Peter Casey Cruz v. Brandon Price

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PETER CASEY CRUZ,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
BRANDON PRICE,
Respondent-Appellee.
No. 19-16191
D.C. No.
1:18-cv-01360-AWI-JLT
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Anthony W. Ishii, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 16, 2022
San Francisco, California
Before: CHRISTEN and BRESS, Circuit Judges, and FEINERMAN,** District
Judge.
Peter Cruz, who is detained at Coalinga State Hospital under California’s
Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), appeals the district court’s dismissal of his
habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The Honorable Gary Feinerman, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
FILED
APR 1 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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§ 2253, and we review the district court’s dismissal of Cruz’s habeas petition de
novo. Rynearson v. Ferguson, 903 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2018). We affirm in part,
and vacate and remand in part.
1. The district court correctly abstained from resolving Cruz’s petition
insofar as Cruz sought to enjoin his ongoing SVPA civil commitment proceedings
in state court based on allegedly unconstitutional delay in bringing him to trial. In
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), “the Supreme Court reaffirmed the long-
standing principle that federal courts sitting in equity cannot, absent exceptional
circumstances, enjoin pending state criminal proceedings.” ReadyLink Healthcare,
Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 758 (9th Cir. 2014). This principle
applies to state civil commitment proceedings like this one “that are akin to criminal
prosecutions.” Herrera v. City of Palmdale, 918 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2019).
We have explained that:
Younger abstention is appropriate when: (1) there is an ongoing state
judicial proceeding; (2) the proceeding implicates important state
interests; (3) there is an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings
to raise constitutional challenges; and (4) the requested relief seeks to
enjoin or has the practical effect of enjoining the ongoing state judicial
proceeding.
Page v. King, 932 F.3d 898, 901–02 (9th Cir. 2019) (quotations omitted).
Although Cruz’s request to enjoin his SVPA trial due to allegedly
unconstitutional trial delay meets these factors, Cruz argues extraordinary
circumstances preclude Younger abstention. We disagree. “Only in cases of proven

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harassment or prosecutions undertaken by state officials in bad faith without hope
of obtaining a valid conviction and perhaps in other extraordinary circumstances
where irreparable injury can be shown is federal injunctive relief against pending
state prosecutions appropriate.” Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971). Cruz
has not alleged harassment. And the irreparable harm exception does not apply to
“pre-conviction habeas petitions seeking to vindicate a petitioner’s speedy trial
affirmative defense,” Bean v. Matteucci, 986 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2021),
because that trial right “can be vindicated through reversal of the improperly-
obtained conviction,” Page, 932 F.3d at 904.
The delay in Cruz’s SVPA trial is also, standing alone, not an extraordinary
circumstance. “Younger abstention is appropriate even in cases of extreme delay
where there is no indication that the state court has been ineffective and where the
delay is instead attributable to the petitioner’s quite legitimate efforts in state court
to escape guilt through litigation.” Id. at 902–03 (citations and quotations omitted).
Here, Cruz has not alleged that the state forum is ineffective, and the trial delays are
largely attributable to Cruz’s counsel’s requests for continuances or acquiescence in
the state’s requests. Thus, the district court correctly concluded that Younger
abstention applies to Cruz’s request to enjoin his SVPA proceedings based on delays
in his trial.
2. Cruz also argues that he has been detained without probable cause, in

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violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court did not address this theory,
and the state argues that Cruz did not raise it below. However, Cruz was proceeding
pro se below, and pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally. See Hebbe v. Pliler,
627 F.3d 338, 341–42 (9th Cir. 2010). While we do not fault the district court for
not appreciating Cruz’s Fourth Amendment theory, judicial economy would not be
served by inviting Cruz to file a new § 2241 petition, as opposed to allowing him to
amend his existing one in order more fully to develop this claim. Because Cruz
fairly argues that his Fourth Amendment claim would not be barred under Younger,
see Page, 932 F.3d at 904–05, we remand for the district court to consider Cruz’s
Fourth Amendment theory in the first instance. Considering the amount of time that
Cruz has been detained pending trial, the district court should consider whether it is
appropriate to appoint counsel for Cruz. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B).1
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.
1 The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

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