Tyrone A. Long v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TYRONE A. LONG,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 20-17117
D.C. No. 2:19-cv-00334-AC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Allison Claire, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 17, 2022**
San Francisco, California
Before: BYBEE, CALLAHAN, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.
Tyrone Long appeals from the district court’s order affirming the decision of
the Commissioner of Social Security denying his claim for disability insurance
benefits under the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 and review de novo the district court’s decision affirming the denial of
benefits. Benton ex rel. Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003).
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without
oral argument. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
FILED
JUL 7 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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We may set aside such a denial only when the findings of the Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) “are based on legal error or not supported by substantial evidence in
the record.” Id. We affirm.
1. Long challenges the ALJ’s assignment of “little weight” to the opinion of
his treating psychiatrist, Dr. Briercheck. Because Dr. Briercheck was a treating
physician whose opinion was contradicted by the state agency psychological
consultant, Dr. Foster-Valdez, the ALJ had to provide “specific and legitimate
reasons that are supported by substantial evidence” to reject Dr. Briercheck’s
opinion. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005).1 We conclude
that he did.
First, the ALJ noted that the opinion of Dr. Briercheck was not backed up by
his own treatment records, which were sparse. “The ALJ need not accept the
opinion of any physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief,
conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings.” Thomas v. Barnhart,
278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). There were no mental health records from Dr.
Briercheck during the relevant period to support the opinion that Long had certain
performance limitations. Dr. Briercheck’s opinion was presented in a checkbox
form dated July 17, 2017—more than two years since the last mental status
1 The “specific and legitimate” standard applies because Long filed his claim
before March 27, 2017. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c); Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th
785, 789 (9th Cir. 2022).

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examination performed by Dr. Briercheck.
Second, the ALJ appropriately characterized Dr. Briercheck’s evaluation as
inconsistent with relatively normal mental examinations from the relevant
timeframe. See Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting the
relevance of such “inconsistencies”). Long reported improvements from 2015 to
2017 and his major depressive disorder was in at least partial remission. Long
reported in some mental examinations being capable of driving, going to the
grocery store, preparing meals, making change at the store, managing finances,
going to the gym four times a week, walking his dog daily, and traveling to Texas
and back.
Third, the ALJ permissibly viewed Dr. Briercheck’s opinion as giving undue
credence to Long’s subjective complaints, especially given the repeated references
to suspected exaggeration in the medical record. Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1217
(explaining that an ALJ need not accept a doctor’s opinion when based on the
claimant’s own “subjective complaints”). Other examiners found that Long
“demonstrated voluntary restriction/moderate exaggeration” and “appeared to
manipulate and malinger” his symptoms. We conclude that the ALJ provided
specific and legitimate reasons, supported by substantial evidence, for discounting
the opinion of Dr. Briercheck.
2. The same standard of providing specific and legitimate reasons,

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supported by substantial evidence, applies to the ALJ’s decision to discount the
contradicted opinion of an examining psychologist, Dr. Chambers. Ryan v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008). Most of the reasons for
discounting Dr. Briercheck’s opinion apply with equal force to Dr. Chambers’
opinion. Dr. Chambers did not review any records from after Long’s alleged
disability onset date. Dr. Chambers’ opinion was based almost entirely on Long’s
own descriptions of his symptoms, which even Dr. Chambers noted were
“exaggerat[ed].” The ALJ reasonably concluded that Dr. Chambers’ evaluation
was inconsistent with the overall medical record, which indicated improvements
during the relevant timeframes and relatively normal mental functionality.
Therefore, the ALJ did not err in discounting Dr. Chambers’ opinion.
3. Lastly, the ALJ permissibly rejected Long’s own testimony concerning
the severity of his symptoms because the ALJ provided “specific, clear and
convincing reasons” for doing so. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir.
2009). The evidence from multiple mental examiners that Long overstated his
symptoms provides a clear and convincing reason to discount his testimony. See
Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 1989) (explaining that an adverse
credibility finding was supported in part by treating physician’s skepticism of
claimant’s reported pain levels). As noted above, more than one examiner
determined that Long “exaggerat[ed]” his condition. Moreover, for substantially

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the same reasons discussed earlier, Long’s testimony was inconsistent with the
overall medical record. These grounds provide sufficiently specific, clear and
convincing reasons to reject Long’s testimony.
AFFIRMED.

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