Leticia Diaz-Jimenez v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LETICIA DIAZ-JIMENEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 20-71012
Agency No. A202-014-594
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted December 14, 2021**
Before: WALLACE, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Leticia Diaz-Jimenez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of
the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying her motion to remand
and dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying
administrative closure. We review for abuse of discretion the BIA’s denial of a
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
DEC 22 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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motion to remand. Movsisian v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2005).
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition for review.
The IJ and BIA did not abuse their discretion in denying administrative
closure. See Gonzalez-Caraveo v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 885, 891-93 (9th Cir. 2018)
(holding the non-exhaustive list of factors in Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec.
688 (BIA 2012), provides a standard for reviewing administrative closure
decisions). We reject as unsupported by the record Diaz-Jimenez’s contentions
that the IJ failed to consider the proper factors or sufficiently explain his decision
and that the BIA engaged in improper fact-finding.
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Diaz-Jimenez’s motion to
remand where she failed to establish prima facie eligibility for post-conclusion
voluntary departure. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(c)(1); Ramirez-Munoz v. Lynch, 816
F.3d 1226, 1228 (9th Cir. 2016) (the BIA may deny a motion to reopen for failure
to establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought); see also Romero-Ruiz v.
Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The formal requirements of a
motion to remand and a motion to reopen are the same.”), overruled on other
grounds by Cheneau v. Garland, 997 F.3d 916, 925-26 (9th Cir. 2021).
The stay of removal remains in place until issuance of the mandate.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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