Maria De La Luz Erigoya Garay v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARIA DE LA LUZ ERIGOYA GARAY,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 22-178
Agency No. A208-120-083
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted December 8, 2023**
San Francisco, California
Before: CALLAHAN, R. NELSON, BADE Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Maria De La Luz Erigoya Garay (“Erigoya Garay”), a citizen of
Mexico, petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA). The BIA dismissed her appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) decision
denying her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under
the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. §
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for
decision without oral argument. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
FILED
DEC 12 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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1252(a)(1). We review the agency’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual
findings for substantial evidence. See Davila v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th
Cir. 2020). Under the latter standard, the “administrative findings of fact are
conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to
the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). We deny the petition.
1. Erigoya Garay sought asylum and withholding of removal based on her
membership in various protected social groups. We hold that there is substantial
evidence to support the BIA’s conclusion that Erigoya Garay is not eligible for
asylum or withholding of removal. A petitioner’s fear of future persecution needs
to be “subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable,” and she needs to provide
“credible, direct, and specific evidence in the record of facts that would support a
reasonable fear of persecution.” Halim v. Holder, 590 F.3d 971, 976 (9th Cir.
2009) (citations omitted). As evidence of persecution, Erigoya Garay testified that
she had been slapped by the father of her partner and her partner had been
threatened by two cartel groups. Erigoya Garay, however, did not experience any
prior violence from the cartels and was not the subject of any threats from the
cartels. She based her fear of cartel violence on her connection to her former
partner’s family, but no members of that family besides her partner were
threatened by the cartels and none have been harmed. Although she was slapped
by the father of her partner, this does not compel the conclusion that this violence

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rises to the level of persecution. See Pagayon v. Holder, 675 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th
Cir. 2011) (finding that a personal dispute could not support a claim for asylum);
Afriyie v. Holder, 613 F.3d 924, 936 n.9 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that “without
demonstrating past persecution,” the petitioner has “the burden of showing that
relocation would not be safe or reasonable”), overruled on other grounds
by Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
Erigoya Garay also failed to show that she could not relocate to another part of
Mexico, as her mother did to avoid the cartel violence.
2. Under CAT, an applicant must show “that it is more likely than not that
he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” 8
C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). Erigoya Garay did not suffer past torture in Mexico.
There is also nothing in the record to show that Erigoya Garay is likely to suffer
torture should she return to Mexico. The IJ reasonably found and the BIA affirmed
that Erigoya Garay failed to establish that a Mexican official would acquiesce to
harm rising to the level of torture. For these reasons, we also deny Erigoya
Garay’s CAT claim.
Accordingly, the petition for review is DENIED.

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