Rojan Bermejo Teves v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROJAN BERMEJO TEVES,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 17-71247
Agency No. A204-271-056
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 10, 2022**
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and O’SCANNLAIN and GRABER, Circuit
Judges.
Rojan Bermejo Teves petitions for review of the denial of his motion to
reopen before the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). As the facts are known
to the parties, we repeat them only as necessary to explain our decision.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
FEB 14 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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After an immigration judge denied Teves’s request for voluntary departure,
Teves appealed that decision to the BIA. The BIA affirmed the denial of voluntary
departure. Teves then filed a motion to reopen, “request[ing] the opportunity to
apply for asylum” and related relief. Teves contended that while his appeal was
proceeding, Rodrigo Duterte had become president of the Philippines and had
begun to wage a “war on drugs,” resulting in thousands of “extrajudicial killings.”
The BIA denied the motion, concluding that Teves failed to “demonstrat[e] that he
is at any individualized risk of harm, including persecution or torture, in his native
country,” primarily because he “has not alleged that he is a criminal, or in any
manner involved in illicit drugs, or that he would be targeted on any other basis by
the Duterte government.”
Teves challenges only the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen. He asserts
that the BIA abused its discretion when it purportedly failed to discuss Teves’s
“eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal based on his political opinion”
and “failed to provide a clear picture and understanding of its reasoning.” We
disagree.
As an initial matter, the Government contends we lack jurisdiction to
consider Teves’s challenge because, the Government asserts, Teves never
presented to the BIA his “political opinion” argument. The Government’s support
is its assertion that Teves “concedes that ‘the argument presented [in his brief] was

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never raised in [his] motion to reopen.’ Pet’r Br. at 14, n. 2.” But the purported
concession to which the Government refers is as follows: “The government has
previously argued that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the issues raised in this
petition for review as the argument presented here was never raised in the
Petitioner’s motion to reopen.” Teves was accordingly referring to the
Government’s own prior argument in its opposition to Teves’s motion to stay
removal. In fairness, Teves does then state, cryptically and without further
analysis, that any failure to exhaust would not “bar review of the issue raised in
this appeal and for the first time in Teves’ opening brief.” But this statement is no
concession; it simply anticipates the Government’s jurisdictional argument, which
the Government had already previewed during briefing on Teves’s motion to stay.
On the merits, however, Teves is unable to demonstrate a future risk of
individualized persecution. Because Teves cannot show past persecution, he must
show that he reasonably fears future persecution, which requires an
“individualized, rather than a generalized, risk of persecution.” Bhasin v.
Gonzales, 423 F.3d 977, 984 (9th Cir. 2005). Yet, as the BIA correctly explained,
Teves’s “fear of generalized lawlessness[,] . . . without more, is not a basis for
asylum or withholding of removal.” In Teves’s asylum application, submitted with
his motion to reopen, he contended that he would be “subject to lawless acts of
violence, widespread civil unrest, and, in general, the illegal acts of a government

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that” violates “the rights and freedoms of all Filipinos.” As is evident, Teves’s
own “general” description of “widespread civil unrest” and “illegal acts” that affect
“all Filipinos” is not individualized.
Teves also asserts that the BIA failed to consider his “political opinion”:
that is, Teves’s “position against Duterte’s threats of invoking martial law and . . .
apparent shift towards authoritarian rule.” Yet Teves points to nothing in the
record that “compels” a finding he has any such political opinion. See I.N.S. v.
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992). Nor could he, as he submitted no
personalized evidence beyond the “general” statements already discussed in
connection with his motion to reopen. And even if he had sufficient opinion
evidence, Teves never explains how such evidence would then “compel[]” a
finding that he will be persecuted. See id. “He has not done so with the degree of
clarity necessary to permit reversal of a BIA finding to the contrary; indeed, he has
not done so at all.” Id.
PETITION DENIED.

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