John Melnik v. Romeo Aranas

20-15471Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitDec 6, 2021

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOHN MELNIK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ROMEO ARANAS,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 20-15471
D.C. No.
2:17-cv-02378-JCM-EJY
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 17, 2021
San Francisco, California
Before: SCHROEDER, W. FLETCHER, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
John Melnik appeals from the district court’s decision granting summary
judgment to Dr. Romeo Aranas in this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Melnik, a
Nevada state prisoner, alleges that for more than a year he was denied treatment for
hepatitis C in violation of the Nevada Department of Corrections’ (NDOC) own
medical directive and contrary to physician recommendations. He sued Dr. Aranas,
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
FILED
DEC 6 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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the prison medical director and chairman of the committee that repeatedly denied
him treatment, for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, in violation
of the Eighth Amendment. The district court determined that Dr. Aranas was
entitled to qualified immunity. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1291, and
we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
We review de novo an order granting summary judgment based on qualified
immunity. Horton v. City of Santa Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 606 (9th Cir. 2019). Dr.
Aranas is entitled to qualified immunity unless (1) the disputed facts taken in the
light most favorable to Melnik show that his conduct violated a constitutional right,
and (2) the constitutional right was clearly established at the time he acted. Tolan
v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655–56 (2014); Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822, 824
(2015) (per curiam).
1. Melnik suffered a deprivation of a constitutional right. An inmate
alleging a denial of medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment must show
that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096
(9th Cir. 2006). Dr. Aranas concedes that hepatitis C is a serious medical need,
leaving only the question of deliberate indifference. While that standard is a
demanding one requiring more than ordinary malpractice, a prison official acts
with deliberate indifference by unduly delaying necessary medical treatment for

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non-medical reasons. See Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066, 1068–70 (9th
Cir. 2014); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122–23 (9th Cir. 2012).
Physicians repeatedly referred Melnik to the prison’s hepatitis C committee
for treatment, and treatment was repeatedly denied. Dr. Aranas’s own medical
expert opined that denying Melnik treatment was “inconsistent with NDOC policy
and with the standard of care at the time,” regardless of “whether or not subsequent
tests fell a little below [the] threshold” that NDOC required to begin treatment.
That Melnik eventually received treatment does not excuse the months-long delay.
Dr. Aranas suggests that the delay may not have caused long-term damage to
Melnik’s health, but the extent of the harm caused by the delay is a disputed
question of fact not appropriately answered at this stage. On this record, viewed in
the light most favorable to Melnik, Dr. Aranas was deliberately indifferent to
Melnik’s serious medical need.
2. Dr. Aranas may be held liable for his personal involvement in denying
treatment to Melnik. Section 1983 claims cannot be based on vicarious liability;
instead, a supervisor may be held liable only “if he or she was personally involved
in the constitutional deprivation or a sufficient causal connection exists between
the supervisor’s unlawful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Lemire v.
California Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2013)
(quoting Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 418 (9th Cir. 2003)). There is

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significant evidence of Dr. Aranas’s personal involvement. He discussed the
situation with Melnik and responded to one of his grievances requesting treatment.
And Dr. Aranas was chair of the two-person committee making approvals and
handing down denials. In fact, Dr. Aranas admitted that “[i]t was me as the Chair
of the Hepatitis C Committee that approved Mr. Melnik for treatment,” an
admission that supports an inference that it was he who denied the earlier requests
for treatment. There is, accordingly, at least a question of fact as to whether Dr.
Aranas was personally responsible for the delay.
3. By 2016, numerous decisions of this and other circuits would have
placed a reasonable official on notice that denying an inmate hepatitis C treatment
for non-medical reasons would violate the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Andrews
v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that hepatitis C “quite
obviously cause[s] serious health problems, and can result in death”). Taken in the
light most favorable to Melnik, the record shows that treatment was denied
notwithstanding both physician opinion and prison policy to the contrary. No
medical basis for the delay has been suggested. The district court therefore erred in
holding that Dr. Aranas was entitled to qualified immunity.
REVERSED and REMANDED.

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