Maria Del Carmen Chavez Soto; Antonia Guadalupe Gomez Chavez; Eduardo Gomez Chavez v. Merrick B. Garland, U.S. Attorney General

22-22-pdfCourt of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitApr 3, 2023

Full text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Maria Del Carmen Chavez Soto; Antonia
Guadalupe Gomez Chavez; Eduardo
Gomez Chavez,
Petitioners,
v.
Merrick B. Garland, U.S. Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 22-22
Agency Nos. A216-267-791
A216-267-792
A216-267-793
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 30, 2023**
San Francisco, California
Before: M. SMITH and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and RODRIGUEZ,*** District
Judge.
Petitioners Maria Del Carmen Chavez Soto and her two children, Antonia
Guadalupe Gomez Chavez and Eduardo Gomez Chavez, petition for review of
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Xavier Rodriguez, United States District Judge for
the Western District of Texas, sitting by designation.
FILED
APR 3 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) dismissal of their appeal of the
immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of their applications for asylum, withholding
of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
Petitioners are natives and citizens of Mexico. As the parties are familiar with
the facts, we do not recount them here. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252 and dismiss the petition.
1. The IJ denied Petitioners’ asylum and withholding of removal
claims based on their arguments that they would be persecuted in Mexico on
account of: (1) imputed political opinion; (2) the particular social group of
“Mexican witnesses who report serious gang crimes to law enforcement” (the
“witness-based group”); and (3) the particular social group of “family members
of Uriel Chavez” (the “family-based group”). On appeal to this court,
Petitioners argue that substantial evidence does not support the IJ’s finding as to
the family-based group. However, Petitioners did not raise this objection before
the BIA, explicitly stating that they were only challenging the IJ’s findings as to
the witness-based group. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to review
Petitioners’ unexhausted claim.1 See Bare v. Barr, 975 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir.
2020) (“Exhaustion requires a non-constitutional legal claim to the court on
appeal to have first been raised in the administrative proceedings below.”).
1 Although Petitioners exhausted their claim as to the witness-based group, they
do not raise it in their briefing in this court, thereby waiving any objection to the
BIA’s decision on this ground. See Cui v. Holder, 712 F.3d 1332, 1338 n.3 (9th
Cir. 2013).

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Because Petitioners’ failure to show a cognizable particular social group
is dispositive to their eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal, we
need not reach the remaining issue of whether their past harm rose to the level
of persecution. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (per curiam)
(“[C]ourts . . . are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which
is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).
2. Petitioners also did not exhaust their CAT claim by failing to raise
it with the BIA. We therefore also lack jurisdiction over the CAT claim. See
Bare, 975 F.3d at 960.
The stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.
PETITION DISMISSED.

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