Kimberly Hope Williams v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KIMBERLY HOPE WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 20-35654
D.C. No. 6:16-cv-01970-CL
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Mark D. Clarke, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 10, 2021**
Seattle, Washington
Before: GOULD, TALLMAN, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
This appeal arises from the denial of Appellant Kimberly Williams’s
Applications for Supplemental Security Income and Disability Insurance Benefits
(“Applications”). The district court affirmed the agency’s denial of Appellant’s
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
DEC 1 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Applications after the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that Appellant was
not disabled. Specifically, the ALJ found that Appellant was not disabled because,
even considering Appellant’s impairments, Appellant was capable of making a
successful adjustment to other work that existed in the national economy in
significant numbers.
We review the district court’s judgment affirming the ALJ’s denial of
benefits de novo, Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008), “and
reverse only if the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence in the
record as a whole or if the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard.” Molina v.
Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012).
First, Appellant argues that the ALJ erred by not considering Appellant’s
testimony because the ALJ discounted Appellant’s testimony on adverse credibility
grounds and on the additional grounds that it was contrary to the objective medical
evidence.
In assessing Appellant’s claims, the ALJ properly found that Appellant’s
various physical and mental conditions were not supported by clinical findings
required to meet or medically equal criteria of any listing under which Appellant’s
disabilities would fall. Specifically, Appellant’s longstanding physician and
several other examining physicians indicated that Appellant’s symptoms were
stable and had not worsened as she suggests. The ALJ properly discounted

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Appellant’s testimony because it was contrary to the objective medical evidence.
“Contradiction with the medical record is a sufficient basis for rejecting the
claimant’s subjective testimony.” Carmickle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 533
F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008).
Next, Appellant argues that the ALJ erred by not properly evaluating
Appellant’s ability to perform work on a regular and sustained basis consistent
with SSR 96-8p. SSR 96-8p governs the assessment of a person’s residual
functional capacity (“RFC”). Titles II & XVI: Assessing Residual Functional
Capacity in Initial Claims, SSR 96-8P (S.S.A. July 2, 1996). One of SSR 96-8p’s
principal purposes emphasizes that the “RFC is an assessment of an individual’s
ability to do sustained work-related physical and mental activities in a work setting
on a regular and continuing basis.” “A ‘regular and continuing basis’ means 8
hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule.” Id. The RFC
assessment must discuss “why reported symptom-related functional limitations and
restrictions can or cannot reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical
and other evidence.” Id.
The crux of Appellant’s argument about SSR 96-8p is that the ALJ should
have considered Appellant Williams’s testimony. This argument challenges the
ALJ’s adverse credibility determination of Appellant on the grounds that her
subjective testimony was not supported by the findings of several examining

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physicians. “Contradiction with the medical record is a sufficient basis for
rejecting the claimant’s subjective testimony.” Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1161. The
ALJ was not required to consider Appellant’s subjective testimony in light of the
adverse credibility findings. The ALJ considered all the required information in
assessing Appellant’s RFC, including a discussion of why Appellant’s reported
symptom-related functional limitations and restrictions cannot reasonably be
accepted as consistent with the medical and other evidence. The ALJ assessed the
medical opinions of Drs. Hahn, Friedburg, Lundblad, Belcher, Weller, Butt, and
Lebow in concluding that Appellant’s fatigue and pain testimony were
unsupported.
AFFIRMED.

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