Patrice E. Brown v. Vincent Dolce, named as Employee at Eymann Complex Cook Unit

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PATRICE E. BROWN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
VINCENT DOLCE, named as Employee at
Eymann Complex Cook Unit; SHAWNNA
BRIER, AKA Shawnna N. Anderson, named
as Employee at Eymann Complex,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 22-16937
D.C. No. 2:21-cv-00515-GMS-JZB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
G. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 12, 2023**
Before: WALLACE, LEE, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
Arizona state prisoner Patrice E. Brown appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging an equal
protection violation based on race. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
DEC 15 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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We review de novo. Jones v. Slade, 23 F.4th 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2022). We
affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Brown failed
to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant Dolce acted with
discriminatory intent when issuing the disciplinary ticket. See Furnace v. Sullivan,
705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (plaintiff alleging an equal protection claim
must show that defendants acted with an intent to discriminate); Nilsson v. City of
Mesa, 503 F.3d 947, 952 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that a “conclusory, self-
serving affidavit, lacking detailed facts and any supporting evidence, is insufficient
to create a genuine issue of material fact” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Brown’s first and
second motions for relief from judgment because Brown failed to establish any
basis for such relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS,
Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and
grounds for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b)).
We do not consider Brown’s contentions related to the district court’s order
denying Brown’s third motion for reconsideration because Brown did not file an
amended or separate notice of appeal from that order. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)
(notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the entry of judgment or the

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denial of certain post-judgment motions); Stephanie-Cardona LLC v. Smith’s Food
& Drug Ctrs., Inc., 476 F.3d 701, 703 (9th Cir. 2007) (“A timely notice of appeal
is a non-waivable jurisdictional requirement.”).
We reject as unsupported Brown’s contentions regarding Dolce’s alleged
failure to respond to Brown’s Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) motion.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised in the
opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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