D.C. No. 2:14-cv-00596- RSM OPINION -- 1 of 35 -- ALLEN V. THE BOEING CO. 2 HARMON v. the Boeing Company, a Delaware Corporation

FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOCELYN ALLEN; LAWRENCE J.
ALLEN; VIVIAN LYNN ALLEN;
CAREN BARNES; EMERY BLESSING;
HORACE BLINER; ROBERT A.
BLINER; JASON BOGART; BRENDA
BRAMMER; BRETNEY A.
BROWNFIELD; DONALD N.
CAMPBELL; DEBORAH JEAN
CETTOLIN; CAROLE DENISE COGGIN;
ROBERT ALLEN COGGIN; ANGELA
COMSTOCK; TIMOTHY EUGENE
CONNOR; CHRISTINE R.
COUNCILMAN; DARYL CRAWFORD;
SHAWN CREED-WOOLERY; ANITA
DECKER; DANIEL DECKER; KERRI
DECKER; SHAWN DECKER; DANIEL
ANDREW DOLLOFF; JACOB DOLLOFF;
TONI RAE DOLLOFF; JEFFREY
DOSCH; KARRIE DOSCH; ALVINE
DRAYTON; PATRICIA ANN DUKE;
JUANITA DUPONT; DONALD WARREN
EDWARDS; TAMMY ELSNER;
MICHAEL PATRICK ETHIER; FAY
FARRINGTON; LARRY D. FORD, SR.;
KENNETH MARK FOREMAN; SHERRI
LEE FOREMAN; MICHAEL GESE;
AIMEE GREEN; JOSH GREEN; LEE
LYNN HARDY; LISA ANN HARDY;
BARRY CURTIS HARMON, II; NICOLE
No. 15-35162
D.C. No.
2:14-cv-00596-
RSM
OPINION

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ALLEN V. THE BOEING CO. 2
HARMON; DONALD R. HAUPT; KARI
LYN HERNANDEZ; RONALD A. HOLT;
BRIAN JONES; MIKISHA D. JONES;
TATIANA JONES; PHYLLIS KAIN;
ROBERT KENNICOTT; ANDREY
KINAKH; TONY KINGSADA;
MICHELLE KLUSMEYER; SONJA
LAPPING; BRITTNEY LYNN LICKEY;
ROBIN LINDY; WAYNE LINDY;
ASHLEY LISENBY; PAULLET
LITTLEFIELD; DEIDRE LORENZ;
COURTNEY MACISAAC; PAUL
MALAVOTTE; RANDOLPH
MALILONG; ANNISSA MANOLOVITZ;
LISA MARTIN; MARIE MCASKILL;
JILL A. MENTZER; JOHN L.
MENTZER; VICKI L. MILLS; KAREN
MILLSAP; TERRENCE MILLSAP;
KYLIE MOREFIELD; ELIZABETH
MORGAN; TARA MOTT; CECILY
NEILSEN; ANTHONY B. NOCERA;
DIANE C. NOCERA; JESSICA PARKER;
RICHARD PARKER; PATRICIA
PLATTNER; MIKE RAMIREZ;
LUDMILLA REDKA; BRIAN REITZ;
KATHLEEN RISMOEN; MATTHEW
MONTGOMERY ROBERTS; LURA
ELAINE ROBERTSON; JANENE M.
ROLLINS; CLAUDE ROUGHT; DAN
RUDOLPH; DEBORAH A. RYAN;
RICHARD R. RYAN; STEVE SANBORN;
MICHAEL C. SCOTT; DAVEENE KIM
SEARS; GERALD L. SEARS; DARRON

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ALLEN V. THE BOEING CO. 3
SHOOK; LISA SHOOK; STACIE SIPPO;
HAROLD A. SPONBERG; PENNY J.
SPONBERG; TRENT B. TESTERMAN;
BERNADETTE J. TRANHOLT; ROBIN
L. TRANHOLT; JEFFREY A. TREKLA;
KAREN R. TREKLA; JESSICA A.
VAUGHN; GABRIEL WARREN; MAX
WERDEN; TINA WERDEN; STACY
WILEY; ANTHONY WILLIAMS; CINDA
J. ZITTERICH; RICKY L. ZITTERICH,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
THE BOEING COMPANY, a Delaware
Corporation,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
BOEING COMMERCIAL AIRPLANES;
LANDAU ASSOCIATES INC., a
Washington Corporation; DOES
1–50, inclusive,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Ricardo S. Martinez, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted
April 6, 2015—Seattle, Washington

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ALLEN V. THE BOEING CO. 4
Filed April 27, 2015
Before: Michael Daly Hawkins, Johnnie B. Rawlinson,
and Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Callahan;
Dissent by Judge Rawlinson
SUMMARY*
Class Action Fairness Act
The panel vacated the district court’s order, which
remanded this action to state court, because the action does
not come within the local single event exception to federal
jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”);
affirmed the district court’s denial of The Boeing Co.’s
allegation of fraudulent joinder; and referred plaintiffs’
assertion that the action came within the local controversy
exception to federal jurisdiction under CAFA to the district
court for initial consideration.
The plaintiff class filed a state action against Boeing and
Landau Associates Inc., alleging that plaintiffs incurred
property damage as a result of groundwater contamination
near Boeing’s Auburn, Washington plant. Boeing removed
the action to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, and
based on the action being a “mass action” pursuant to CAFA,
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B).
* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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ALLEN V. THE BOEING CO. 5
The district court held that plaintiffs’ action fell within the
local single event exception to federal jurisdiction under
CAFA, which provides that the term “mass action” does not
include a civil action in which all of the claims in the action
arose “from an event or occurrence in the State in which the
action was filed, and that allegedly resulted in injuries in that
State or in States contiguous to that State.” 28 U.S.C,
§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I).
The panel disagreed with the Third Circuit’s broad
definition of CAFA’s “event or occurrence” in Abraham v. St.
Croix Renaissance Group, L.L.L.P., 719 F.3d 270 (3d Cir.
2013), and adhered to the decision in Nevada v. Bank of
America Corp., 672 F.3d 661 (9th Cir. 2012), which held that
the local single event exception is limited to a “local single
event.” The panel concluded that plaintiffs did not allege a
single event or occurrence resulting from Boeing’s or
Landau’s acts. The panel also held that even if the panel
were to accept the Fifth Circuit’s approach that the term could
include a continuous pattern that led to a single event,
plaintiffs’ action would not come within that definition
because plaintiffs’ challenged several distinct actions on the
part of Boeing and Landau.
Concerning diversity jurisdiction and the alleged
fraudulent joinder of Landau, the panel held that Boeing had
not presented discrete and indisputable facts that would
preclude plaintiffs from recovering against Landau. The
panel affirmed the district court’s denial of Boeing’s
allegation that Landau was fraudulently joined, and held,
accordingly, that there was not complete diversity.
Finally, the panel referred plaintiffs’ assertion that their
action fell within the local controversy exception to federal

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ALLEN V. THE BOEING CO. 6
jurisdiction under CAFA, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A), to the
district court for consideration in the first instance.
Judge Rawlinson dissented from that portion of the
majority opinion reversing the remand of the case to state
court, and she would affirm the district court’s decision
remanding the case.
COUNSEL
Michael Sylvain Paisner, The Boeing Company, Renton,
Washington (argued); Jeffrey M. Hanson, Perkins Coie LLP,
Seattle, Washington; and Michael F. Williams, Peter A.
Farrell, Michael J. Podberesky, and Devin A. DeBacker,
Kirkland & Ellis, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Defendant-
Appellant.
Robert Finnerty, Thomas V. Giraldi, and David N. Bigelow
(argued), Giraldi/Keese, Los Angeles, California; Thomas
Vertetis, Pfau Cochran Vertetis, Tacoma, Washington, for
Plaintiffs-Appellees.
OPINION
CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge:
Jocelyn Allen and others ( Plaintiffs) sued The Boeing
Company (Boeing) and Landau Associates (Landau) in a
Washington state court alleging that for over forty years
Boeing released toxins into the groundwater around its
facility in Auburn, Washington, and that for over a decade
Landau had been negligent in its investigation and

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ALLEN V. THE BOEING CO. 7
remediation of the pollution. Boeing removed the case to the
District Court for the Western District of Washington
claiming federal jurisdiction based on diversity and the Class
Action Fairness Act (CAFA). The district court remanded the
case to state court holding that (1) Landau was not
fraudulently joined, and thus there was not complete
diversity, and (2) Plaintiffs’ action came within the local
single event exception to CAFA federal jurisdiction,
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I). Boeing sought and was
granted leave to appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c). We
hold that Plaintiffs’ action does not come within the local
single event exception to CAFA, and that, therefore, the
district court has federal jurisdiction under CAFA. We affirm
the district court’s determination that Boeing failed to show
that Landau was fraudulently joined. We refer Plaintiffs’
assertion that their action falls within the local controversy
exception to federal jurisdiction under CAFA, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(4)(A), to the district court for consideration in the
first instance.
I. Background
From the 1960s to the 1990s, Boeing used solvents that
allegedly contained hazardous chemicals in its aircraft parts
manufacturing plant in Auburn, Washington. In 1987, the
Washington State Department of Ecology (Department of
Ecology) initiated requirements for the treatment, storage and
handling of hazardous materials. In 2002, Boeing entered
into an agreement with the Department of Ecology to
investigate and remediate releases of hazardous substances
from its manufacturing plant and retained Landau to conduct
the investigation and remediation.

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ALLEN V. THE BOEING CO. 8
In November 2013, Plaintiffs filed an action against
Boeing and Landau in King County Superior Court,
Washington. Plaintiffs alleged that they “incurred property
damages as a result of groundwater contamination by
hazardous chemicals at and around” Boeing’s Auburn plant
“from the 1960s to the present.” They further alleged “that
Boeing and its environmental-remediation contractor,
Landau, are liable for negligently investigating, remediating,
and cleaning up the contamination and for failing to warn
Plaintiffs of the contamination.” Based on these allegations,
Plaintiffs asserted state law claims of negligence, nuisance,
and trespass against Boeing and negligence against Landau.
In April 2014, Boeing removed the action to the District
Court for the Western District of Washington. It asserted two
independent bases for federal jurisdiction: diversity
jurisdiction and CAFA. With respect to diversity jurisdiction,
Boeing alleged that Landau had been fraudulently joined to
defeat complete diversity.
On September 23, 2014, the district court held that
Landau had not been fraudulently joined, but that the action
fell within the local single event exception to federal
jurisdiction under CAFA, and remanded the case to the state
court.
II. The Local Single Event Exception
A. Standard of Review
Boeing filed a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1)
for leave to appeal, which we subsequently granted. We
review the remand order de novo. Ibarra v. Manheim Invs.,
Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 2015).

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ALLEN V. THE BOEING CO. 9
A defendant generally may remove a civil action if a
federal district court would have original jurisdiction over the
action. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The Supreme Court has
clarified that “no antiremoval presumption attends cases
invoking CAFA, which Congress enacted to facilitate
adjudication of certain class actions in federal court.” Dart
Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 554
(2014). This clarification reinforces our holding that “the
objecting party bears the burden of proof as to the
applicability of any express statutory exception under
§§ 1332(d)(4)(A) and (B).” Serrano v. 180 Connect, Inc.,
478 F.3d 1018, 1024 (9th Cir. 2007).1
B. Federal Jurisdiction
Boeing alleged federal jurisdiction based on diversity,
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), and on the ground that Plaintiffs’
action was a “mass action” pursuant to CAFA,
§ 1332(d)(11)(B). A “mass action” is defined as “any civil
action . . . in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more
persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the
plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of law or fact,
except that jurisdiction shall exist only over those plaintiffs
whose claims in a mass action satisfy the jurisdictional
amount requirements under subsection (a).” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(i). There is no real question that Plaintiffs’
action fits within this definition.
1 Our position is consistent with the perspectives of the Fifth, Seventh,
and Eleventh Circuits. See Frazier v. Pioneer Amer. LLC, 455 F.3d 542,
546 (5th Cir. 2006); Hart v. FedEx Ground Package Sys. Inc., 457 F.3d
675, 680 (7th Cir. 2006); and Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc., 449 F.3d 1159,
1164 (11th Cir. 2006).

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ALLEN V. THE BOEING CO. 10
However, § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii) sets forth certain
exceptions to CAFA jurisdiction. In particular, subsection
(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I) provides that the term “mass action” does not
include a civil action in which “all of the claims in the action
arise from an event or occurrence in the State in which the
action was filed, and that allegedly resulted in injuries in that
State or in States contiguous to that State.” It is the district
court’s holding that Plaintiffs’ action falls within this local
single event exception to federal jurisdiction under CAFA
that commands our attention.
C. Case law
We addressed the local event exception in Nevada v. Bank
of America Corp., 672 F.3d 661 (9th Cir. 2012). In that case,
Nevada brought a parens patriae action alleging that “Bank
of America misled Nevada consumers about the terms and
operation of its home mortgage modification and foreclosure
processes, in violation of [Nevada law].” Id. at 664. In the
process of concluding that the parens patriae action was not
a “mass action,” id. at 672, we stated:
The district court ruled that this action does
not qualify as a “mass action” under the
“event or occurrence” exclusion in CAFA,
which expressly provides that the term “mass
action” excludes any civil action in which “all
of the claims in the action arise from an event
or occurrence in the State in which the action
was filed, and that allegedly resulted in
injuries in that State . . . .” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I). The district court
reasoned that it lacked mass action
jurisdiction because “the claims all allegedly

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ALLEN V. THE BOEING CO. 11
arise from activity in Nevada and all injuries
allegedly resulted in Nevada.” This was a
misapplication of the “event or occurrence”
exclusion.
The “event or occurrence” exclusion applies
only where all claims arise from a single
event or occurrence. “[C]ourts have
consistently construed the ‘event or
occurrence’ language to apply only in cases
involving a single event or occurrence, such
as an environmental accident, that gives rise
to the claims of all plaintiffs.” Lafalier v.
Cinnabar Serv. Co., Inc., 2010 WL 1486900,
at *4 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 13, 2010). Moreover,
the legislative history of CAFA supports this
interpretation, making clear that the exception
was intended to apply “only to a truly local
single event with no substantial interstate
effects” in order to “allow cases involving
environmental torts such as a chemical spill to
remain in state court if both the event and the
injuries were truly local.” S. Rep. No.
109–14, at 41 (2005), reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 44. The Complaint in this
case alleges widespread fraud in thousands of
borrower interactions, and thus this action
does not come within the “event or
occurrence” exclusion.
Id. at 668.
The district court, however, thought that this action
against Boeing was more similar to Abraham v. St. Croix

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ALLEN V. THE BOEING CO. 12
Renaissance Group, L.L.L.P., 719 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 2013).
In Abraham, plaintiffs alleged that defendants purchased
property knowing that bauxite and piles of red mud on the
property had the propensity to disperse in wind, causing
injuring plaintiffs and their property. Id. at 273. The
defendants removed the case to district court. Id. The
plaintiffs argued that removal was improper because their
action fell within the local single event exception. Id. The
defendants responded that:
the exclusion for “an event or occurrence” did
not apply because it requires a single incident
and the plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that
“there were multiple events and occurrences
over many years.” It emphasized that the
exclusion requires that to avoid removal there
had to have been just “an event or
occurrence”—a “single” event or occurrence.
Id. at 274. The Third Circuit rejected the defendant’s
perspective and held that the action fell within the local single
event exception, explaining:
As the District Court explained, the “word
event in our view is not always confined to a
discrete happening that occurs over a short
time span such as a fire, explosion, hurricane,
or chemical spill. For example, one can speak
of the Civil War as a defining event in
American history, even though it took place
over a four-year period and involved many
battles.” The Court’s construction of the word
is consistent with the word’s common usage.
Important events in history are not always

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ALLEN V. THE BOEING CO. 13
limited to discrete incidents that happened at
a specific and precise moment in time.
As further support for this construction, we
note that the plain text of the exclusion and
the statutory scheme do not delimit the words
“event or occurrence” to a specific incident
with a fixed duration of time. Because the
words “event” and “occurrence” do not
commonly or necessarily refer in every
instance to what transpired at an isolated
moment in time, there is no reason for us to
conclude that Congress intended to limit the
phrase “event or occurrence” in
§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I) in this fashion.
Accordingly, where the record demonstrates
circumstances that share some commonality
and persist over a period of time, these can
constitute “an event or occurrence” for
p u r p o s e s o f t h e e x c l u s i o n i n
§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I).
In short, treating a continuing set of
circumstances collectively as an “event or
occurrence” for purposes of the mass-action
exclusion is consistent with the ordinary usage
of these words, which do not necessarily have
a temporal limitation. Giving the words
“event” or “occurrence” their ordinary
meaning is not at odds with the purpose of the
statutory scheme of CAFA. Congress clearly
contemplated that some mass actions are
better suited to adjudication by the state courts
in which they originated. This intent is

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ALLEN V. THE BOEING CO. 14
evident in both the “event or occurrence”
exclusion for mass actions, as well as the
local-controversy and home-state exceptions
in § 1332(d)(4)(A) and (B) for class actions.
These provisions assure that aggregate actions
with substantial ties to a particular state
remain in the courts of that state.
719 F.3d at 277–78 (internal citations omitted).
D. Analysis
1. The exception is limited to a single happening.
We must consider whether the district court’s
determination that Plaintiffs’ action comes within the local
single event exception based on the Third Circuit’s opinion
in Abraham, should be, or can be, reconciled with our opinion
in Nevada. With due respect to the Third Circuit, we do not
agree with its definition of “event or occurrence” as that term
is used in CAFA. We find that such a broad definition
renders portions of CAFA redundant and is not supported by
legislative history. Furthermore, even if “event or
occurrence” could be interpreted to cover one continuing
activity or tort, Plaintiffs in this case seek relief from at least
two distinct activities.
Initially, we note that to the extent that the definition of
“event or occurrence” in Abraham conflicts with the
definition in Nevada, we are bound by our opinion in Nevada.
Rodriguez v. AT & T Mobility Services LLC, 728 F.3d 975,
979 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that “we are bound by prior
panel decisions . . . and can only reexamine them when their
‘reasoning or theory’ of that authority is ‘clearly

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ALLEN V. THE BOEING CO. 15
irreconcilable’ with the reasoning or theory of intervening
higher authority”).
However, even were we free to interpret the phrase as we
would, we would not adopt the Third Circuit’s approach. In
context, it is clear that the phrase “event or occurrence” was
not intended to cover something like the Civil War. The
common definition of “event” is “something (especially
something important or notable) that happens”2 or “a thing
that happens, esp. one of importance.”3 Similarly, the
common definition of “occurrence” is “something that
happens”4 or “an incident or event.”5 This is not to say that
in recounting the history of the United States, the Civil War
may not fairly be described as an “event.” But, in the context
of determining whether a legal cause of action concerns an
“event” or an “occurrence” for purposes of CAFA, the terms
most commonly and reasonably refer to a singular happening.
There is no reason to think that Congress intended anything
else.
A careful parsing of CAFA reveals no support for a
broader reading of the term. Instead, the phrase “event or
occurrence” in 28 U.S.C. § (d)(11)(B)(ii)(I) is used to limit
2 Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/event
(last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
3 The New Oxford American Dictionary 588 (Elizabeth J. Jewell &
Frank Abate, eds., 2001).
4 Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
occurrence (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
5 The New Oxford American Dictionary 1184 (Elizabeth J. Jewell &
Frank Abate, eds., 2001).

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ALLEN V. THE BOEING CO. 16
the types of mass actions for which there is not federal
jurisdiction. A civil action is exempt only if “all of the claims
. . . arise from an event or occurrence” and the resulting
alleged injuries occurred in a single state or in contiguous
states. Id. In other words, the statute requires that the district
court review the allegations of a complaint to determine
whether all the claims are based on a singular happening.
Indeed, giving “event or occurrence” a broader definition
is inconsistent with the overall structure of CAFA. CAFA
contains a number of detailed exceptions to its grant of
federal jurisdiction.6 Principal among these is the local
controversy exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A).7 Giving
6 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(A) (denying jurisdiction where “the
primary defendants are States, State officials, or other governmental
entities against whom the district court may be foreclosed from ordering
relief”); and § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(III) (excluding from the definition of
mass action any case where “all of the claims in the action are asserted on
behalf of the general public (and not on behalf of individual claimants or
members of a purported class) pursuant to a State statute specifically
authorizing such action”). In addition, § 1332(d)(3) provides that a district
court “may, in the interest of justice and looking at the totality of the
circumstance,” decline to exercise federal jurisdiction under CAFA over
certain class actions “in which greater than one-third but less than
two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate
and the primary defendants are citizens of the State in which the action
was originally filed.”
7 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A) provides:
A district court shall decline to exercise jurisdiction
under paragraph (2)–(A)(i) over a class action in
which–
(I) greater than two-thirds of the members of all
proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate are

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ALLEN V. THE BOEING CO. 17
“event or occurrence” a broad definition tends to obfuscate
the boundaries between the exceptions. For example, if the
single happening requirement is read out of the local event
exception (§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I)), then the criteria for the
local controversy exception (§ 1332(d)(4)(A)) become
redundant (at least where the alleged spill does not cross a
state line). There would be no need to consider the local
controversy exception’s criteria, such as whether at least two-
thirds of the members of a class were citizens of the State or
at least one significant defendant is a citizen of the State, if
the local single event exception applied to all “circumstances
citizens of the State in which the action was
originally filed;
(II) at least 1 defendant is a defendant–
(aa) from whom significant relief is sought by
members of the plaintiff class;
(bb) whose alleged conduct forms a
significant basis for the claims asserted by the
proposed plaintiff class; and
(cc) who is a citizen of the State in which the
action was originally filed; and
(III) principal injuries resulting from the alleged
conduct or any related conduct of each defendant
were incurred in the State in which the action was
originally filed; and
(ii) during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that
class action, no other class action has been filed
asserting the same or similar factual allegations against
any of the defendants on behalf of the same or other
persons.

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ALLEN V. THE BOEING CO. 18
that share some commonality and persist over a period of
time.” See Abraham, 719 F.3d at 277.
The singular nature of the term is also supported by
legislative history. The Senate Committee Report includes
the following passage:
The Committee finds that mass actions are
simply class actions in disguise. They involve
a lot of people who want their claims
adjudicated together and they often result in
the same abuses as class actions. In fact,
sometimes the abuses are even worse because
the lawyers seek to join claims that have little
to do with each other and confuse a jury into
awarding millions of dollars to individuals
who have suffered no real injury.
For these reasons, it is the Committee’s intent
that the exceptions to this provision be
interpreted strictly by federal courts. The first
exception would apply only to a truly local
single event with no substantial interstate
effects. The purpose of this exception was to
allow cases involving environmental torts
such as a chemical spill to remain in state
court if both the event and the injuries were
truly local, even though there are some
out-of-state defendants.

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ALLEN V. THE BOEING CO. 19
S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 7 (2005), reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 44.8 This passage reflects that the Senate
sought to exclude from the exception cases where the
plaintiffs sought to “join claims that have little to do with
each other” and to limit the exception to cases that arise out
of “a truly local single event with no substantial interstate
effects.” Moreover, the Report states that the exception is to
“be interpreted strictly by federal courts.” The concluding
quoted sentence does not alter this reading because, rather
than expand the exception to apply to all cases involving
environmental torts, the Report states that the exception
applies to a “chemical spill” not chemical spills.9 Thus, the
legislative history draws the line between a one-time
chemical spill and a continuing course of pollution,
contamination, or conduct that occurs over a period of years.
For example, if an oil refinery has an accident and, as a result,
releases toxic materials into the air or water, a suit against the
refinery based on the accidental release of contaminants
would fall within the exception, but an action against the
refinery alleging a continuous course of pollution over a
number of years would not.
8 The suggestion in Tanoh v. Dow Chemical Co., 561 F.3d 945, 954 n.5
(9th Cir. 2009), and other cases, that the Senate Committee Report
provided minimal guidance because it was not printed until ten days after
CAFA’s passage, was implicitly rebutted by the Supreme Court last year
when, in Dart, it cited to the Report. 135 S. Ct. at 554. See also Lowery
v. Alabama Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1206 n.50 (11th Cir. 2007)
(“While the report was issued ten days following CAFA’s enactment, it
was submitted to the Senate on February 3, 2006—while that body was
considering the bill.”).
9 Reading this sentence to expand the exception to cover all instances
where “both the events and injuries were truly local” is precisely the
reading we rejected in Nevada, 672 F.3d at 668.

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ALLEN V. THE BOEING CO. 20
Furthermore, the admonition in the Report that exceptions
to CAFA are to be strictly interpreted has been endorsed by
the courts. In Dart, the Supreme Court noted that there was
no presumption against removal jurisdiction and that CAFA
should be read “with a strong preference that interstate class
actions should be heard in a federal court if properly removed
by any defendant.” 135 S. Ct. at 554 (quoting S. Rep. No.
109-14, at 43). See also Jordan v. Nationstar Mort. LLC, –
F.3d – , 2015 WL 1447217, at * 5 (9th Cir. Apr. 1, 2015)
(noting the Supreme Court’s reference to Congress’s overall
intent to strongly favor the exercise of federal diversity
jurisdiction over class actions). The Supreme Court’s opinion
in Dart reinforces our holding in Serrano, 478 F.3d at 1024,
that “the objecting party bears the burden of proof as to the
applicability of any express statutory exception under
§§ 1332(d)(4)(A) and (B).”
In sum, even accepting that the meaning of “event or
occurrence” as used in § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I) is ambiguous,
we are constrained to read it as referring to a single
happening because this definition: (1) reflects the most
common understanding of the terms; (2) is consistent with,
and furthers the purposes of CAFA; (3) conforms to the
judicially endorsed admonition in CAFA that exceptions to
federal jurisdiction under CAFA are to be strictly construed;
and (4) is consistent with, if not compelled by, our opinion in
Nevada, 672 F.3d 661.
2. Plaintiffs’ action does not come within even a broad
interpretation of event or occurrence.
Even if the single local event exception were to be read as
covering some allegations of a continuing nature, Plaintiffs’
action would not come within such an expanded definition.

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ALLEN V. THE BOEING CO. 21
The Fifth Circuit adopted such an approach in Rainbow Gun
Club, Inc. v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C., 760 F.3d 405 (5th Cir.
2014). In that case, the plaintiffs brought an action in
Louisiana state court alleging that Denbury “breached its duty
to act as a reasonable and prudent operator of the well that
was drilled under [their] leases.” Id. at 407. In other words,
the well had been depleted and was no longer producing. Id.
at 413. Denbury removed the case to federal court under
CAFA, but the district court remanded it to state court,
finding that it came within the local single event exclusion.
Id. at 408. On Denbury’s appeal, the Fifth Circuit concluded:
“[a]lthough the exclusion certainly applies in cases in which
the single event or occurrence happens at a discrete moment
in time, the single event or occurrence may also be
constituted by a pattern of conduct in which the pattern is
consistent in leading to a single focused event that culminates
in the basis of the asserted liability.” Id. at 412.
The Fifth Circuit’s approach is neither helpful to
Plaintiffs nor necessarily contrary to Nevada, 672 F.3d 661.
The case before the Fifth Circuit concerned a single “event or
occurrence,” the failure of a well, although the precise timing
of the failure was not clear. Referring by analogy to the
Deepwater Horizon spill, the Fifth Circuit noted that the spill
“resulted from a number of individual negligent acts related
to each other, all of which came together to culminate in the
single event.” Id. at 413. Similarly, although the alleged
underlying acts in Rainbow Gun Club may have occurred
over a period of time, they resulted in a single happening, the
failure of the well, which produced the alleged injuries to the
plaintiffs.
In contrast, here Plaintiffs do not allege a single event or
occurrence resulting from Boeing’s or Landau’s acts. Rather,

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ALLEN V. THE BOEING CO. 22
Boeing is alleged to be responsible for the leeching of
hazardous materials over forty years and Landau is alleged to
be responsible for negligently failing to remediate the
pollution (but not to have caused the pollution) for over a
decade. Thus, even under the Fifth Circuit’s approach to the
local single event exception, Plaintiffs have not alleged the
requisite singular happening. Perhaps, under the Fifth
Circuit’s approach, Plaintiffs’ action would fit within the
local single event exception if they had sued only Boeing for
its alleged pollution, or only Landau for its alleged
negligence. However, Plaintiffs’ action asserts claims against
two distinct defendants for at least two separate activities.
We adhere to our decision in Nevada, 672 F.3d 661, that
the local single event exception is limited to a “local single
event,” but, in this case, even if we were to accept the Fifth
Circuit’s approach that this term could include a continuous
pattern that led to a single event, Plaintiffs’ action would not
come within that definition because Plaintiffs challenge
several distinct actions on the part of Boeing and Landau.
III. Fraudulent Joinder
As discussed below, unless another CAFA exception
applies, our determination that the Plaintiffs’ action does not
come within the local single event exception establishes
federal jurisdiction under CAFA, and thus negates the need
for Boeing to establish complete diversity based on Landau’s
alleged fraudulent joinder. Nonetheless, we address Boeing’s
allegation of fraudulent joinder because it is relevant to
another possibly applicable CAFA exception, the local
controversy exception, which we refer to the district court.
See supra.

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ALLEN V. THE BOEING CO. 23
A. Standard of Review
In Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th
Cir. 2009), we indicated that a denial of a motion to remand
to state court is reviewed de novo. We noted that a joinder is
fraudulent when a plaintiff’s failure to state a cause of action
against the resident defendant is obvious according to the
applicable state law. Id. at 1043. Agreeing with the Fifth
Circuit, we held that:
“. . . a summary inquiry is appropriate only to
identify the presence of discrete and
undisputed facts that would preclude
plaintiff’s recovery against the in-state
defendant” and reasoned that “the inability to
make the requisite decision in a summary
manner itself points to an inability of the
removing party to carry its burden.”
[Smallwood v. Illinois Central R. R. Co.,
385 F.3d 568] at 573–74 [(5th Cir. 2004) (en
banc)]. The court further stated that “[t]he
party seeking removal bears a heavy burden
of proving that the joinder of the in-state party
was improper.” Id. at 574.
Id. at 1044. We also agreed with the Eleventh Circuit, that “if
there is a possibility that a state court would find that the
complaint states a cause of action against any of the resident
defendants, the federal court must find that the joinder was
proper and remand the case to the state court.” Hunter,
582 F.3d at 1046 (quoting Tillman v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco,
340 F.3d 1277, 1279 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam)).

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ALLEN V. THE BOEING CO. 24
B. The contentions
Boeing argues that Plaintiffs’ complaint contains only
conclusory allegations that do not suffice to satisfy the
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Although the complaint alleged that Landau failed to act
reasonably in investigating, evaluating, remediating,
eliminating, and cleaning-up the hazardous substances, and
failed to warn Plaintiffs about the presence of hazardous
substances, Boeing claims that the complaint contains “not a
single allegation tying any duty owed by Landau to any of
these 116 Plaintiffs.” Boeing argues that: (1) Plaintiffs were
not parties to the contract between Boeing and Landau;
(2) the parties to the contract did not intend to create an
obligation to third parties: and (3) the parties, in fact,
expressly disclaimed that there were any third party
beneficiaries. Boeing further asserts that Plaintiffs’ claims
fail because “Landau was acting under the direction” of the
Department of Ecology, “a government agency that oversaw
and supervised each step of Landau’s work.”
Plaintiffs respond that under Washington state law
engineering firms owe a duty to third parties, even without
privity, that Plaintiffs have alleged that Landau owed them a
duty of care, and that they are “third party beneficiaries of
Defendants’ contract despite their attempts to disclaim such
benefits.”
The district court, citing Warner v. Design & Build
Homes, Inc., 114 P.3d 664, 670 (Wash. App. 2005), found
that, under Washington state law, a third party beneficiary
contract exists when the contracting parties “at the time they
enter into the contract, intend that the promisor will assume
a direct obligation to the claimed beneficiary.” The district

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ALLEN V. THE BOEING CO. 25
court further held, again relying on Warner, that the “test of
intent is an objective one—whether performance under the
contract necessarily and directly benefits the third party.”
The district court recognized that there was no indication that
Boeing and Landau “intended to benefit residents near and
around the Auburn plant.” However the district court
concluded:
it is clear that Landau’s performance of its
obligations under the contract would
“necessarily and directly benefit” the
Plaintiffs in this action. Indeed, part of its
obligations included remediation services and
engineering services. Plaintiffs allege that the
remediation services were performed
negligently. Therefore, the Court finds that it
is conceivable based on Plaintiffs’ Amended
Complaint that Landau voluntarily undertook
remediation services to benefit the Plaintiffs
and performed those services negligently.
C. Analysis
Boeing has not met its heavy burden of showing that there
is no possibility that Washington law might impose liability
on Landau. It seems clear that some, if not most, of the
remediation efforts undertaken by Landau were intended to
benefit Plaintiffs and their property. Thus, even accepting
Boeing’s representations that its contract expressly
disclaimed any intent to create third party beneficiaries, and
that neither Boeing nor Landau had any intent to create third
party beneficiaries, a court could reasonably conclude that the
contract did just that. We, like the district court, do not pass
on the merits of any such conceivable claim. We hold only

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ALLEN V. THE BOEING CO. 26
that Boeing has not presented discrete and indisputable facts
that would preclude Plaintiffs from recovering against
Landau. See Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1044.
IV. The Local Controversy Exception
After Boeing removed this action to the district court,
Plaintiffs filed their motion to remand, arguing that there was
complete diversity, the case was not a mass action under
CAFA because it came within the local single event
exception to federal jurisdiction under CAFA, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I), and that the case satisfied the local
controversy exception, id. § 1332(d)(4)(A). Boeing
responded to all three arguments in its opposition to remand,
but the district court’s order remanding the case addressed
only fraudulent joinder and the local single event exception.
Accordingly, Boeing’s petition for leave to appeal pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1453(1), which we granted, addressed only the
district court’s rulings on fraudulent joinder and the local
single event exception. Nonetheless, both sides addressed the
local controversy exception in their briefs and at oral
argument.
Our leading case on the local controversy exception,
Coleman v. Estes Express Lines, Inc., 631 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir.
2011), states that a plaintiff seeking remand under this
exception has the burden of showing that it applies and that
we review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Id. at
1013–14. Coleman further holds “that CAFA’s language
unambiguously directs the district court to look only to the
complaint in deciding whether the criteria set forth in
§ 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)(aa) and (bb) are satisfied.” Id. at 1015.
Unlike subsection (cc) which requires that the court
determine whether a defendant “is a citizen of the State,”

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ALLEN V. THE BOEING CO. 27
subsections (aa) and (bb) require only that “significant relief
is sought” from the defendant and that the defendants’
“alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims.”
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)(aa)–(cc). Coleman offers
three reasons for courts not looking beyond the complaint in
determining whether a case satisfies the requirements of
subsections (aa) and (bb): (1) “the plain language of these
subsections indicates, through the use of the words ‘sought’
and ‘alleged,’ that the district court is to look to the complaint
rather than to extrinsic evidence”; (2) “though district courts
sometimes consider evidence in making some subject matter
jurisdiction determinations, they do not always do so”; and
(3) “factual determinations under subsections (aa) and (bb)
are likely to be more expensive and time consuming than
factual determinations of citizenship and amount-in-
controversy.” 631 F.3d at 1016. Coleman concludes that
“nothing in CAFA . . . indicates a congressional intention to
turn a jurisdictional determination concerning the local
defendant’s ‘alleged conduct’ into a mini-trial on the merits
of the plaintiff’s claims.” Id. at 1017.
Although Coleman directs us to look only to the
complaint in determining whether Plaintiffs have met the
criteria set forth in § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)(aa) and (bb), we
decline to make this determination in the first instance. As
noted, the issue was not addressed by the district court.
Furthermore, the time restraints for deciding a CAFA appeal,
see 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(2), make it more difficult for the
parties to fully brief, and the court to consider, issues that
were not fully fleshed out in the district court.
More importantly, whether Plaintiffs’ case meets these
criteria for the local controversy exception raises questions
under Washington law that merit more briefing and

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ALLEN V. THE BOEING CO. 28
consideration than is feasible under § 1453(c)(2), and might
even require that Plaintiffs amend their complaint. In
Coleman, we recognized “the difficulties that can be created
by different pleading requirements in state and federal
courts.” 631 F.3d at 1020. Accordingly, it is possible that if
a case “is removed from state to federal court under CAFA
the complaint, as originally drafted, will not answer the
questions that need to be answered before the federal court
can determine whether the suit comes within the local
controversy exception.” Id. at 1020–21. Coleman concluded
that in such a circumstance, “the district court may, in its
discretion, require or permit the plaintiff to file an amended
complaint that addresses any relevant CAFA criteria.” Id. at
1021.
As previously indicated, Boeing argues that Plaintiffs’
complaint is too conclusory to meet the requirements of Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and does not specify how Landau’s
undertakings were to benefit Plaintiffs. It also argues that
Plaintiffs are not third-party beneficiaries to the contract.
Plaintiffs respond that their complaint is adequate under
Washington law and that certain obligations and
responsibilities arise as a matter of Washington law. Both
Boeing and the district court cite Burg v. Shannon & Wilson,
Inc., 43 P.3d 526 (Wash. App. 2002), but Boeing concluded
that Plaintiffs cannot assert a viable cause of action, while the
district court concluded that they might be able to assert a
claim for negligence. Thus, the adequacy of Plaintiffs’
complaint under Washington law is not clear.
Moreover, whether Plaintiffs seek “significant relief”
from Landau and whether Landau’s conduct “forms a
significant basis” for their claims are not simple issues. They
appear to fall between the two examples in the legislative

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ALLEN V. THE BOEING CO. 29
history that are noted in Coleman. Clearly, Landau’s
involvement is greater than the car dealership in the first
example, but its involvement is also much less than that of
the Florida funeral home in the second example. See
Coleman, 631 F.3d at 1018. Landau’s “alleged conduct” is
distinct from Boeing’s alleged pollution. The consequences
of Landau’s alleged conduct may also be separate from the
alleged harm from Boeing’s actions. In addition, even if the
alleged harm from Boeing’s activities is far greater than the
alleged harm from Landau’s activities, it is not clear that the
relief sought from Landau is not “significant.” Coleman
indicates that courts should not inquire into “the factual
swamp of assessing the financial viability of a defendant,” id.
at 1017 (quoting Coffey v. Freeport McMoran Copper &
Gold, 581 F.3d 1240, 1245 (10th Cir. 2009)), but Coleman
does not address whether “significant relief” is an
independent factor or is related to the relief sought from other
defendants.
In sum, although Coleman directs our attention to the
complaint in deciding whether Plaintiffs have satisfied the
criteria for the local controversy exception to federal
jurisdiction under CAFA, on the record and briefing before
us, we decline to attempt to determine in the first instance
whether Plaintiffs’ case fits within the exception.
Accordingly, we leave this issue for the district court to
consider.10
10 At oral argument, Boeing agreed that a remand was an available
option.

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ALLEN V. THE BOEING CO. 30
V. Conclusion
Because Plaintiffs’ action does not come within the local
single event exception to federal jurisdiction under CAFA,
the district court’s order remanding this case to state court is
vacated. The district court’s denial of Boeing’s allegation of
fraudulent joinder is affirmed, and accordingly, there is not
complete diversity. Finally, Plaintiffs’ assertion that their
action comes within the local controversy exception to federal
jurisdiction under CAFA is referred to the district court for
initial consideration.
VACATED AND REMANDED. Each side shall bear its
own costs.
RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part:
I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority
opinion reversing the remand of this case to state court. The
facts of this case fall somewhere between our decision in
Nevada v. Bank of America, 672 F.3d 661 (9th Cir. 2012),
and the Third Circuit’s decision in Abraham v. St. Croix
Renaissance Group, L.L.L.P., 719 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 2013).
Ultimately, I conclude that the analysis in Abraham is more
persuasive on the particular issue we are called upon to
decide.
I am persuaded to this view by the particular facts of the
respective cases. In the Nevada case, the state’s Attorney
General filed an action against Bank of America, alleging that
the bank “misled Nevada consumers about the terms and
operation of its home mortgage modification and foreclosure

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ALLEN V. THE BOEING CO. 31
processes . . .” Nevada, 672 F.3d at 664. Bank of America
removed the action to federal court under the Class Action
Fairness Act (the Act). The district court denied the state’s
motion to remand, and this court granted the state’s request
for leave to appeal. See id. at 665. We identified the pivotal
issue as whether the action qualified as a mass action.
Specifically, we considered whether the “event or
occurrence” exclusion in the Act precluded federal
jurisdiction. See id. at 668; see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I) (excluding from the Act’s definition
of “mass action” a “civil action in which all of the claims in
the action arise from an event or occurrence in the State in
which the action was filed”). We explained that the “event or
concurrence exclusion applies only where all claims arise
from a single event or occurrence . . .” Nevada, 672 F.3d at
668 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in the
original). We noted that this standard was not met because
the action filed by the Attorney General “allege[d]
widespread fraud in thousands of borrower interactions . . .”
Id.
In contrast to Nevada, the facts in Abraham more closely
mirror the facts of this case. The defendant purchased a
former alumina refinery. The plaintiffs alleged in their
complaint that the refinery released hazardous materials that
were dispersed and disseminated by wind and erosion. See
719 F.3d at 272–73. Plaintiffs also alleged that the defendant
failed to abate the dispersal and dissemination of the
hazardous substances. See id. at 273.
The parties disagreed about whether the “event or
occurrence” exclusion applied. The plaintiffs argued that
their action came within the exclusion “because every
operative incident occurred [locally] and caused injury and

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ALLEN V. THE BOEING CO. 32
damages to the plaintiffs’ persons and property [locally].” Id.
at 274 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).
According to the plaintiffs, their claims arose “from an event
or occurrence [locally] that happened at a single location, the
alumina refinery. . . .” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The defendant countered that the “event or occurrence”
exclusion was inapplicable “because it requires a single
incident and the plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that there were
multiple events and occurrences over many years. . . .” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). On appeal, the Third
Circuit reasoned that “[i]n common parlance, neither the term
event nor occurrence is used solely to refer to a specific
incident that can be definitively limited to an ascertainable
period of minutes, hours or days.” Id. at 277 (footnote
reference and internal quotation marks omitted). The Third
Circuit noted that the words “event” and “occurrence” do not
“necessarily” embody a “temporal limitation.” Id.
The Third Circuit concluded that the complaint’s
allegations asserted “circumstances that persisted over a fixed
period of time—specifically, from 2002, when [defendant]
acquired the former alumina refinery, to [2013].” Id. at 279.
The Third Circuit delineated the allegations in the complaint
as including the hazardous substances embedded in the mud,
the plaintiffs’ exposure to those hazardous substances, and
the failure of the defendant to remediate. See id. The Third
Circuit adopted the district court’s characterization of
plaintiffs’ allegations as involving “the continuous release of
toxic substances from a single facility located in the Virgin
Islands . . .” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Third Circuit agreed that “these circumstances” met the
“event or occurrence” exclusion in the Act, and affirmed the

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ALLEN V. THE BOEING CO. 33
district court’s remand of the action to state court. Id. at
279–80.
There is a clear parallel between the allegations made by
the plaintiffs in the Abraham case and the allegations made
by the plaintiffs in this case. Although I would not
necessarily go so far as to label the Civil War a single event
under the Act, the approach taken by the Third Circuit is
otherwise reasonable. The plaintiffs in this case made
allegations similar to those made in Abraham. In their
Amended Complaint, they alleged that they and their
properties were affected by the release of toxic chemicals and
other hazardous substances emanating from the operations of
defendant Boeing. Plaintiffs also alleged that Boeing and its
agent Landau Associates failed to adequately remediate the
hazardous substances. All of the affected residents and
properties were located in Algona, Washington and made
identical claims against Boeing and Landau Associates.
Plaintiffs identified two plumes of volatile organic
chemicals originating from the same Boeing plant as the
source of their injuries. The district court described the
allegations as follows:
As in Abraham, Plaintiffs’ Amended
Complaint alleges circumstances that
persisted over a fixed period of time—
specifically, from the late 1960s and/or mid-
1970s, when Boeing bought and used certain
property as an airplane manufacturing site,
through the present. These circumstances
included: 1) Boeing’s use of certain chemical
solvents as degreasing agents for their metal
parts, which allegedly leeched into the

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ALLEN V. THE BOEING CO. 34
surrounding groundwater, then soil and air;
2) the Plaintiffs’ alleged continual exposure to
the chemical solvents as the chemicals
escaped the groundwater into the soil and into
the air; and 3) the alleged failures of Boeing
and its subcontractor to properly remediate
the hazard and/or inform neighboring owners
of the hazard. . . . Simply put, [Plaintiffs]
allege that the condition of the site during the
period of Boeing’s use and ownership
provided a source for the ongoing emission of
chemical solvents into the site’s groundwater
(then soil and air) which were subsequently
dispersed onto the Plaintiffs’ persons and
property, and which have not been properly
remediated . . . .
District Court Order, p. 6 (citations omitted).
I agree with the district court this case is more like
Abraham than Nevada.
It is understandable why we held that the “event or
occurrence” exclusion did not apply in Nevada. The
allegations in the complaint alleged fraud in thousands of
individual lending transactions. See Nevada, 672 F.3d at 668.
Each loan is necessarily dependent on highly individualized
circumstances, including creditworthiness and income. See,
e.g., Enriquez v. Countrywide Home Loans, 814 F. Supp. 2d
1042, 1051–52 (D. Haw. 2011) (referencing plaintiff’s credit
rating and debt to income ratio in relation to her loan
qualification process).

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ALLEN V. THE BOEING CO. 35
In addition to the obvious individualized circumstances at
issue in Nevada, two other matters are noteworthy. The first
is that the State of Nevada did not even contend that the
“event or occurrence” exclusion applied in the district court
or on appeal. Nevada, 672 F.3d at 668 n.2. The second is
that we expressly referenced “environmental torts such as a
chemical spill” as occurrences to which the exception was
“clear[ly] . . . intended to apply.” Id. at 668. These
considerations persuade me that Nevada does not support the
outcome reached by the majority.
A recent decision from the Fifth Circuit similarly
distinguished our “ambiguous decision” in Nevada. Rainbow
Gun Club, Inc. v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C., 760 F.3d 405,
412 (5th Cir. 2014). As discussed above, the Fifth Circuit
also highlighted our citation in Nevada to an “environmental
tort” as an “example that satisfies [the “event or occurrence”]
language” and our holding that the single event exclusion
“cannot apply to . . . thousands of separate transactions.” Id.
(citation omitted). The reasoning of the Third Circuit in
Abraham, the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Rainbow Gun
Club, and the disparate facts of Nevada lead me to dissent. I
would affirm the district court decision remanding this case
to state court.

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