Baljit Singh v. PATRICK COVELLO, Warden

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BALJIT SINGH,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
PATRICK COVELLO, Warden,
Respondent-Appellee.
No. 20-17357
D.C. No.
2:16-cv-02517-KJM-AC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Kimberly J. Mueller, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 17, 2021
San Francisco, California
Before: WATFORD and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and KORMAN,** District
Judge.
California state prisoner Baljit Singh appeals from the district court’s denial
of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. We have jurisdiction under § 2253, and
we affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
FILED
DEC 30 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Singh was sentenced to sixteen years to life in prison following his 2011
conviction for the second-degree murder of his wife. Because Singh pursued an
insanity defense, his trial was bifurcated into a guilt phase and a subsequent sanity
phase, pursuant to California law. See Cal. Penal Code § 1026(a). Prior to the
guilt phase of trial, two court-appointed mental health experts examined Singh and
concluded that he suffered from mental illness and that that illness rendered him
legally insane at the time of the murder. While the latter testimony about his sanity
would not have been admissible at the guilt phase, Singh argues that his attorney’s
decision not to have these experts at the guilt phase testify about his mental illness
apart from his sanity constituted deficient performance.
After the jury found Singh guilty of second-degree murder and the
California Court of Appeal upheld the conviction.1 Singh sought postconviction
relief in state court, contending that his trial counsel’s decision not to introduce the
favorable expert testimony at the guilt phase—either to negate malice or intent to
kill or to support a lesser-included manslaughter offense—rendered her assistance
constitutionally deficient under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
The California Supreme Court summarily denied relief. Singh then petitioned for
1 Singh continued his direct appeal by petitioning for review in the
California Supreme Court, but the court denied Singh’s petition, and Singh never
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, so the
judgment became final.

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federal habeas relief on this same ineffective assistance of counsel theory. A
magistrate judge recommended that his petition be denied, and the district court
adopted the recommendation, while issuing a certificate of appealability. We
review the petition de novo. Doody v. Ryan, 649 F.3d 986, 1001 (9th Cir. 2011)
(en banc).
A Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel claim has two components.
“First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient,” and
“[s]econd, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Singh’s petition is governed by the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) and may not
be granted unless the state court’s adjudication resulted in a decision that was: (1)
“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”; or (2)
“based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).
The California Supreme Court would not have been unreasonable in
concluding that Singh did not demonstrate prejudice.2 Singh failed to articulate
2 Singh alleges that the standard of review for prejudice is de novo, but that
is incorrect. In the cases Singh cites for support, the state courts considered either
the deficiency or prejudice prong in a reasoned opinion and declined to reach the
other Strickland prong. See Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 37 (2009) (per
curiam); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.
510, 518 (2003); Miles v. Ryan, 713 F.3d 477, 486-87 (9th Cir. 2013). When a

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any concrete theory regarding how the expert testimony, or other evidence related
to his mental health, could have been used at the guilt phase to change the result of
that proceeding. In particular, Singh did not contextualize the expert testimony in
a manner that makes clear its admissibility. Indeed, in his briefing, he relies on
expert testimony that he suffered from a schizoaffective disorder without in any
way explaining how that related to the elements of the guilt phase. Moreover, he
has not explained what other mental health evidence he might have offered that
would have been admissible at the guilt phase. See People v. Elmore, 325 P.3d
951, 965-66 (Cal. 2014); People v. McGehee, 201 Cal. Rptr. 3d 714, 729-30 (Cal.
App. 2016).
And even assuming the expert testimony’s admissibility at the guilt phase, it
is not clear that introducing the testimony would have made a difference. The
Supreme Court has held that, “actual ineffectiveness claims alleging a deficiency
in attorney performance are subject to a general requirement that the defendant
affirmatively prove prejudice,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. Singh failed to meet
that requirement. Specifically, in the sanity phase, the jury considered the
testimony that Singh argues should have been introduced at the guilt phase. But
state court summarily rejects a claim without a reasoned opinion, as it did here, the
federal habeas court must determine the arguments or theories that could have
supported the state court’s decision and then must evaluate those arguments under
AEDPA. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011).

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the jury rejected the experts’ opinions that Singh was insane at the time of the
murder. Thus, it would not be unreasonable for the California Supreme Court to
have concluded that there was not “a reasonable probability that . . . the result of
the proceeding would have been different” if the testimony had been introduced at
the guilt phase. Id. at 694.
AFFIRMED.

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