United States of America v. Aaron New

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
AARON NEW,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 21-10198
D.C. Nos.
2:11-cr-00210-JAM-3
2:11-cr-00210-JAM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 24, 2023**
San Francisco, California
Before: GOULD, RAWLINSON, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
Following our remand for resentencing, Aaron New appeals the district
court’s re-imposition of a two-level sentencing enhancement for obstruction of
justice based on New committing perjury during his criminal trial involving a
mortgage fraud scheme. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We “review
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JAN 26 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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a district court’s factual findings for purposes of an obstruction of justice sentence
enhancement for clear error.” United States v. Herrera-Rivera, 832 F.3d 1166, 1172
(9th Cir. 2016). We affirm.
A two-level enhancement may be imposed when a “defendant willfully
obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of
justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant
offense of conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. For perjury to be deemed obstruction,
the district court must find that: “(1) the defendant gave false testimony, (2) on a
material matter, (3) with willful intent.” United States v. Castro-Ponce, 770 F.3d
819, 822 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Garro, 517 F.3d 1163, 1171 (9th
Cir. 2008)). “Although it is ‘preferable’ for the court to make a separate and clear
finding for each element of the alleged perjury, doing so is unnecessary where the
court makes a determination of an obstruction of justice ‘that encompasses all of the
factual predicates for a finding of perjury.’” United States v. Armstrong, 620 F.3d
1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 95
(1993)). In this case, between the court’s express finding that New willfully gave
false testimony on material matters and its adoption of the examples in the
government’s sentencing memorandum, the district court sufficiently articulated its
findings.
In addition, the record supports the district court’s determination that New

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willfully gave false testimony on material matters. That New lied about his lack of
knowledge regarding fraudulent loan applications is supported by the fact that
numerous fraudulent applications were submitted under his name. New was
responsible for verifying the accuracy of the loan applications for which he was the
loan officer. And a witness testified that New often personally dropped off the loan
files to the escrow company. But when the FBI showed New some of the fraudulent
loan applications he had signed, he did not claim—as he later would—that his
signatures had been forged, nor did he express any surprise as to their contents.
The record also supports the district court’s determination that New made
false statements regarding his knowledge of shell companies integral to the
fraudulent scheme. At trial, New testified that he did not know that Ardis
Construction, Markevich Home Improvement, and Brazil, Inc., were shell
companies created to launder funds. But the government demonstrated that New
had extensive knowledge that these were shell entities used to perpetuate a fraud.
The record further supports that New falsely testified regarding his knowledge of
fraudulent liens placed on properties for which he was the mortgage broker, his
intent to occupy a property for which he had obtained a mortgage, and the length of
his employment, which was relevant to whether his loan application was fraudulent.
In sum, the district court did not clearly err as it based the two-level
obstruction of justice enhancement on sufficient evidence.

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AFFIRMED.

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