Samark Jose Lopez Bello v. Andrea M. Gacki

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued January 19, 2024 Decided March 12, 2024
No. 23-5036
S AMARK J OSE LOPEZ B ELLO ,
APPELLANT
v.
ANDREA M. GACKI, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR
OF THE OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS C ONTROL AND UNITED
S TATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY OFFICE OF FOREIGN
ASSETS C ONTROL,
APPELLEES
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:21-cv-01727)
Erich C. Ferrari argued the cause and filed the briefs for
appellant.
Benjamin M. Shultz, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were
Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, and Sharon Swingle, Attorney.
Before: S RINIVASAN , Chief Judge, H ENDERSON, Circuit
Judge, and R ANDOLPH , Senior Circuit Judge.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.
KAREN LEC RAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: The Office
of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), a part of the U.S.
Department of the Treasury (Treasury), named two Venezuelan
men as Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers (SDNTs or
Traffickers). OFAC designated Tareck Zaidan El Aissami for
“playing a significant role in international narcotics
trafficking,” see 21 U.S.C. § 1904(b)(4), and Samark Jose
Lopez Bello for materially assisting in that trafficking and
providing support to El Aissami. See id. § 1904(b)(2)–(3). In
this action, Lopez Bello alleged that OFAC and its Acting
Director erred in designating him a Trafficker. The district
court rejected his challenge and we affirm.
I.
The Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Kingpin
Act), 21 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1908, authorizes the President or the
Treasury Secretary to name persons as Traffickers. The
Kingpin Act authorizes the imposition of sanctions on
Traffickers, their organizations and supporting persons whose
“activities threaten the national security, foreign policy, and
economy of the United States.” Id. § 1902. The President and
the Secretary can designate so-called Tier 1 Traffickers—those
who play “a significant role in international narcotics
trafficking.” Id. §§ 1903 (President’s authority), 1904(b)(4)
(Secretary’s authority), 1907(7). The Secretary can also
designate as so-called Tier 2 Traffickers (1) those who
materially assist, provide financial or technological support for
or to, or provide goods or services in support of a Tier 1
Trafficker’s trafficking activities, and (2) those who support or
act for or on behalf of Tier 1 Traffickers. Id. § 1904(b)(2)–(3).
The Secretary has delegated his Kingpin Act authority to the

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OFAC Director. 31 C.F.R. § 598.803. A Trafficker
designation—Tiers 1 and 2—blocks all of the designee’s assets
in the United States or under the control of persons in the
United States. 21 U.S.C. § 1904(b). All assets are “effectively
frozen.” Zevallos v. Obama, 793 F.3d 106, 110 (D.C. Cir.
2015). No person can transact or deal with the frozen property,
as doing so risks civil and/or criminal penalties. 21 U.S.C. §§
1904(c), 1906(a)–(b).
Designation under the Kingpin Act is analogous to several
other Executive Branch designations. See Fares v. Smith, 901
F.3d 315, 318 (D.C. Cir. 2018). The Congress based the
Kingpin Act on Executive Order 12978’s successful
application of the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (IEEPA) against Colombian narcotics Traffickers. H.R.
Rep. No. 106-457, at 42 (1999) (Conf. Rep.); see Exec. Order
No. 12,978, 60 Fed. Reg. 54579 (Oct. 21, 1995); 50 U.S.C. §§
1701–1707. IEEPA is itself analogous to the antiterrorism
provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 8 U.S.C. § 1189. Under IEEPA,
AEDPA and the Kingpin Act, any designated person or entity
is added to the “Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked
Persons List” and subject to asset freezing. See Zevallos, 793
F.3d at 110; 31 C.F.R. § 501.807(a).
A Kingpin Act designee “may seek administrative
reconsideration” before OFAC and request “delisting.” 31
C.F.R. § 501.807. The designee may submit evidence that
demonstrates “the insufficient basis” for the designation or that
“circumstances resulting in the designation no longer apply.”
Id. Said another way, the designee must show that OFAC’s
basis for designation “was never true or is no longer true.”
Zevallos, 793 F.3d at 110. OFAC reviews the reconsideration
request and subsequently provides a written decision. 31 C.F.R.

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§ 501.807(d). A designee can request delisting “as many times
as he likes.” Zevallos, 793 F.3d at 110.
Lopez Bello, a citizen of Venezuela and Italy, ran several
corporations related to the Venezuelan oil and gas industries.
He also conducted business in the United States, held U.S.
visas and resided in Florida. OFAC simultaneously designated
El Aissami and Lopez Bello in 2017. Sanctions Actions
Pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act,
82 Fed. Reg. 11101, 11101–02 (Feb. 17, 2017). OFAC
designated El Aissami, then Executive Vice President of
Venezuela, as a Tier 1 Trafficker under 21 U.S.C. § 1904(b)(4)
and Lopez Bello as a Tier 2 Trafficker under § 1904(b)(2)–(3).
Id. The designation also blocked thirteen entities and an
aircraft, all associated with Lopez Bello.1 Id. A Treasury press
release explained that Lopez Bello served as a “frontman,”
handled “business arrangements and financial matters” and
laundered drug proceeds on El Aissami’s behalf.2
Lopez Bello requested the full administrative record
supporting his designation and blocking. In response, OFAC
provided the administrative record supporting designation but
redacted classified, privileged and law enforcement sensitive
information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 1903(e). OFAC also
provided him with a copy of the Designation and Blocking
Memorandum, the Federal Register notice and the press release
1 Based on OFAC’s factual findings, third-party plaintiffs
holding judgments against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) have successfully executed on some of the
blocked assets. Other assets remain subject to post-judgment writs of
garnishment and execution. J.A. 68–69.
2 Treasury Sanctions Prominent Venezuelan Drug Trafficker
Tareck El Aissami and His Primary Frontman Samark Lopez Bello,
U.S. DEP ’T OF THE TREASURY (Feb. 13, 2017),
https://perma.cc/7PHT-TJTN.

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related to his designation. OFAC then produced an unclassified
summary of the redacted information. The summary noted
Lopez Bello’s: money laundering of drug proceeds through
state-owned oil company Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A.;
organization of trans-continental air and maritime cocaine
routes; purchase of Venezuelan news outlets on El Aissami’s
behalf; management of El Aissami’s financial matters; and
procurement of vehicles in the U.S. that were transported to
Venezuela and given to El Aissami and other government
officials.
Lopez Bello requested administrative reconsideration
pursuant to 31 C.F.R. § 501.807. OFAC sought additional
information from Lopez Bello, who received numerous
extensions to respond. In summer 2021, Lopez Bello
voluntarily withdrew his petition and OFAC closed the matter.
Lopez Bello then sued OFAC and its Acting Director in district
court, seeking the vacatur of his and his companies’
designation. He pressed various claims, including that OFAC’s
designation constituted arbitrary and capricious action, went
beyond OFAC’s statutory authority, deprived Lopez Bello of
fair notice and resulted in an unconstitutional seizure of
property. He additionally claimed that OFAC failed to provide
sufficient post-deprivation notice. OFAC provided the district
court with classified portions of the administrative record ex
parte, in camera.
OFAC moved to dismiss or in the alternative for summary
judgment. Lopez Bello cross-moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted OFAC’s motion to dismiss. Lopez
Bello v. Smith, 651 F. Supp. 3d 20 (D.D.C. 2022). According
to the court, OFAC reasonably examined the record and
articulated a satisfactory explanation for its designation of
Lopez Bello. Id. at 33–34. OFAC’s simultaneous designation
of El Aissami and Lopez Bello—notwithstanding that Lopez

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Bello’s Tier 2 designation was based on his support of El
Aissami—did not, in the court’s view, exceed the agency’s
statutory authority under the Kingpin Act. Id. at 35–36.
Moreover, the court held, simultaneous designation did not
deprive Lopez Bello of fair notice of prohibited conduct. Id. at
41–42. It further held that blockage of Lopez Bello’s assets did
not violate his Fourth Amendment protection against seizure.
Id. at 45. Finally, the court concluded that OFAC provided
Lopez Bello with sufficient post-deprivation notice to satisfy
due process. Id. at 43–44. Lopez Bello timely appealed the
district court’s dismissal.
Parallel to the OFAC litigation, a grand jury in the
Southern District of New York indicted Lopez Bello and others
for engaging in transactions prohibited by the Kingpin Act. See
Superseding Indictment, United States v. El Aissami Maddah,
No. 19-cr-144 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2019). Lopez Bello is now a
fugitive and refuses to return to the United States to stand trial.
See United States v. Lopez Bello, No. 19-cr-144, 2023 WL
3199968, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2023).3
II.
Our review of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is de novo. Islamic
Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 732 (D.C. Cir.
2007). Although we accept the complaint’s factual allegations
as true, we need not “accept inferences that are unsupported by
the facts set out in the complaint.” Id. (citing Kowal v. MCI
Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). Lopez
Bello raises three claims on appeal: (1) simultaneous
3 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement has listed Lopez
Bello as one of their most wanted individuals and offered a
$5,000,000 reward for information leading to his arrest. See U.S.
Immigr. and Customs Enf’t, Most Wanted: Samark Jose Lopez-
Bello, https://perma.cc/88CW-2FDC (last visited Feb. 6, 2023).

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designation is beyond OFAC’s statutory authority; (2)
simultaneous designation deprives a designee of fair notice of
prohibited conduct; and (3) OFAC failed to provide sufficient
post-deprivation notice. We reject each claim.
A. Simultaneous Designation under § 1904(b)(2)–(3)
We begin with Lopez Bello’s statutory challenge. He
contends that the Kingpin Act’s plain language and legislative
history prohibit OFAC from derivatively designating a Tier 2
Trafficker at the same time it designates the relevant Tier 1
Trafficker. We disagree. The best reading of 21 U.S.C.
§ 1904(b)(2)–(3) permits simultaneous designation of a Tier 1
Trafficker and a derivative Tier 2 Trafficker.
We start with the text. The Kingpin Act authorizes Tier 2
designation for persons assisting in the trafficking activities of
or acting on behalf of a “significant foreign narcotics trafficker
so identified in the [President’s] report” or “foreign persons
designated by the Secretary of Treasury [or OFAC] pursuant to
this subsection.” 21 U.S.C. § 1904(b)(2)–(3) (emphasis added).
The text does not require that the “significant foreign narcotics
trafficker[s]” or “foreign persons” be “previously” or “already”
designated. Lopez Bello argues that the statute’s past participle
“designated” imposes such a temporal requirement. According
to him, the phrase “designated by the Secretary” necessarily
means already designated, that is, before Tier 2 designation.
The Court rejected a similar argument in Rural Cellular
Association v. FCC, 685 F.3d 1083, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
Based on precedent interpreting similar adjectival phrases as
temporally ambiguous, the Rural Cellular Court accepted the
FCC’s interpretation that “established by the Commission”
covered establishment in the past, present or future. Id. at
1092–93 (citing Regions Hosp. v. Shalala, 522 U.S. 448, 458
(1998) and Dep’t of Treasury v. FLRA, 960 F.2d 1068, 1072

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(D.C. Cir. 1992)). Because “designated by” is a temporally
ambiguous adjectival phrase, we adhere to OFAC’s
interpretation that the statutory provision includes both past
and simultaneous designations.4
The Kingpin Act’s purpose reinforces our understanding
of the text. According to the Act, foreign narcotics Traffickers
and their organizations “threaten the national security, foreign
policy, and economy of the United States.” 21 U.S.C. § 1902.
The Act’s “bottom line objective . . . is to bankrupt and disrupt
the major narcotics trafficking organizations” and “those
involved in their illicit activities.” H.R. Rep. No. 106-457, at
43 (1999) (Conf. Rep.). Achieving this objective requires
taking “immediate action upon designation to avoid dissipation
of affected assets.” Id. at 47. Not taking immediate action, such
as by providing pre-deprivation notice, “would create a
substantial risk of asset flight.” Zevallos, 793 F.3d at 116; see
also H.R. Rep. No. 106-457, at 47. Although Lopez Bello
asserts that OFAC must designate a Tier 1 Trafficker first and
then identify anyone assisting, supporting or acting on behalf
of the designated Trafficker, his interpretation hamstrings the
Kingpin Act’s stated purpose of bankrupting and disrupting
narcotics Traffickers by allowing not-yet-designated Tier 2
Traffickers to drain assets after a Tier 1 Trafficker designation
occurs. Simultaneous designation upholds the Act’s purpose.
The history preceding the Kingpin Act’s enactment
buttresses simultaneous designation. The Congress explicitly
based the Kingpin Act on Executive Order No. 12978’s use of
4 At oral argument, the Court questioned whether “designated
by” encompasses future designation. Oral Arg. Tr. 13:20–22. In
other words, could OFAC designate a Tier 2 Trafficker before
designating the relevant Tier 1 Trafficker? OFAC noted it has likely
never made such a designation under the Kingpin Act, Oral Arg. Tr.
14:15–15:11, and we express no view about whether it could.

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IEEPA against Colombian narcotics Traffickers. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 1901(a). The Executive Order itself designated several drug
kingpins. The Order also permitted Treasury to designate
significant Traffickers and those who materially assist or
support trafficking activities “of persons designated in or
pursuant to this order.” Exec. Order No. 12,978, 60 Fed. Reg.
54579 (Oct. 21, 1995) (emphasis added). For example, the
Treasury simultaneously designated Julio Cesar Nasser David
as a significant Trafficker and “4 associated individuals.”5
Even under the Kingpin Act’s predecessor Executive Order,
Treasury used IEEPA to simultaneously designate a Tier 1
Trafficker and relevant Tier 2 Traffickers.6
Lopez Bello overstates the Kingpin Act’s legislative
history. A House Conference Report recites that the Executive
Order permits designation of persons materially assisting “the
named drug kingpins or other, already designated SDNTs.”
H.R. Rep. No. 106-457, at 46 (emphasis added). Given the
Treasury’s simultaneous designation of Nasser David and his
associates, however, this sentence inaccurately describes how
Treasury exercises its Executive Order-IEEPA authority.
Regardless, the comment addresses only the Executive Order
program; it does not suggest that the Kingpin Act will function
accordingly. Nor does OFAC’s implementation of the
Executive Order via research on foreign targets “that can be
linked by evidence to individuals or entities already
5 U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Press Release, Treasury Names
Fronts for the Colombian Drug Cartels (May 26, 1998),
https://perma.cc/M4SE-TVPF.
6 OFAC regularly makes Tier 1-Tier 2 simultaneous
designations under the Kingpin Act. See, e.g., OFAC, U.S. Dep’t of
the Treasury, Sanctions Pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin
Act, 10–29, https://perma.cc/G6UJ-DDF9 (last visited Feb. 7, 2024).
See id. at 28 for the simultaneous designations of El Aissami and
Lopez Bello.

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designated,” H.R. Rep. No. 106-457, at 47 (emphasis added),
foreclose simultaneous designation. And it does not state that
OFAC only researched persons linked to designated
individuals. Thus, neither of Lopez Bello’s references to the
legislative history conflicts with our view of 21 U.S.C.
§ 1904(b)’s text, purpose and history.
We conclude that the best reading of 21 U.S.C. § 1904(b)
permits simultaneous designation of a Tier 1 Trafficker and a
derivative Tier 2 Trafficker. Lopez Bello’s contention that he
conducted no sanctionable conduct before El Aissami’s
designation is inapposite. When Lopez Bello assisted El
Aissami—a not-yet-designated Tier 1 Trafficker—he was on
notice that he, too, could be designated by OFAC. For these
reasons, we conclude that the Kingpin Act permits OFAC to
designate a Tier 2 Trafficker and any relevant Tier 1 Trafficker
at the same time.
B. Simultaneous Designation and “Fair Notice”
We turn to Lopez Bello’s argument that simultaneous
designation deprives potential designees of “fair notice” of
sanctionable conduct in violation of the Due Process Clause.
According to Lopez Bello, his alleged conduct occurred before
El Aissami’s designation and thus before Lopez Bello had
notice that he was assisting or supporting a Tier 1 Trafficker.7
7 We have held that the government can sanction a foundation
based on evidence tying it to a terrorist organization before the
organization’s terrorist designation occurs. Holy Land Found. for
Relief and Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 162 (D.C. Cir. 2003). In
that IEEPA case, the Court affirmed Treasury’s consideration of the
ties because “no plausible evidence” “showed that these ties
[between the foundation and terrorist organization] had been
severed.” Id. Similarly, OFAC could rely on information regarding

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Due Process requires that a law “give fair notice of conduct
that is forbidden or required.” FCC v. Fox Television Stations,
Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012). This requirement “‘is
implicated’ whenever the government imposes ‘civil
penalties.’” Karem v. Trump, 960 F.3d 656, 664 (D.C. Cir.
2020) (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574
n.22 (1996)). We consider whether a regulated party received
adequate notice of the agency’s interpretation “in the most
obvious way of all: by reading the regulations.” General Elec.
Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1995). But “[e]ven
trained lawyers may find it necessary to consult legal
dictionaries, treatises, and judicial opinions before they may
say with any certainty what some statutes may compel or
forbid.” Fed. Express Corp. v. Dep’t of Com., 39 F.4th 756,
773 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (quoting U.S. v. Bronstein, 849 F.3d 1101,
1107 (D.C. Cir. 2017)). Thus, we ask “whether the law or
regulation ‘provides a discern[i]ble standard when legally
construed.’” Id.
The Kingpin Act provides a discernible standard that is
reasonably comprehensible to the public. The Tier 2 provisions
cover persons “materially assisting in, or providing financial or
technological support for or to, or providing goods or services
in support of” a Tier 1 Trafficker’s trafficking activities or
“acting for or on behalf of” a Tier 1 Trafficker. 21 U.S.C.
§ 1904(b)(2)–(3). The provisions do not require a Tier 2
Trafficker to “knowingly” or “recklessly” assist or support.
The Congress’ omission of a mens rea requirement carries
great weight here because other provisions in the Kingpin Act
do have heightened mens rea requirements. The Act’s criminal
penalties apply only to persons who “willfully” or “knowingly”
Lopez Bello’s assistance and support before El Aissami’s
designation. To the extent Lopez Bello has severed ties to El
Aissami, he can seek delisting. See 31 C.F.R. § 501.807.

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violate the Act. 21 U.S.C. § 1906(a); see also Fed. Express
Corp., 39 F.4th at 773 (statute’s express mens rea requirement
“for criminal penalties, but silence as to civil sanctions, gives
notice that civil penalties may be assessed on a strict liability
basis”). The Kingpin Act also defines the term “narcotics
trafficking” with specificity. See 21 U.S.C. § 1907(3).8 The
public is on notice that Kingpin Act designation may occur
even if the designee lacks a specific mens rea.
Further, the public is on notice that OFAC has previously
designated Tier 1 and Tier 2 Traffickers simultaneously, at
least since 2010. See supra note 6. The public is also on notice
that assisting a not-yet-designated Tier 1 Trafficker subjects an
aider to potential OFAC sanction as a Tier 2 Trafficker. A
designee can always, and repeatedly, seek delisting by showing
that the circumstances supporting designation no longer exist.
See Zevallos, 793 F.3d at 110; 31 C.F.R. § 501.807.
To the extent Lopez Bello argues that the Constitution
forbids simultaneous designation, several cases rejecting pre-
deprivation notice foreclose his argument. “[D]ue process is
flexible.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). Post-
deprivation process satisfies due process if the government
must act quickly. Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997).
When seizure is aimed at property that can be easily moved to
another jurisdiction, destroyed or concealed, the government
has a “special need for very prompt action.” Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 678–79 (1974). In
the Kingpin Act context, we have denied pre-deprivation notice
because it would create a substantial risk of asset flight.
8 The Kingpin Act defines “narcotics trafficking” as “any illicit
activity to cultivate, produce, manufacture, distribute, sell, finance,
or transport narcotic drugs, controlled substances, or listed
chemicals, or otherwise endeavor or attempt to do so, or to assist,
abet, conspire, or collude with others to do so.” 21 U.S.C. § 1907(3).

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Zevallos, 793 F.3d at 116. Indeed, pre-deprivation process
“would likely cripple the Kingpin Act.” Id. Barring
simultaneous designation would have the same effect as
requiring pre-deprivation notice: providing Traffickers an
opportunity to drain assets. Because of the government’s strong
interest in stopping asset dissipation, simultaneous designation
with an opportunity for post-deprivation process satisfies due
process. See Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 930.
C. Due Process and Post-Deprivation Notice
Finally, we address Lopez Bello’s argument that OFAC
gave insufficient post-deprivation notice. Although OFAC
provided the Blocking Memorandum, Federal Register notice,
press release, redacted administrative record and unclassified
summary, Lopez Bello alleges that he lacks a basis to
understand his designation and offer rebuttal arguments. We
disagree.
The Court weighs three factors under the familiar
Matthews v. Eldridge balancing test to assess the constitutional
adequacy of notice: (1) the private interest affected by official
action; (2) the risk of error and probable value of additional
safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest. Fares, 901 F.3d
at 323 (citing Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 355 (1976)).
We apply this balancing in our consideration of the adequacy
of notice following an OFAC designation. See id. (Kingpin Act
designation); Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of
State (NCORI), 251 F.3d 192, 206 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (AEDPA
designation); Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Dep’t of
Treasury, 686 F.3d 965, 979 (9th Cir. 2012) (IEEPA
designation).
An OFAC designation has a “dire” effect on a designee’s
private interests. Fares, 901 F.3d at 323. Lopez Bello’s
designation froze all of his assets in the United States and many

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of them are now subject to garnishment and execution. See
supra Section I. OFAC’s reliance on redacted evidence creates
a risk of erroneous deprivation because the designee has only a
limited opportunity to probe the evidence. Fares, 901 F.3d at
323–24. But the government—namely, the Executive
Branch—has a critical interest in protecting classified,
privileged and law enforcement information.9 See Holy Land
Found., 333 F.3d at 164; People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v.
Dep’t of State (People’s Mojahedin), 327 F.3d 1238, 1242
(D.C. Cir. 2003). Indeed, requiring the government to disclose
such information could “compel a breach in the security which
[the Executive B]ranch is charged to protect.” NCORI, 251
F.3d at 208–09.
Because of classified information’s national security
implications, we have found due process satisfied when the
government discloses only the unclassified portion of the
administrative record in AEDPA cases. See NCORI, 251 F.3d
at 209; People’s Mojahedin, 327 F.3d at 1242. In the Kingpin
Act context, OFAC satisfied due process when it provided a
Trafficker with the unclassified evidence on which the agency
relied and gave him an opportunity to respond. Zevallos, 793
F.3d at 116–17. Other circuits have used “means of providing
information to the potential designee that do not implicate
national security.” Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 983. According to
the Third and Ninth Circuits, the government may provide
designees with a “short unclassified summary of classified
evidence.” Id.; see Fares, 901 F.3d at 324. Though “not highly
9 The Kingpin Act separately defines “intelligence” and “law
enforcement” information. 21 U.S.C. § 1903(e). OFAC described its
redactions here as protecting privileged law enforcement information
and classified information. J.A. 111. Lopez Bello does not
distinguish between withholding “classified” and “law enforcement”
information so we assume that the withheld information constitutes
classified information. See Fares, 901 F.3d at 324–25.

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fact-specific,” such summaries can provide a designee “with
the ‘who,’ ‘what,’ ‘when’ and ‘where’ of the allegations
against him.” Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 542, 548 (3d
Cir. 2001).
We conclude that OFAC gave sufficient notice via the
redacted administrative record, unclassified summary,
Blocking Memorandum, Federal Register notice and press
release. As in Zevallos, OFAC provided the redacted
administrative record on which it relied and an opportunity for
Lopez Bello to be heard thereon. OFAC went further and
provided an unclassified summary of the administrative
record’s privileged information. Although brief, the summary
identifies Lopez Bello’s laundering of drug proceeds,
organizing of trans-continental cocaine shipments, handling of
financial affairs, purchasing of Venezuelan news outlets and
procuring of vehicles on behalf of El Aissami. Lopez Bello is
not “forced to stumble towards a moving target.” Zevallos, 793
F.3d at 118. Due process does not require more. See id. at 117.
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is affirmed.
So ordered.

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