAN; ANZHELIKA
KIRAKOSIAN; ARAM OVSEPOVICH
KIRAKOSIAN; ARMAN KIRAKOSIAN,
Petitioners,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 20-71573
Agency Nos. A208-600-878
A208-600-879
A208-600-472
A208-600-473
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted October 20, 2021**
San Francisco, California
Before: BADE and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and BERMAN,*** District Judge.
Petitioners Anush Matsakian (“Anush”), her husband, Aram Ovsepovich
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Richard M. Berman, United States District Judge for
the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
FILED
OCT 22 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 4 --

2
Kirakosian (“Aram”), and their two minor children (collectively, “Petitioners”)
petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) dismissal of
their appeal from an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) decision denying their applications
for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against
Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the
agency’s factual findings for substantial evidence, Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d
1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010), applying the standards governing adverse credibility
determinations created by the REAL ID Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see
Alam v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc).
1. The IJ identified numerous inconsistencies between the testimony of Anush
and Aram, documentary evidence in the record, the asylum application, and a prior
visa application. These inconsistencies and omissions were non-trivial. See Silva-
Pereira v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 1176, 1186 (9th Cir. 2016) (upholding adverse credibility
determination based on added allegations about a beating and account that police
told applicant that they were pointing a gun at his son “because of [his] political
opinion”). And the IJ gave Aram sufficient opportunity to explain any
inconsistency. See Rizk v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2011).
Accordingly, the BIA did not err in upholding the adverse credibility determination
against Aram.

-- 2 of 4 --

3
The BIA also properly upheld the adverse credibility determination against
Anush because her testimony regarding an alleged dog attack that was the purported
impetus for Petitioners’ flight from Russia was inconsistent with Amar’s testimony
regarding that incident. Aram and Anush also testified inconsistently about whether
the couple planned to merely visit the United States in 2014. See Kin v. Holder, 595
F.3d 1050, 1057 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Don v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 738, 741–42
(9th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, the adverse credibility determination against Amar is
supported by substantial evidence.
2. The BIA did not err in upholding the adverse credibility determination against
Petitioners’ expert. The REAL ID Act allows the IJ to make adverse credibility
determinations on any witness based on the “totality of the circumstances.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Considering the totality of the circumstances, the record
supports the IJ’s conclusion that the expert’s testimony was inconsistent with the
State Department’s report on Russia, and that the expert’s testimony that Armenians
face pervasive discrimination in Russia contradicted his admission that there has
been a large influx of Armenians to Russia. Moreover, even if the BIA erred in
upholding the adverse credibility determination, the expert himself did not witness
any of the mistreatment Petitioners faced, and thus, this evidence is not
particularized to them and cannot independently support their claims to relief
without their credible testimony. See Singh v. Barr, 935 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir.

-- 3 of 4 --

4
2019) (per curiam). Therefore, remand would not be appropriate because it would
be futile. Id.
3. Given the agency’s adverse credibility determination, Petitioners’ asylum and
withholding of removal claims fail, as “the remaining evidence in the record is
insufficient to carry [their] burden of establishing eligibility for relief.” Wang v.
Sessions, 861 F.3d 1003, 1009 (9th Cir. 2017). Moreover, Petitioners did not argue
before the BIA that they were entitled to CAT relief, despite the adverse credibility
argument, and thus, the court lacks jurisdiction to review the denial of CAT relief as
that claim is unexhausted. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677–78 (9th Cir.
2004).
PETITION DISMISSED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

-- 4 of 4 --