Nicholas D. Scoyni v. Central Valley Fund L.p. Ii & Iii

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NICHOLAS D. SCOYNI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CENTRAL VALLEY FUND L.P. II & III;
MB FINANCIAL BANK; CVF CAPITAL
PARTNERS; FIFTH THIRD BANCORP;
CENTRAL VALLEY FUND L.P.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 21-35011
D.C. No. 1:20-cv-00402-SEH
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
Sam E. Haddon, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 11, 2022**
Before: McKEOWN, CHRISTEN, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
Nicholas D. Scoyni appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
APR 19 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Int’l, Inc., 874 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 2017) (dismissal under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(2)); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010)
(dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction
Scoyni’s action against defendants CVF Capital Partners and Fifth Third Bancorp
because Scoyni failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that these defendants
had such continuous and systematic contacts with Idaho to establish general
personal jurisdiction, or sufficient claim-related contacts with Idaho to provide the
court with specific personal jurisdiction over them. See Williams v. Yamaha Motor
Co., 851 F.3d 1015, 1020-25 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing requirements for general
and specific personal jurisdiction).
The district court properly dismissed Scoyni’s claims against defendants
Central Valley Fund L.P. II and III because Scoyni failed to allege facts sufficient
to state a plausible claim. See Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352,
1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (elements of a trademark infringement claim); Verity v. USA
Today, 436 P.3d 653, 665 (Idaho 2019) (elements of a defamation claim); Mosell
Equities, LLC v. Berryhill & Co., 297 P.3d 232, 241 (Idaho 2013) (elements of a
breach of contract claim); Galaxy Outdoor Advert. Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dep’t, 710
P.2d 606 (Idaho 1985) (elements of a fraud claim).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney’s fees

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under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) because an alleged commercial relationship formed
the basis of Scoyni’s claims. See Barnard v. Theobald, 721 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th
Cir. 2013) (standard of review); Bridge Tower Dental, P.A. v. Meridian Computer
Ctr., Inc., 272 P.3d 541, 547 (Idaho 2012) (“A commercial transaction formed the
gravamen of the lawsuit because the negligence claim arose out of the commercial
transaction . . . .”). Moreover, the district court did not err by utilizing the lodestar
method to determine whether the attorney’s fees were reasonable. See Gonzalez v.
City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[C]ourts generally apply
the lodestar method to determine what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee.”
(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
We reject as without merit Scoyni’s contentions that the district court erred
by requiring Scoyni’s first amended complaint to comply with the pleading
requirements of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic
Corporation v. Twombly, 550, U.S. 544 (2007) or that the amended judgment was
deficient.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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