United States of America v. Jose Ramon Sanchez-Ramirez

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JOSE RAMON SANCHEZ-RAMIREZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 21-30142
D.C. No. 3:19-cr-00344-JO-1
MEMORANDUM*
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JOSE RAMON SANCHEZ-RAMIREZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 21-30143
D.C. No. 3:16-cr-00162-JO-1
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Robert E. Jones, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 11, 2022
Seattle, Washington
Before: BOGGS,** HURWITZ, and KOH, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
FILED
APR 25 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2
After Jose Sanchez-Ramirez was indicted for illegal reentry in violation of 8
U.S.C. § 1326, he moved to dismiss the indictment, collaterally attacking a 2009
administrative removal order, and arguing that but for due-process violations in the
issuance of that order, he would have applied for relief under the Convention Against
Torture (“CAT”). The government conceded for purposes of argument that due-
process violations had occurred, but argued that the motion to dismiss should be
denied because Sanchez had not demonstrated prejudice. The district court denied
the motion. Sanchez then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to
appeal that order. We affirm.
1. The district court did not err in declining to presume prejudice. Sanchez
argues that he was denied due process because the Notice of Intent to Issue a Final
Administrative Removal Order served on him was in English, a language he did not
understand, and immigration officials did not explain it to him in Spanish. But we
have required a showing of actual prejudice in similar circumstances. See United
States v. Reyes-Bonilla, 671 F.3d 1036, 1044, 1047–49 (9th Cir. 2012). We therefore
decline to presume prejudice here.
2. To establish prejudice, Sanchez had the burden of showing that it is
“plausible” he would have been granted CAT relief had he sought it in 2009. United
** The Honorable Danny J. Boggs, United States Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.

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3
States v. Ramos, 623 F.3d 672, 684 (9th Cir. 2010). This showing requires “some
evidentiary basis on which relief could have been granted, not merely a showing that
some form of immigration relief was theoretically possible.” Reyes-Bonilla, 671
F.3d at 1049–50.
The district court did not err in finding that Sanchez did not make the requisite
showing. CAT protection is only available if “it is more likely than not that [a
petitioner] would be tortured” upon removal. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). Sanchez’s
claim focused on a single incident in which his father was attacked in Mexico by
rival ranchers when Sanchez was eight years old. He made no claim that he faced
any harm in the approximately nine years he remained in Mexico after the incident,
and indeed told authorities in 2008 that he did not fear harm if returned to Mexico.
The documentary evidence only shows a generalized risk of violence in Mexico, not
that it is more likely than not that Sanchez would be tortured if removed. See
Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010).
AFFIRMED.

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