Geneva Langworthy v. Superior Court for Whatcom County

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GENEVA LANGWORTHY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SUPERIOR COURT FOR WHATCOM
COUNTY; GEORGE ROCHE, Senior Civil
Prosecuting Attorney, Whatcom County;
DISTRICT COURT FOR WHATCOM
COUNTY; WASHINGTON STATE
COURT OF APPEALS, DIVISION I,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 22-35397
D.C. No. 2:21-cv-01615-RAJ
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Richard A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 12, 2023**
Before: CANBY, CALLAHAN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Geneva Langworthy appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing her action alleging violations of Title II of the Americans with
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
SEP 21 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Disabilities Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003)
(dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
Langworthy’s claims against the Whatcom County District Court and Superior
Court and the Washington Court of Appeals because Langworthy’s action
constitutes a forbidden “de facto appeal” of prior state court judgments and raises
claims that are “inextricably intertwined” with those judgments. Noel, 341 F.3d at
1163-65 (discussing proper application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); see also
Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 782 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that claims are
“inextricably intertwined” with state court decisions where federal adjudication
“would impermissibly undercut the state ruling on the same issues” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed Langworthy’s claims against George
Roche as barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522
U.S. 118, 126 (1997) (explaining when prosecutorial immunity applies).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend
because amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review

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and explaining that leave to amend may be denied when amendment would be
futile).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Langworthy’s
motions for appointment of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). See
Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth standard of
review).
AFFIRMED.

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