Larry De Silva Sumala v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LARRY DE SILVA SUMALA,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 19-73160
Agency No. A094-912-730
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 15, 2022**
Before: FERNANDEZ, TASHIMA, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Larry De Silva Sumala, a native and citizen of the Philippines, petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to
remand and dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision
denying his motion for a continuance. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
FEB 24 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 19-73160
§ 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a continuance, Ahmed v.
Holder, 569 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2009), and the denial of a motion to remand,
Movsisian v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny the petition
for review.
The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Sumala’s motion for a
continuance where he failed to demonstrate good cause. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29
(an IJ may grant a continuance for good cause shown); see also Ahmed, 569 F.3d at
1012 (court reviews the denial of a continuance on a case by case basis in
consideration of a non-exhaustive list of factors).
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Sumala’s motion to remand,
where he failed to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief. See Lopez-
Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The BIA is entitled to
deny a motion to reopen where the applicant fails to demonstrate prima facie
eligibility for the underlying relief.”) (citation omitted); Rodriguez v. INS, 841 F.2d
865, 867 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The formal requirements of the motion to reopen and
those of the motion to remand are for all practical purposes the same.”).
We reject as unsupported by the record Sumala’s contentions that he was
improperly denied the opportunity to apply for voluntary departure because the
record demonstrates Sumala did not apply for voluntary departure before the IJ.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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