Joseph Antonetti v. Filson;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOSEPH ANTONETTI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
FILSON; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 20-16795
D.C. No. 3:17-cv-00605-MMD-
CLB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Miranda M. Du, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 16, 2022**
Before: SILVERMAN, MILLER, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
Nevada state prisoner Joseph Antonetti appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state
law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.
Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAR 23 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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The district court properly granted summary judgment on Antonetti’s
deliberate indifference claims regarding his medical diet, pain medication, and leg
restraints because Antonetti failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. See
id. at 1057-60 (a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he or she knows
of and disregards an excessive risk to the prisoner’s health; medical malpractice,
negligence, or a difference of opinion concerning the course of treatment does not
amount to deliberate indifference).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Antonetti’s claim
regarding the right to send mail because Antonetti failed to raise a triable dispute
as to whether defendants interfered with the sending of his mail. See Witherow v.
Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (discussing First Amendment
right to send and receive mail).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Antonetti’s due
process claim regarding his confinement in administrative segregation because
Antonetti failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether he was denied any
procedural protections that were due. See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080,
1100-01 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner,
515 U.S. 472 (1995) (setting forth due process requirements for placement in
administrative segregation and continued segregated confinement); see also

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Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84 (a constitutionally protected liberty interest arises only
when a restraint imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Antonetti’s
retaliation claim regarding the handling of his mail and his placement in
administrative segregation because Antonetti failed to raise a triable dispute as to
whether defendants took an adverse action against him because of his protected
conduct. See Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009) (elements of a
First Amendment retaliation claim in the prison context).
The district court properly dismissed Antonetti’s other federal claims
because Antonetti failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See
Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings
are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible
claim).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Antonetti’s motion
for a further extension of time to amend his complaint. See Ready Transp., Inc. v.
AAR Mfg., Inc., 627 F.3d 402, 404 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of review
and explaining that a district court has inherent power to control its docket).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Antonetti’s motions
to compel because Antonetti did not comply with the federal and local rules or the

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district court’s scheduling order. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th
Cir. 2002) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that the district court is
vested with broad discretion to permit or deny discovery).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Antonetti’s motion
for appointment of counsel because Antonetti failed to demonstrate exceptional
circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting
forth standard of review and “exceptional circumstances” requirement for
appointment of counsel).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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