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21-15644•Anthony Ruben Aldo Barbieri v. Timeshare Liquidators LLC; Stan Mullis
21-15644Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitDec 21, 2021
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANTHONY RUBEN ALDO BARBIERI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
TIMESHARE LIQUIDATORS LLC; STAN
MULLIS,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 21-15644
D.C. No. 2:18-cv-00355-JAD-EJY
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Jennifer A. Dorsey, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 14, 2021**
Before: WALLACE, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Anthony Ruben Aldo Barbieri appeals pro se from the district court’s
judgment dismissing his Title VII employment discrimination action. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for plain error the district judge’s
decision not to recuse. United States v. Spangle, 626 F.3d 488, 495 (9th Cir.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
DEC 21 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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2 21-15644
2010). We affirm.
In his opening brief, Barbieri fails to raise, and has therefore waived, any
challenge to the district court’s judgment dismissing his action. See Indep. Towers
of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e will not
consider any claims that were not actually argued in appellant’s opening brief.”);
Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle, 7 F.3d 139, 144 (9th Cir. 1993) (issues not supported by
argument in pro se appellant’s opening brief are waived).
The district judge did not plainly err in choosing not to recuse herself
because no reasonable person would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might
reasonably be questioned. See Mayes v. Leipziger, 729 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir.
1984) (standard for recusal); see also 28 U.S.C. § 455. We reject as meritless
Barbieri’s contentions that the district judge was required to recuse because she
briefly presided over a case in which Timeshare Liquidators, LLC was a defendant
and made rulings against Barbieri in the present case.
AFFIRMED.
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