MIGUEL MIRANDA-SANTANA, AKA Miguel Santana Miranda v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MIGUEL MIRANDA-SANTANA, AKA
Miguel Santana Miranda,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 20-70471
Agency No. A205-466-951
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 14, 2023**
San Francisco, California
Before: S.R. THOMAS and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF,***
District Judge.
FILED
APR 18 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

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Miguel Miranda-Santana petitions for review of a final order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision
denying his application for cancellation of removal for certain nonpermanent
residents under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). We deny the petition for review.
1. The BIA applied the correct legal standards and did not ignore relevant
evidence. The BIA’s analysis of the hardships Miranda-Santana’s children would
face upon their father’s removal was plainly forward looking, see Figueroa v.
Mukasey, 543 F.3d 487, 497 (9th Cir. 2008), abrogated on other grounds by Abebe
v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc), and considered the hardship
factors cumulatively, see In re Gonzalez Recinas, 23 I&N Dec. 467, 472 (BIA
2002) (en banc). Nothing in the record overcomes our presumption that the BIA
considered all relevant evidence. See Szonyi v. Barr, 942 F.3d 874, 897 (9th Cir.
2019).
2. Miranda-Santana does not “specifically and distinctly” argue that the BIA
improperly applied the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard in
§ 1229b(b)(1)(D) to the established facts of his case and therefore forfeits any such
claim. Castro-Perez v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 2001)).
Miranda-Santana’s briefing argues that we would have jurisdiction over such a
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claim, but does not address the merits of the hardship question. That is, Miranda
Santana does not explain why the established facts of his case amount to
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying relative upon removal.
PETITION DENIED.
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