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22-55362•Rilla Huml v. SERVIS ONE, INC., DBA BSI Financial Services, a Delaware corporation, authorized to…
22-55362Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitDec 5, 2023
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RILLA HUML,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SERVIS ONE, INC., DBA BSI Financial
Services, a Delaware corporation, authorized
to do business in California; WILMINGTON
TRUST FUND SOCIETY FSB, a Delaware
corporation, doing business, but not
authorize do business, as CHRISTIANA
TRUST in California) as Trustee, for
BROUGHAM FUND I TRUST, an unknown
entity; ZIEVE, BRODNAX AND STEELE,
LLP, a California Limited Liability
Partnership; WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
S/B/M Wachovia Mortgage, FSB; WELLS
FARGO BANK SOUTH CENTRAL, N.A.;
DOES, 1 through 10,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 22-55362
D.C. No.
8:20-cv-00489-DOC-KES
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 5, 2023**
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
FILED
DEC 5 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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Before: O’SCANNLAIN, KLEINFELD, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
Rilla Huml appeals pro se after voluntarily dismissing without prejudice her
claims against Wilmington Trust Fund Society FSB, the sole remaining defendant
in Huml’s action alleging violations of the Truth in Lending Act, the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act, and state law stemming from the servicing and transfer
of her mortgage loan. We dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Huml’s notice of appeal was timely only as to her voluntary dismissal of the
claims without prejudice. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) (notice of appeal must be
filed 30 days after judgment or order appealed); Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205,
214 (2007) (“[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a
jurisdictional requirement.”). “A voluntary dismissal without prejudice is
ordinarily not a final judgment from which the plaintiff may appeal,” unless “1)
there [is] no evidence of any attempt to manipulate appellate jurisdiction; and 2)
the plaintiff . . . sought the district court’s permission to dismiss the remaining
claims.” Galaza v. Wolf, 954 F.3d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Because Huml did not seek the “approval and
meaningful participation of the district court” in the dismissal of her claims, such
as by seeking entry of partial final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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54(b), we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. Id. at 1272; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b);
see also WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(“[A] plaintiff, who has been given leave to amend, may not file a notice of appeal
simply because he does not choose to file an amended complaint. A further district
court determination must be obtained.”).
Wells Fargo’s request for judicial notice, Dkt. Entry No. 15, is denied.
DISMISSED.
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