Yecheng Du v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
YECHENG DU,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 15-73064
Agency No. A201-187-752
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 16, 2022**
San Francisco, California
Before: SILER,*** S.R. THOMAS, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Yecheng Du, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of the Board
of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of his applications for asylum,
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
FILED
FEB 18 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. We
have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny Du’s petition.
Du argues that the BIA erred in upholding the immigration judge’s (“IJ”)
adverse credibility finding. “We review factual findings, including adverse
credibility determinations, for substantial evidence.” Iman v. Barr, 972 F.3d 1058,
1064 (9th Cir. 2020). “The agency’s ‘findings of fact are conclusive unless any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’” Silva-
Pereira v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 1176, 1184 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B)).
The BIA affirmed the IJ’s adverse credibility determination based on
conflicting and implausible testimony regarding several subjects. First, Du alleges
he entered the United States in 2010 to continue to practice Christianity, but he was
not baptized until March 2014, just prior to his immigration hearing. Du attributed
the delay to his inability to take time off work prior to March 2014, but the IJ
found this explanation to be implausible and inconsistent with his testimony that
his employer regularly allowed him to take time off and travel; indeed, at one point
his employer let him take nearly two months off work.
Second, the IJ found that Du lied on his visa application regarding his true
intent in traveling to the United States. Du was admitted to the United States to
attend the University of Detroit Mercy, but he never attended the school and the

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record is devoid of any indication he ever intended to do so. Du’s briefing does
not attempt to explain why he did not seek to further his education in the United
States.
Third, Du’s recitation of his employment history was not consistent. During
his hearing, he stated multiple times that he worked for Happy Feet Massage Spa.
But in his recitation of the employment history he submitted after his hearing, Du
stated that he worked for Paradise Foot Spa and did not mention Happy Feet
Massage Spa at all.
Fourth, there were inconsistencies in the record regarding Du’s residence.
Du testified that his driver’s license and his tax returns listed an address in
Monterey Park, California, during 2012–13. However, this address did not appear
in Du’s summary of his residence history that he submitted after his hearing. His
post-hearing submission also stated that he lived and worked in Texas for six
months in 2013, a fact which he never mentioned during his hearing.
Du contends that these discrepancies did not enhance his claims for relief
and thus cannot support the adverse credibility finding. But following the REAL
ID Act, inconsistencies no longer need to go to the heart of the petitioner’s claim to
support an adverse credibility determination. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034,
1046–47 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, the combination of the implausible and
inconsistent testimony cited by the IJ and Du’s failure to address why he lied in his

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visa application constitute substantial evidence in support of the IJ’s finding, and
Du has failed to show the record compels the conclusion he testified truthfully.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). In the absence of credible testimony, we agree with
the BIA that the remaining objective evidence in the record is insufficient to
support Du’s claims for relief.
The petition for review is DENIED.

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