Yaneth Valeska Lopez Bonilla v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
YANETH VALESKA LOPEZ BONILLA,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 22-1975
Agency No.
A073-934-368
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted November 15, 2023**
Seattle, Washington
Before: McKEOWN and GOULD, Circuit Judges, and BENNETT, District
Judge.***
Yaneth Valeska Lopez Bonilla petitions for review of a Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissal of her appeal from an oral decision by an
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Richard D. Bennett, United States District Judge for
the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.
FILED
NOV 17 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 4 --

2 22-1975
immigration judge (“IJ”) denying her applications for asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), and ordering
her deportation to Honduras. Lopez Bonilla challenges the agency’s adverse
credibility determination, focusing on the agency’s application of the maxim falsus
in uno, falsus in omnibus. Lopez Bonilla also challenges the denial of CAT relief.
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C § 1252(a)(1), and we deny Lopez Bonilla’s
petition for review.
We review factual findings, including adverse credibility determinations,
“under the deferential substantial evidence standard.” Zhi v. Holder, 751 F.3d
1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2014). Under that standard, “we must uphold the agency
determination unless the evidence compels a contrary conclusion.” Duran-
Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
Where “the BIA agrees with and incorporates specific findings of the IJ while
adding its own reasoning, we review both decisions.” Bhattarai v. Lynch, 835 F.3d
1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016).
1. Substantial evidence does not compel a conclusion that Lopez Bonilla
was credible. Lopez Bonilla had earlier submitted an application, later denied, that
she knew was fraudulent. She also attempted to reenter the U.S. with the card of a
lawful permanent resident which did not belong to her.
Lopez Bonilla’s reopened application centers around the same underlying

-- 2 of 4 --

3 22-1975
facts of her previous fraudulent application. Although Lopez Bonilla submitted
corroborating evidence related to her new asylum claims, the IJ and BIA both
noted that the evidence did not specifically support her new version of events.
In making its adverse credibility determination, the agency relied on the
maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, Latin for “false in one thing, false in all.”
That maxim is a tool that “allows a fact-finder to disbelieve a witness’s entire
testimony if the witness makes a material and conscious falsehood in one aspect of
[their] testimony.” Li v. Holder, 738 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in
original) (citing Cvitkovic v. United States, 41 F.2d 682, 684 (9th Cir. 1930));
Falsus In Uno Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). We have
allowed IJs to use this maxim in their factfinding, which includes credibility
determinations. Li, 738 F.3d at 1162. We need not decide on an absolute rule as to
when this maxim can be considered in all cases, or when it can be rebutted. It is
sufficient to decide this case merely to note that the false statements made by
Lopez Bonilla in the prior application are substantial evidence supporting the
adverse credibility determination.
2. Nor does substantial evidence compel us to reverse the agency’s denial of
CAT relief. “To be eligible for relief under CAT, an applicant bears the burden of
establishing that she will more likely than not be tortured with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official if removed to her native country.” Xochihua-

-- 3 of 4 --

4 22-1975
Jaimes v. Barr, 962 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2020). The agency found that Lopez
Bonilla “did not establish that she would be tortured by or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official in Honduras or that the government of Honduras
may be willfully blind to her torture.” The harms Lopez Bonilla experienced—and
the future harms she fears—revolve around her past assailant, who she testified is
now serving a long prison sentence. That fact reasonably leads to the agency’s
conclusions (1) that there is a low probability that he would subject her to future
torture, and (2) that there is no clear nexus between the torture Lopez Bonilla fears
and government acquiescence because the government has punished her assailant
for his violence against women. There was no clear error in these agency findings.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

-- 4 of 4 --