Danielle Hdavis v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DANIELLE H DAVIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 21-35411
D.C. No. 3:19-cv-06230-DWC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
David W. Christel, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 7, 2022**
Anchorage, Alaska
Before: HURWITZ, BRESS, and H. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
Danielle Davis appeals the district court’s order affirming the Commissioner
of Social Security’s denial of disability benefits and supplemental Social Security
income. “We review the district court’s order affirming the [Administrative Law
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUN 9 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Judge’s (ALJ’s)]’s denial of social security benefits de novo and will disturb the
denial of benefits only if the decision contains legal error or is not supported by
substantial evidence.” Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 2020)
(citation and quotations omitted). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and
we affirm.
1. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s discounting of Davis’s
subjective symptom testimony. An “ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about
the severity of her symptoms . . . by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons
for doing so.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996). Here, the ALJ
found that Davis’s mental health functioning was not as limited as she alleged
because she had made inconsistent efforts to seek clinical treatment and had not
pursued recommended medication. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th
Cir. 2012) (holding that an ALJ may rely on an inadequately explained failure to
seek treatment), superseded on other grounds by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a). The ALJ
also found that Davis’s performance on her mental status exams and presentation
before the agency conflicted with her subjective testimony. “Contradiction with the
medical record is a sufficient basis for rejecting the claimant’s subjective testimony.”
Carmickle v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008).
2. In discounting Dr. Wilkinson’s conclusions, the ALJ articulated
“specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.” Ryan

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v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). The
ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Wilkinson’s assessed limitations because Dr.
Wilkinson “provided no explanation for these ratings” and relied almost entirely on
Davis’s self-reporting during her one visit to him. The ALJ also found that Dr.
Wilkinson’s assessed limitations were not supported by the medical record and
conflicted with his other findings. This reasoning was sufficient. See Chaudhry v.
Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted) (holding that when a
physician offers an opinion that is “brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by
clinical findings,” the ALJ need not accept it); Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035,
1041–42 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that an incongruity between a doctor’s conclusions
and the medical records provides a “specific and legitimate reason” for rejecting that
opinion, and that an ALJ may also reject a medical opinion based on the claimant’s
self-reported ailments when it is made “with little independent analysis or
diagnosis”).
3. Assuming without deciding that the ALJ was required to provide
specific and legitimate reasons for discounting Mr. Dilk’s opinion, the ALJ did so.
The ALJ rejected Mr. Dilk’s conclusions because they conflicted with the medical
record and the findings of other providers. See Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1156
(9th Cir. 2020) (holding that inconsistencies with the medical record provide a valid
basis to discount an opinion). In addition, “the ALJ may permissibly reject check-

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off reports that do not contain any explanation of the bases of their conclusions,” id.
at 1155 (citation omitted), which was the case here. Moreover, substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s reliance on the opinions of state medical and psychological
consultants because the ALJ could conclude those opinions were consistent with the
medical record.
4. Before discounting lay testimony, the ALJ must give specific reasons
“germane to each witness.” Bruce v. Astrue, 557 F.3d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 2009)
(citation omitted). Here, the ALJ discounted Marion Yusko’s function report
because it was inconsistent with the medical evidence. This reasoning was
sufficient.
5. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s step-five finding that Davis
could perform gainful work in the national economy. Davis argues that the ALJ did
not include all her limitations in his hypothetical to the vocational expert. But this
reprises Davis’s arguments regarding the ALJ’s assessment of the opinion evidence.
Because substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s findings, the hypothetical to the
vocational expert “contained all of the limitations that the ALJ found credible” and
“was proper.” Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005).
AFFIRMED.

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