Mychal Andra Reed v. Csp Lac

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MYCHAL ANDRA REED,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CSP LAC; CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS AND
REHABILITATION; PAULETTE
FINANDER, Chief M.D. Individual
Capacity and Official Capacity; C.
HUGHES, Lt.: Individual Capacity and
Official Capacity; SAL URIBE, Correctional
Officer: Individual Capacity and Official
Capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 22-56097
D.C. No. 2:12-cv-10727-SB-AS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Stanley Blumenfeld, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 14, 2023**
Before: SILVERMAN, WARDLAW, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Mychal Andra Reed appeals pro se from the district
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
NOV 21 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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court’s judgment dismissing for failure to prosecute his action brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion.
Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of L.A., 782 F.2d 829, 832 (9th Cir. 1986). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Reed’s action
because the court granted Reed multiple continuances, Reed informed the court
that he was ready to proceed to trial, Reed failed to appear for trial and a show
cause hearing, and the court had warned Reed that failure to appear could result in
dismissal. See id. at 831 (discussing factors to be considered before dismissing a
case as a sanction under a district court’s inherent power to control its docket); see
also Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 640-41 (9th Cir. 2002) (a district court’s
dismissal should not be disturbed absent a “definite and firm conviction” that it
“committed a clear error of judgment” (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
In light of our disposition, we do not consider Reed’s challenge to the
district court’s interlocutory order dismissing Reed’s ADA claims. See Al-Torki v.
Kaempen, 78 F.3d 1381, 1386 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[I]nterlocutory orders, generally
appealable after final judgment, are not appealable after a dismissal for failure to
prosecute, whether the failure to prosecute is purposeful or is a result of negligence
or mistake.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

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We reject as unsupported by the record Reed’s contentions that the district
court violated his due process rights or was biased and prejudiced against him.
AFFIRMED.

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