United States of America v. MURVILLE LAVELLE LAMPKIN, AKA Lamar

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MURVILLE LAVELLE LAMPKIN, AKA
Lamar,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 21-30154
D.C. No.
3:15-cr-00005-SLG-DMS-5
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska
Sharon L. Gleason, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 15, 2022**
Before: FERNANDEZ, TASHIMA, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Murville Lavelle Lampkin appeals from the district court’s orders denying
his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) and his
subsequent motion for reconsideration. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review for abuse of discretion, see United States v. Keller, 2 F.4th
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAR 1 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 3 --

2 21-30154
1278, 1281 (9th Cir. 2021), and we affirm.
Lampkin contends that the district court erred by failing to recognize the
gravity of his medical conditions in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and by
concluding that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors weighed against relief. Contrary to
Lampkin’s first argument, the district court considered Lampkin’s circumstances
and reasonably concluded that his medical conditions did not rise to the level of
extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting release. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Moreover, the district court did not rely on any clearly
erroneous facts in reaching this conclusion. See United States v. Graf, 610 F.3d
1148, 1157 (9th Cir. 2010) (“A finding is clearly erroneous if it is illogical,
implausible, or without support in the record.”). The district court also did not
abuse its discretion in concluding that release was unwarranted in light of the
§ 3553(a) sentencing factors, including the nature and circumstances of the offense
and Lampkin’s criminal history. See Keller, 2 F.4th at 1284. Finally, the court’s
decision to deny relief under the § 3553(a) factors was not, as Lampkin advances,
inconsistent with the court’s previous comments that the mandatory minimum
sentence was “wrong.”
The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to hold an
evidentiary hearing because, as the district court observed, the evidence Lampkin
sought to develop would not have affected the court’s decision. See United States

-- 2 of 3 --

3 21-30154
v. Townsend, 98 F.3d 510, 513 (9th Cir. 1996).
AFFIRMED.

-- 3 of 3 --