Patrick Glenn Goodwin v. Spearman

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK GLENN GOODWIN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
SPEARMAN,
Respondent-Appellee.
No. 19-17220
D.C. No. 1:17-cv-01604-JLT
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Jennifer L. Thurston, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 10, 2021**
San Francisco, California
Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and IKUTA and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
Patrick Glenn Goodwin, an incarcerated individual in California, appeals the
district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus
challenging his conviction for battery under California law. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
DEC 16 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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We review the district court’s denial of Goodwin’s § 2254 petition de novo.
Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003). A district court may not
grant a § 2254 petition unless the state court’s decision was (1) “contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”; or (2) “based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Goodwin, who proceeded in propria persona during his state trial court
proceeding, argues that he was denied his constitutional right to testify on his own
behalf when the state trial court declined to reopen evidence to permit him to testify
during the trial.1 The California Court of Appeal found that the state trial court did
not abuse its discretion when the trial court refused to reopen evidence to allow
Goodwin’s testimony.
Goodwin has not shown that the California Court of Appeal’s conclusion that
Goodwin waived his right to testify was objectively unreasonable. See United States
v. Joelson, 7 F.3d 174, 177 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[W]aiver of the right to testify may be
inferred from the defendant's conduct and is presumed from the defendant’s failure
1 After Goodwin filed a petition to proceed in propria persona, the state trial court
judge conducted a Faretta hearing, in which he cautioned Goodwin against
proceeding in propria persona and informed Goodwin that he would be responsible
for all aspects of his criminal trial.

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to testify or notify the court of his desire to do so.”); United States v. Edwards, 897
F.2d 445, 446–47 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the defendant waived his right to
testify when “[n]either the prosecution nor the court was given any reason to think
the defendant desired to testify”).
Goodwin claims that the state trial court violated his constitutional right to
testify under Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987). The California Court of Appeal
concluded that permitting Goodwin to testify would have resulted in the
“consumption of court resources” and would have likely required the prosecution to
call rebuttal witnesses. Under Rock, restrictions on a defendant’s right to testify
“may not be arbitrary and disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to
serve.” Id. at 56. “‘Arbitrary’ in this context means without a basis in reason or
law.” Williams v. Borg, 139 F.3d 737, 740 (9th Cir. 1998). Goodwin has not shown
that this conclusion was objectively unreasonable. United States v. Pino-Noriega,
189 F.3d 1089, 1095 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that a defendant’s right to testify “may,
in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal
trial process” quoting Rock, 483 U.S. at 55)); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (“In the exercise of this right, the accused, as is required of the
State, must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to
assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilty and innocence.”);
United States v Orozco, 764 F.3d 997, 1002 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding that a trial court

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a trial court “may refuse to permit an accused to reopen his case, and present
additional evidence, where there is insufficient reason for the accused’s failure to
offer evidence at the proper time”).
We decline to reach Goodwin’s challenges to the California Court of Appeal’s
factual findings, which he raises for the first time on appeal. Picard v. Connor, 404
U.S. 270, 275 (1971); Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230–31 (9th Cir. 2002).
Goodwin’s petition is therefore DENIED.

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