ELIZABETH SANCHEZ FERNANDEZ, AKA Sandra Hilda Aguilar Campoverde, AKA Dora Fernandez… v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ELIZABETH SANCHEZ FERNANDEZ,
AKA Sandra Hilda Aguilar Campoverde,
AKA Dora Fernandez Ortiz,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 18-73395
Agency No. A208-924-401
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 9, 2022**
Pasadena, California
Before: IKUTA, LEE, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
Elizabeth Sanchez Fernandez seeks review of a decision of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the decision of an immigration judge (IJ)
FILED
MAR 14 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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denying her claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
Because the BIA conducted its own review of the evidence and law, “our review is
limited to the BIA’s decision, except to the extent the IJ’s opinion is expressly
adopted.” Rodriguez v. Holder, 683 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up).
The immigration court was vested with jurisdiction over Sanchez
Fernandez’s case. Sanchez Fernandez received a Notice to Appear (NTA), and
well before the hearing, she also received a Notice of Hearing that specified the
time, date, and location of the hearing. See Aguilar Fermin v. Barr, 958 F.3d 887,
889, 893–95 (9th Cir. 2020); see also Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158,
1160–61 (9th Cir. 2019). We reject Sanchez Fernandez’s argument that the Notice
of Hearing she received was deficient because it did not reference a specific NTA
or specify the legal issues or charges involved because the regulations do not
require the inclusion of such information. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.13, 1003.14,
1003.15, 1003.18.
Because Aguilar Fermin and Karingithi have not been overruled by a higher
authority or superseded by agency opinion, we remain bound by them, and reject
Sanchez Fernandez’s argument to the contrary. See Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d
383, 390 n.4 (9th Cir. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of
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Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1 (2013). Sanchez Fernandez’s reliance on Pereira v.
Sessions, 138 S.Ct. 2105 (2018), is misplaced, because Pereira has no application
to the jurisdiction of the immigration court, see Karingithi, 913 F.3d at 1160–61.
We uphold the agency’s denial of Sanchez Fernandez’s claims for asylum
and withholding of removal. The BIA’s determination that Sanchez Fernandez
failed to show a nexus between future persecution and her family membership was
supported by substantial evidence because nothing in the record suggests that the
criminals Sanchez Fernandez had encountered had any motivation other than
financial gain. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010). Further,
Sanchez Fernandez testified that her son and daughter currently live in Mexico and
have not suffered mistreatment. The BIA’s determination that Sanchez Fernandez
was not a member of a protected social group based on her opposition to criminal
activity was supported by substantial evidence because she did not report any
crimes or testify against any criminal. See Pirir-Boc v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1077,
1080, 1084 (9th Cir. 2014); Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1093 (9th
Cir. 2013). While Sanchez Fernandez quarreled with the smuggler she hired to
transport her to the United States, this dispute concerned the quality of the false
document he provided rather than his criminal activities.
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We uphold the agency’s denial of Sanchez Fernandez’s claim for relief
under the CAT. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2); Al-Saher v. INS, 268 F.3d 1143,
1146–47 (9th Cir. 2001) (as amended). The BIA’s determination that Sanchez
Fernandez did not show that it was more likely than not that a government official
would acquiesce to her future torture was supported by substantial evidence.
Although country condition reports indicated the existence of torture and
government corruption within Mexico, Sanchez Fernandez did not provide
evidence showing she faces any ongoing or particularized threat of torture. See
Tzompantzi-Salazar v. Garland, 25 F.4th 752 (9th Cir. 2022). Generalized
evidence of torture in a country is insufficient. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2); see
also Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010); Almaghzar v.
Gonzales, 457 F.3d 915, 923 (9th Cir. 2006).
PETITION DENIED.
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