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15-73781•Yunita Theresia Liana Lie v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General
15-73781Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitFeb 18, 2022
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
YUNITA THERESIA LIANA LIE,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 15-73781
Agency No. A089-880-599
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 16, 2022**
Pasadena, California
Before: BRESS and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and GLEASON,*** District
Judge.
Yunita Lie, a citizen of Indonesia, petitions for review of a Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision dismissing her appeal of an Immigration Judge
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Sharon L. Gleason, United States District Judge for
the District of Alaska, sitting by designation.
FILED
FEB 18 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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(IJ) order denying her claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under
the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We review for substantial evidence and
may grant relief only if the record compels a contrary conclusion. Yali Wang v.
Sessions, 861 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 2017). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252, and we deny the petition.1
1. To obtain withholding of removal, Lie must establish a clear probability
of future persecution on account of a protected ground. See Zi Lin Chen v. Ashcroft,
362 F.3d 611, 617 (9th Cir. 2004); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2). The record does not
compel the conclusion that Lie made this showing.
The BIA reasonably determined that the harm Lie experienced in Indonesia
did not rise to the level of past persecution. See Nagoulko v. INS, 333 F.3d 1012,
1016 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Persecution . . . is an extreme concept that does not include
every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.” (quotations omitted)); see
also Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1060–63 (9th Cir. 2021) (identifying factors
considered in analyzing past persecution). Here, Lie was not physically harmed,
most of the events occurred decades earlier when she was a child, and a later robbery
reflected a criminal rather than persecutory act. The BIA could conclude these
allegations of past persecution are insufficient. See Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1063 (noting
1 Lie does not challenge the BIA’s determination that her asylum claim was
untimely. She has thus forfeited any challenge to the denial of asylum. See
Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996).
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that key factors for establishing past persecution include “physical violence and
resulting serious injuries, frequency of harm, specific threats combined with
confrontation, length and quality of detention, harm to family and close friends,
economic deprivation, and general societal turmoil”).
The BIA also reasonably determined that Lie had not demonstrated an
individualized risk of persecution on account of being Chinese and Catholic distinct
from her membership in these disfavored groups. See Halim v. Holder, 590 F.3d
971, 979 (9th Cir. 2009) (requiring a “unique risk of persecution” that is “distinct
from the petitioner’s mere membership in a disfavored group”) (quoting Lolong v.
Gonzales, 484 F.3d 1173, 1180 n.5 (9th Cir. 2007)). The BIA could reasonably
conclude that Lie had not presented evidence that would support this showing,
especially considering the lack of any past physical harm and the fact that her family
still resides in Indonesia.
2. Lie also argues that the agency violated her due process rights by
“cherry picking positive statements in the record, while excluding evidence of
violence against Christians.” To establish a due process violation, Lie must show
both that the proceeding was “so fundamentally unfair that [she] was prevented from
reasonably presenting [her] case” and prejudice, “which means that the outcome of
the proceeding may have been affected by the alleged violation.” Colmenar v. INS,
210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2000). Lie has not made this showing. There is no
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indication that the BIA failed to consider Lie’s arguments, and the BIA was not
required to address in writing every piece of evidence Lie submitted. See Garcia v.
Holder, 749 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2014).
3. To obtain CAT relief, Lie must show that government officials or
private actors with government consent would more likely than not torture her if she
is returned to Indonesia. See Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1033 (9th
Cir. 2014); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). The record does not compel the conclusion
that Lie made this showing. Lie has not demonstrated past torture, and the record
does not require the conclusion that Lie would be tortured with the participation or
consent of the Indonesian government. See Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1068
(9th Cir. 2009).
PETITION DENIED.
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