Lee Edward Peyton v. THERESA CISNEROS, Warden

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LEE EDWARD PEYTON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
THERESA CISNEROS, Warden,
Respondent-Appellee.
No. 20-56185
D.C. No.
2:19-cv-09249-VAP-KK
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Virginia A. Phillips, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 16, 2022**
San Francisco, California
Before: HAWKINS, S.R. THOMAS, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Lee Edward Peyton appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment denying his habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We have
FILED
DEC 20 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review de novo, see Rowland v.
Chappell, 876 F.3d 1174, 1180–81 (9th Cir. 2017), and we affirm.1
The district court correctly concluded that the state court decision at issue
was neither “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Peyton contends that the state court’s denial of his requests for self-
representation violated his rights under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975),
because his requests were knowing and intelligent, unequivocal, and timely. The
California Court of Appeal’s decision, which did not incorporate the trial court’s
basis for denying Peyton’s Faretta requests, is the last reasoned state-court
1 Peyton’s motion to waive oral argument is GRANTED.
2

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decision resolving this claim, and therefore the only one we review.2 See Barker v.
Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091–93 (9th Cir. 2005).
After independently reviewing the record, the appellate court concluded,
inter alia, that Peyton’s purpose in invoking his right to self-representation was to
disrupt or delay proceedings. That conclusion was neither contrary to, nor an
unreasonable application of, Faretta, nor an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Hirschfield v.
Payne, 420 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a requirement imposed by
state courts “that the request not be for the purpose of delay” is not contrary to, nor
an unreasonable application of, Faretta).
AFFIRMED.
2 The record belies Peyton’s assertion that the state appellate court improperly
applied harmless error review; instead, it simply relied on a different basis to
conclude that no constitutional error had occurred. See Williams v. Johnson, 840
F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2016) (“The state appellate court was entitled to make its
own factual findings, unconstrained by what the trial court did.”). Further,
contrary to Peyton’s contention, the appellate court’s analysis was not improper
under Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 737–38 (9th Cir. 2008), or Van Lynn v.
Farmon, 347 F.3d 735, 741 (9th Cir. 2003). Those cases address whether federal
courts can supply alternative reasons from those proffered by a state court when
affirming a denial of relief under § 2254(d)(1). They are therefore inapposite.
3

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