Sandra Rosario Javiel Torres v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SANDRA ROSARIO JAVIEL TORRES,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 15-73904
Agency No. A208-124-252
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted June 9, 2022**
Pasadena, California
Before: M. SMITH, BADE, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Sandra Rosario Javiel Torres, a native and citizen of Guatemala,
seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision affirming an
Immigration Judge’s (IJ) adverse credibility determination against her that resulted
in the denial of her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JUN 13 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 4 --

2
from removal under the Convention against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), and we deny the petition.
Because the BIA agreed with the IJ’s reasoning, we review both the BIA’s
and IJ’s decisions. Kumar v. Holder, 728 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2013). We review
the agency’s factual findings, including adverse credibility determinations, for
substantial evidence. Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 977 F.3d 924, 925 (9th Cir. 2020). We
will not disturb an adverse credibility determination unless “any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B); Manes v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 1261, 1263 (9th Cir. 2017) (per
curiam). Therefore, “only the most extraordinary circumstances will justify
overturning an adverse credibility determination.” Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d
1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Jibril v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1129, 1138 n.1 (9th
Cir. 2005)).
Here, the agency’s adverse credibility determination is supported by
substantial evidence. The agency found several non-trivial inconsistencies between
Petitioner’s statements and her hearing testimony. See Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d
1079, 1089 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “[u]nder the REAL ID act, even minor
inconsistencies that have a bearing on a petitioner’s veracity” may support an
adverse credibility determination). For example, the agency noted Petitioner’s
inconsistent statements about her reason for leaving Guatemala and her willingness

-- 2 of 4 --

3
to return. In her initial interview before a Customs and Border Protection officer,
Petitioner stated she left Guatemala for “a better life” and to help her family
“economically.” She further explained that she “would like to return to my country
because I’ll be happy there,” had no fear of returning, and no reason to believe she
would be harmed. Those answers stand in stark contrast to her later interview and
testimony. Petitioner told the asylum officer that “I cannot return they are going [to]
take my life,” and testified before the IJ that she believed the people making
threatening phone calls and the hitmen driving around her house would “go through
with the threats” to kill her.
The agency also found other aspects of Petitioner’s testimony inconsistent,
but the glaring inconsistencies described above were more than sufficient evidence
supporting the agency’s decision. See Alam v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1133, 1137 (9th
Cir. 2021) (“There is no bright-line rule under which some number of
inconsistencies requires sustaining or rejecting an adverse credibility
determination—our review will always require assessing the totality of the
circumstances.”). Petitioner does not meaningfully challenge the BIA’s affirmance
of the denial of CAT protection. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8). Additionally,
substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT protection, which was
based on the same statements the agency found not credible. Petitioner has not
pointed to any evidence compelling a conclusion contrary to the agency’s

-- 3 of 4 --

4
determination. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 2003)
(affirming the BIA’s rejection of a CAT claim when the petitioner failed to point to
any “other evidence that he could claim the BIA should have considered in making
its determination under [CAT]”).
PETITION DENIED.

-- 4 of 4 --