United States of America v. ARTURO IBARRA, AKA Fat Boy, AKA Tury

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ARTURO IBARRA, AKA Fat Boy, AKA
Tury,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 21-10255
D.C. No. 1:19-cr-00049-DKW-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
Derrick K. Watson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 19, 2022**
Before: SILVERMAN, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Arturo Ibarra appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion for
compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, see United States v.
Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 2021), we affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JAN 25 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Ibarra sought compassionate release on the grounds that his health
conditions made him particularly vulnerable if he were to contract COVID-19 and
that he should have been granted safety valve relief at sentencing. The district
court denied the motion, concluding that the risk to Ibarra from COVID-19,
whether considered alone or in combination with his alleged safety valve
eligibility, was insufficient to establish extraordinary and compelling
circumstances and did not justify relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Ibarra argues
that the district court abused its discretion because it (1) did not appreciate the
difference between a substantial assistance departure and a safety valve reduction
when it applied the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and (2) failed to recognize that it
was precluded from considering at the original sentencing whether the § 3553(a)
factors justified a sentence lower than 63 months.
Ibarra’s claims are not supported by the record, which reflects that the court
assumed Ibarra’s safety valve eligibility,1 further assumed that Ibarra would have
received a 4-level substantial assistance reduction in addition to the safety valve
reduction, and then analyzed whether those circumstances, along with the
mitigating arguments Ibarra asserted, justified a lower sentence under § 3553(a).
That the court concluded that Ibarra’s sentence should not be reduced does not
1 We assume, without deciding, that changes in sentencing law can be considered
in evaluating a compassionate release motion.

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reflect that it misunderstood its own § 3553(a) analysis from the original
sentencing or failed to consider all of Ibarra’s mitigating arguments. Nor are we
persuaded that the court was required to give less weight to the seriousness of the
offense, and more weight to his mitigating circumstances, in light of his alleged
safety valve eligibility. See United States v. Gutierrez-Sanchez, 587 F.3d 904, 908
(9th Cir. 2009) (“The weight to be given the various factors in a particular case is
for the discretion of the district court.”). The court acknowledged Ibarra’s medical
conditions and post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts, and accepted Ibarra’s
assertion of safety valve eligibility, but concluded that those circumstances did not
justify relief in light of Ibarra’s vaccination status, his recovery from a prior
COVID-19 infection, the low number of infections in his prison, and the applicable
§ 3553(a) factors. It did not abuse its discretion in reaching this conclusion.
AFFIRMED.

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