Rosa Idalia Tobar-De Linares; Stephanie Sarai Linares-Tobar v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROSA IDALIA TOBAR-DE LINARES;
STEPHANIE SARAI LINARES-TOBAR,
Petitioners,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 20-72667
Agency Nos. A201-920-817
A201-920-818
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted September 12, 2023**
San Francisco, California
Before: WALLACE, S.R. THOMAS, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
FILED
SEP 14 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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Rosa Idalia Tobar-De Linares,1 a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions
for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision dismissing her
appeal from an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denials of asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Our
jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Where, as here, “the BIA summarily
affirms the IJ’s decision, we review the IJ’s decision as the final agency action.”
Pagayon v. Holder, 675 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation
omitted).
We review for substantial evidence the agency’s denials of asylum,
withholding of removal, and CAT relief, Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025,
1028 (9th Cir. 2019), affirming “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary,” Garland v. Ming Dai, 141 S. Ct. 1669,
1677 (2021) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). Because the parties are familiar
with the factual and procedural history of the case, we need not recount it here.
We deny the petition for review.
I
1 Tobar-De Linares is the mother of Stephanie Sarai Linares-Tobar, who was
a minor at the time of the underlying removal proceedings in this case, and
therefore is listed only as a derivative beneficiary of Tobar-De Linares’s asylum
request.
2

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Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Tobar-De
Linares did not establish the required nexus for asylum or withholding of removal.
To meet the nexus requirement, a noncitizen must show that her protected ground
was “a reason” (withholding of removal) or “one central reason” (asylum) that she
has been or will be harmed. See Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 357–58
(9th Cir. 2017) (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(A), (C)).
Here, however, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that the
gang members who targeted Tobar-De Linares did so in furtherance of a criminal
enterprise. The record does not compel the conclusion that any protected ground
was “a reason” or “one central reason” that the gang members targeted her. See id.
II
Because Tobar-De Linares did not raise her CAT-protection claim before the
BIA or in her opening brief, we decline to consider it and deny this portion of the
petition. See Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550 (9th Cir. 2023)
(declining to consider a claim that the petitioner failed to exhaust before the BIA);
Iraheta-Martinez v. Garland, 12 F.4th 942, 959 (9th Cir. 2021) (deeming an
argument not developed in an opening brief forfeited).
DENIED.
3

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