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17-72751•Marlon Rivera-Ronquillo v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General
17-72751Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitDec 13, 2022
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARLON RIVERA-RONQUILLO,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 17-72751
Agency No. A070-664-079
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted December 7, 2022**
San Francisco, California
Before: NGUYEN and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges, and BOUGH,*** District Judge.
Marlon David Rivera-Ronquillo (“Rivera-Ronquillo”) and Norma Aracely
Donis Tejada (“Donis Tejada”) (together, Petitioners), natives and citizen of
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Stephen R. Bough, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Missouri, sitting by designation.
FILED
DEC 13 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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Guatemala, petition for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”) affirming the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order denying Rivera-
Ronquillo’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, cancellation of
removal, protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), and relief
under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (“NACARA”),
as well as Donis Tejada’s separate application for cancellation of removal.1 We
have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. §1252 and we deny the petition for review.
1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that
Petitioners have not suffered harm rising to the level of past persecution. Rivera-
Ronquillo testified that he received verbal and written threats from the Guatemalan
government and guerilla groups, but the threats were never carried out. Rivera-
Ronquillo offered no evidence that these threats caused suffering or harm. Lim v.
I.N.S., 224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Threats standing alone . . . constitute
past persecution . . . only when the threats are so menacing as to cause significant
actual ‘suffering or harm.’”). The record does not compel the conclusion that these
threats rose to the level of past persecution.
2. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Rivera-
Ronquillo failed to establish a nexus to a protected ground. Rivera-Ronquillo
1 On appeal, Petitioners challenge the denial of Rivera-Ronquillo’s application for
asylum, relief under NACARA, and Donis Tejada’s application for cancellation of
removal.
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testified that he feared returning to Guatemala due to issues with “kidnapping, the
gangs, [and] the extortion.” But a fear of “random violence by gang members
bears no nexus to a protected ground.” Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th
Cir. 2010).
3. We lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s discretionary denial of
Rivera-Ronquillo’s NACARA application and Donis Tejada’s application for
cancellation of removal. Monroy v. Lynch, 821 F.3d 1175, 1177 (9th Cir. 2016).
However, we retain jurisdiction to review the due process claims raised in the
petition. Id.
The introduction of hearsay statements from two police reports did not
deprive Petitioners of a fundamentally fair hearing. See Espinoza v. I.N.S., 45 F.3d
308, 310 (9th Cir. 1995). Donis Tejada admitted at the hearing to prior statements
she made in one of the police reports, and admitted to the content described in the
second police report. The IJ made several attempts to obtain the presence of
another witness interviewed in one of the police reports, but she did not wish to
testify. Therefore, the introduction of these police reports did not violate
Petitioners’ due process rights. See Hammad v. Holder, 603 F.3d 536, 546 (9th
Cir. 2010); Angov v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 2015).
The IJ also did not violate Petitioners’ due process rights when she indicated
at the close of the hearing that she intended to grant cancellation of removal relief
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but ultimately denied such relief in a written decision. Petitioners fail to establish
how this statement prevented them from reasonably presenting their case.
Colmenar v. I.N.S., 210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2000); Cinapian v. Holder, 567
F.3d 1067, 1074 (9th Cir. 2009).
PETITION DENIED.
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