Jehan Zeb Mir, M.d. v. Ten Unknown Fbi Agents, in Personal, Individual Capacities as Doe 1-10;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JEHAN ZEB MIR, M.D.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
TEN UNKNOWN FBI AGENTS, in
Personal, Individual Capacities as Doe 1-10;
et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 20-55739
D.C. No. 2:16-cv-03664-JFW-PJW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 8, 2021**
Before: CANBY, TASHIMA, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
Jehan Zeb Mir, M.D. appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his action brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging federal and state law
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
NOV 17 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 20-55739
claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a
dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler, 627
F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Mir’s action because Mir failed to
allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See id. at 341-42 (although pro se
pleadings are construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations
sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for misconduct alleged.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mir’s requests to
take depositions before the parties conferred pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(f). See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting
forth standard of review and explaining that a trial court has broad discretion to
permit or deny discovery); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1) (a party generally
“may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have conferred as
required by Rule 26(f)”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mir’s motion to
disqualify the magistrate judge because Mir failed to establish any ground for
disqualification. See United States v. McTiernan, 695 F.3d 882, 891-92 (9th Cir.

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3 20-55739
2012) (setting forth standard of review and circumstances requiring
disqualification).
We reject as without merit Mir’s contention that the district court erred by
not entering default judgment against certain defendants.
Averbuch and Lazimi Lock & Key’s motion to take judicial notice is denied
as unnecessary.
AFFIRMED.

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