United States of America v. Marklin Christopher Manuel

21-10303Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitNov 25, 2022

Full text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MARKLIN CHRISTOPHER MANUEL,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 21-10303
D.C. No. 2:91-cr-00264-SRB-4
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Susan R. Bolton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 15, 2022**
Before: CANBY, CALLAHAN, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
Marklin Christopher Manuel appeals from the district court’s order denying
his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1291. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, see
United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 2021), we affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
NOV 25 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 21-10303
Manuel contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
motion because his medical conditions, considered either individually or
collectively, provided an extraordinary and compelling reason for his immediate
release. The district court specifically acknowledged each of Manuel’s “serious
chronic” medical conditions and agreed with Manuel that they put him at
heightened risk from COVID-19. The court explained, however, that these
conditions were not extraordinary and compelling because they could be managed
in Bureau of Prisons’ custody and the risks posed by COVID-19 were mitigated by
the low infection rate at his facility, his vaccination, as well as vaccine efficacy and
the anticipated availability of booster shots.1 We cannot say that the court abused
its discretion in reaching this conclusion, which it amply explained and supported.
Moreover, contrary to Manuel’s claim, the court applied the correct legal standard
under the applicable statute and this court’s decision in Aruda; the court
acknowledged that it was not constrained in the reasons it could consider for
release, and properly treated U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 as informative. See Aruda, 993
F.3d at 802.
Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
1 Manuel’s contention that the district court should not have considered
information from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention regarding
vaccine efficacy is unpersuasive. The sources Manuel cites, to the extent they have
any relevance to this issue, postdate the district court’s decision and thus are not
part of the record.

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finding that Manuel did not have extraordinary and compelling reasons for
compassionate release, we need not reach Manuel’s argument that the court erred
in its analysis of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Wright, 46
F.4th 938, 947 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding that when a district court properly denies
compassionate release on one ground, any error at another step of the analysis is
harmless).
AFFIRMED.

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