United States of America v. DARNELL CORNELIUS ST. CLAIR, AKA Big Brownie

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DARNELL CORNELIUS ST. CLAIR, AKA
Big Brownie,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 21-50286
D.C. No. 2:20-cr-00526-SB-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Stanley Blumenfeld, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 16, 2023
Pasadena, California
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, HURWITZ, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
Darnell St. Clair appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress
the firearm that was discovered when an officer frisked him after he fled from the
lawful stop of a vehicle in which he was a passenger. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. St. Clair does not contest that there was reasonable suspicion to stop
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
FILED
MAR 14 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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the vehicle in which he was a passenger. Rather, he only argues that the officer
who detained him lacked reasonable suspicion to do so and to frisk him after he
fled from the vehicle.
When an officer performs a lawful traffic stop, he may reasonably “order a
passenger back into an automobile that he voluntarily exited.” United States v.
Williams, 419 F.3d 1029, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005). There is no dispute that the traffic
stop was lawful, St. Clair matched the description of one of the individuals who
had fled the vehicle after it crashed, and St. Clair was found in close temporal and
spatial proximity to the crash. The officers therefore had the authority to control
St. Clair’s movements to investigate the incident. The district court did not err in
concluding that there was reasonable suspicion to detain St. Clair.
2. We need not decide whether the frisk was justified by reasonable
suspicion that St. Clair was armed and dangerous because the firearm would have
inevitably been discovered during a lawful search incident to arrest. There was
probable cause to arrest St. Clair for violating California Penal Code § 148, which
prohibits a person from resisting, delaying, or obstructing a police officer when the
officer has reasonable suspicion to detain the person. See Velazquez v. City of
Long Beach, 793 F.3d 1010, 1018–19 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Garcia v. Superior
Ct., 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 488, 500 (Ct. App. 2009)) (listing elements of section 148).
St. Clair’s flight from the arresting officer in the parking lot “delayed the

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performance of [the officer’s] duties and created probable cause to arrest for
violating [section] 148.” In re Andre P., 277 Cal. Rptr. 363, 364 (Ct. App. 1991)
(citing People v. Allen, 167 Cal. Rptr. 502 (Ct. App. 1980)) (finding “a garden
variety section 148 violation” on nearly identical facts). A command to stop is not
an element of a § 148 violation. See Allen, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 505–06 (rejecting
defendant’s argument “that the officer must advise the individual that he is under
arrest or that the officer wants to detain him”).
AFFIRMED.

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