Dirk Ja'ong Bouie v. R. WILLOX; V. WIHLIDAL, Deputy District Attorney; FIELDER, Correctional Counselor

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DIRK JA'ONG BOUIE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
R. WILLOX; V. WIHLIDAL, Deputy
District Attorney; FIELDER, Correctional
Counselor,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 20-17168
D.C. No. 2:16-cv-00624-JAM-AC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 15, 2022**
San Francisco, California
Before: FERNANDEZ, TASHIMA, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Dirk Ja’ong Bouie appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Williams v.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
FEB 24 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015) (summary judgment); Hebbe v.
Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010) (dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6)). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Bouie’s retaliation
claim because Bouie failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and failed to
raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether administrative remedies were
effectively unavailable to him. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 638, 641-44
(2016) (holding that an inmate must exhaust such administrative remedies as are
available before bringing suit, and describing limited circumstances in which
administrative remedies are unavailable); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006)
(explaining proper exhaustion requires “using all steps that the agency holds out,
and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits)”
(emphasis, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed Bouie’s access-to-courts claim because
Bouie failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate that he suffered an actual
injury. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349-53 (1996) (describing elements of
an access-to-courts claim and actual injury requirement); Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 341-
42 (holding that although pro se pleadings are construed liberally, a plaintiff must
present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bouie’s motion to

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strike defendants’ reply because Bouie failed to demonstrate any error or prejudice.
See Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1224 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Evidentiary rulings
made in the context of summary judgment motions are reviewed for abuse of
discretion and can only be reversed if [they were] both manifestly erroneous and
prejudicial.” (alteration in original, citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bouie’s motions for
appointment of counsel because Bouie failed to demonstrate exceptional
circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting
forth standard of review and “exceptional circumstances” requirement for
appointment of counsel).
AFFIRMED.

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