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18-72590•Martin Ramos-Reyes v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General
18-72590Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitNov 16, 2021
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARTIN RAMOS-REYES,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 18-72590
Agency No. A070-974-306
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted November 8, 2021**
Portland, Oregon
Before: GRABER and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges, and R. COLLINS,*** District
Judge.
Petitioner Martin Ramos-Reyes seeks review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals’ (“BIA”) final order denying his requests for cancellation of removal,
FILED
NOV 16 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Raner C. Collins, United States District Judge for the
District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
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withholding of removal, asylum, and protection under the Convention Against
Torture. We deny the petition in part and dismiss it in part.
1. The BIA correctly held that Petitioner’s conviction under Oregon’s law
prohibiting cockfighting constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude. In Ortega-
Lopez v. Barr, 978 F.3d 680, 687 (9th Cir. 2020), we deferred to the BIA’s
conclusion that a conviction under the federal cockfighting statute is a crime
involving moral turpitude. Petitioner’s argument that his conduct was dissimilar
from that in Ortega-Lopez because he was convicted merely of possessing a
fighting bird is unavailing. Oregon’s law allows conviction only if the owner
knows and intends that the bird will be used in cockfighting or trains the bird for
cockfighting. Or. Rev. Stat. § 167.428(2).
2. Because the BIA considered Petitioner’s “imputed nationality” argument
on de novo review, any error committed by the immigration judge was harmless.
Brezilian v. Holder, 569 F.3d 403, 411 (9th Cir. 2009). Before us, Petitioner does
not challenge the BIA’s conclusion that, by submitting insufficient evidence of
imputed nationality, Petitioner was ineligible for withholding of removal.
3. We lack jurisdiction over Petitioner’s arguments as to the merits of his
asylum application. Petitioner does not challenge the determination that his
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asylum application was time-barred, and thus he has failed to exhaust
administrative remedies. Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2004).
4. We lack jurisdiction over the question whether the immigration judge
violated due process when denying Petitioner’s application under the Convention
Against Torture. The BIA correctly determined that Petitioner did not
meaningfully raise this argument on appeal from the immigration judge’s decision
and, similarly, he fails to raise it sufficiently here. Id.
PETITION DENIED IN PART and DISMISSED IN PART.
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