Santiago Vazquez v. MARTHA LEE WALTERS, Chief Justice of the Oregon Supreme Court

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SANTIAGO VAZQUEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MARTHA LEE WALTERS, Chief Justice of
the Oregon Supreme Court; THOMAS A.
BALMER; CHRISTOPHER L. GARRETT;
ROGER J. DEHOOG, Justice of the Oregon
Supreme Court; MEAGAN A. FLYNN;
REBECCA DUNCAN; ADRIENNE
NELSON, Associate Justices of the Oregon
Supreme Court, each sued in their official
capacities,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 21-35759
D.C. No. 3:20-cv-01761-HZ
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Marco A. Hernandez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 17, 2023**
Before: CLIFTON, R. NELSON, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
APR 25 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Santiago Vazquez appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging an equal protection violation in
connection with the temporary rules governing admission to the Oregon bar in
2020. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Gordon
v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1122 (9th Cir. 2018). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Vazquez
failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the classification
scheme in question was not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See
United States v. Padilla-Diaz, 862 F.3d 856, 862 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining
rational bases review and recognizing that the challenger of a classification bears
the burden of “negativing every conceivable basis which might support it” (citation
omitted and alteration adopted)); see also Gallinger v. Becerra, 898 F.3d 1012,
1018 (9th Cir. 2018) (explaining that “classifications that are to some extent both
underinclusive and overinclusive” may be upheld under rational-basis review
(citation omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Vazquez’s motion
for leave to file a supplemental complaint because Vazquez’s proposed complaint
failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible First Amendment retaliation
claim. See Capp v. County of San Diego, 940 F.3d 1046, 1053-58 (9th Cir. 2019)
(setting forth elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim and explaining that

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a plaintiff must plausibly allege that retaliation was the but-for motive for
defendants’ actions); see also id. at 1055 (recognizing that an allegation is not
plausible where there is an “obvious alternative explanation” for alleged
misconduct (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 682 (2009)); Planned
Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Neely, 130 F.3d 400, 402 (9th Cir. 1997) (standard of
review).
Defendants’ motion to substitute party (Docket Entry No. 26) is granted.
AFFIRMED.

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