Marvin G. Hollis v. RISENHOOVER, Nurse Practitioner;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARVIN G. HOLLIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RISENHOOVER, Nurse Practitioner; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 20-16489
D.C. No. 5:17-cv-00326-BLF
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Beth Labson Freeman, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 16, 2022**
Before: SILVERMAN, MILLER, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Marvin G. Hollis appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C § 1983 action alleging deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review de novo, Wilk v. Neven, 956 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2020),
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAR 22 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Hollis failed
to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants were
deliberately indifferent in treating his chronic pain and mental health issues. See
Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057-60 (holding deliberate indifference is a
“high legal standard” requiring a defendant be aware of and disregard an excessive
risk to an inmate’s health; medical malpractice, negligence, and difference of
opinion concerning the course of treatment do not amount to deliberate
indifference).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hollis’s motion for
recusal. See United States v. Johnson, 610 F.3d 1138, 1147 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting
forth standard of review and objective test to determine if recusal is required).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hollis’s motion for
leave to amend his complaint. See Yakama Indian Nation v. State of Wash. Dep’t
of Revenue, 176 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 1999) (setting forth standard of review
and explaining denial of leave to amend is warranted if amendment “would cause
prejudice to the opposing party . . . or creates undue delay”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hollis’s motion to
compel discovery because Hollis failed to establish that denial would result in
actual and substantial prejudice. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th

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Cir. 2002) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a district court’s
“decision to deny discovery will not be disturbed except upon the clearest showing
that denial of discovery results in actual and substantial prejudice to the
complaining litigant” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hollis’s motion for
appointment of counsel because Hollis failed to demonstrate “exceptional
circumstances” warranting appointment. See Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1218
(9th Cir. 2014) (setting forth standard of review and “exceptional circumstances”
requirement for appointment of counsel).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hollis’s motion for
appointment of an expert because such appointment was not necessary for the
court to make its determination. See Walker v. Am. Home Shield Long Term
Disability Plan, 180 F.3d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir. 1999) (setting forth standard of
review for appointment of an expert under Federal Rule of Evidence 706).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hollis’s motion for
judicial notice. See Fed. R. Evid. 201; Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668,
689 (9th Cir. 2001) (standard of review).
We reject as meritless Hollis’s contentions that the district court failed to
liberally construe his pro se pleadings, was biased against him, and improperly
denied him subpoena forms.

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We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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