Maxwell Goodluck v. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued September 16, 2022 Decided June 25, 2024
No. 21-5263
MAXWELL GOODLUCK, ET AL.,
APPELLEES
v.
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.,
APPELLANTS
Consolidated with 21-5270, 21-5271, 21-5272, 21-5277,
21-5288
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:21-cv-01530)
(No. 1:21-cv-01874)
(No. 1:21-cv-00943)
(No. 1:21-cv-02228)
(No. 1:21-cv-02033)
(No. 1:21-cv-02071)
(No. 1:21-cv-00999)

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Cara E. Alsterberg, Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of
Justice, argued the causes for appellants/cross-appellees. With
her on the briefs were Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, and William C. Bateman, III, Anna
L. Dichter, Michelle M. Ramus, Eric C. Steinhart, James J.
Wen, and William H. Weiland, Trial Attorneys.
Jesse M. Bless and Rafael Urena argued the causes for
appellees. With them on the joint brief were Laboni A. Hoq,
Stephen W. Manning, Andrew J. Pincus, Carmen N. Longoria-
Green, Karen C. Tumlin, Esther H. Sung, Charles H. Kuck,
Nicolette Glazer, and Curtis Lee Morrison. Jennifer R.
Coberly entered an appearance.
Charles H. Kuck argued the cause and filed the brief for
appellees/cross-appellants.
Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, HENDERSON and
KATSAS, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge KATSAS.
KATSAS, Circuit Judge: In these four consolidated
appeals, district courts held that the Department of State had
unlawfully suspended, deprioritized, and delayed the
processing of applications for diversity visas for fiscal years
2020 and 2021, at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. As
a remedy, the courts ordered the Department to continue
processing applications and issuing visas after the statutory
deadlines for doing so had passed. We hold that the courts
lacked authority to order this relief.

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I
A
The Immigration and Nationality Act creates an annual
allotment of immigrant visas for aliens from countries with low
rates of immigration to the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c).
These visas are known as diversity visas. Congress capped the
number of diversity visas at 55,000 per fiscal year. Id.
§ 1151(a)(3), (e).
The State Department administers the diversity-visa
program annually. Before the start of each fiscal year, it holds
a lottery for applicants from qualifying countries. 22 C.F.R.
§ 42.33. Millions of individuals apply. See Bureau of Consular
Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Diversity Visa Program, DV 2019-
2021: Number of Entries During Each Online Registration
Period by Region and Country of Chargeability. From among
these applicants, the Department randomly selects a number
that it estimates will ensure filling the authorized diversity
visas “for the fiscal year in question.” 22 C.F.R. § 42.33(c).
Selectees become “eligible” to receive such visas “for the fiscal
year involved.” 8 U.S.C. § 1153(e)(2).
Selectees do not automatically receive visas. Rather, they
must submit a full, written application for an immigrant visa
and must personally appear for an interview before a consular
officer. See 22 C.F.R. §§ 40.1(l)(2), 42.33(g). They must
satisfy all admissibility requirements. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a).
They must also complete the application process and receive a
visa before “the end of the specific fiscal year for which they
were selected.” Id. § 1154(a)(1)(I)(ii)(II).
Selectees who timely complete the application process
may receive immigrant visas, provided that the annual cap of
55,000 visas is not exceeded. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(a)(3),

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1151(e), 1201(a)(1)(A). They then may travel to the United
States and seek admission. Id. § 1181(a). Like any other visa,
a diversity visa does not guarantee admission; instead, it
“merely gives the alien permission to arrive at a port of entry
and have an immigration officer independently examine the
alien’s eligibility for admission.” Saavedra Bruno v. Albright,
197 F.3d 1153, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see 8 U.S.C. § 1201(h).
B
The COVID pandemic significantly hampered the State
Department’s administration of the diversity-visa program.
Section 1182(f) of Title 8 permits the President to
“suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens” whenever
he finds that their entry “would be detrimental to the interests
of the United States.” In April 2020, President Trump issued
Proclamation 10014, which suspended the entry of aliens to
protect domestic labor markets harmed by the pandemic. 85
Fed. Reg. 23,441 (Apr. 27, 2020). President Trump twice
extended Proclamation 10014, but President Biden revoked it
in February 2021. 85 Fed. Reg. 38,263 (June 25, 2020); 86
Fed. Reg. 417 (Jan. 6, 2021); 86 Fed. Reg. 11,847 (Mar. 1,
2021). During the ten months when the Proclamation remained
in effect, the State Department declined to issue diversity visas.
The Department took the position that a section 1182(f)
proclamation, by rendering covered aliens inadmissible, also
renders them ineligible for visas.
Around the same time, the Department also issued its own
guidance instructing consular officers how to respond to
COVID. In March 2020, the Department suspended all
“routine visa services”—including the processing of
applications for diversity visas—but permitted certain
“mission-critical visa services” to continue. J.A. 411. The
Department re-established more visa services over the summer,

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but the pandemic hampered its efforts to reduce backlogs in
pending applications. In November 2020, the Department
instructed consular posts to follow a four-tiered prioritization
scheme for addressing the backlog, with diversity visas in the
lowest-priority tier. J.A. 2281–84. The Department rescinded
this guidance one year later.
C
The plaintiffs in these cases are selectees in the FY 2020
and 2021 diversity-visa lotteries. They contend that the State
Department policies noted above unlawfully prevented them
from receiving visas before the fiscal-year-end deadlines. The
district courts largely agreed. As a remedy, the courts ordered
the Department to prioritize processing and issuing diversity
visas past the end of the fiscal years.
The Gomez plaintiffs—a class of FY 2020 diversity-visa
selectees—sued in May 2020. On September 4, 2020, the
district court granted a preliminary injunction. Gomez v.
Trump, 485 F. Supp. 3d 145 (D.D.C. 2020) (Gomez I). At the
outset, the court held that the doctrine of consular non-
reviewability does not foreclose judicial review of the claims
at issue. Id. at 175–76. On the merits, the court first held that
a section 1182(f) proclamation likely does not make covered
aliens ineligible to receive visas. See id. at 191–94. Then, it
held that the Department likely had unreasonably delayed
processing the plaintiffs’ visa applications. Id. at 195–98.
Finally, it held that the Department’s guidance likely was
arbitrary because it did not adequately explain the exclusion of
diversity-visa processing from mission-critical services. Id. at
198–99. The court stayed the Department’s policy, ordered the
Department to “undertake good-faith efforts” to “expeditiously
process and adjudicate DV-2020 diversity visa and derivative
beneficiary applications,” and enjoined the Department from

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directing consular personnel not to consider the diversity
program “mission critical.” Id. at 205.
On September 30, 2020—the last day of the fiscal year—
the court granted “supplemental equitable relief” ordering the
Department to “reserve” FY 2020 diversity visas for processing
and issuance after the end of the fiscal year. Gomez v. Trump,
490 F. Supp. 3d 276, 283 (D.D.C. 2020) (Gomez II). The court
ordered the Department to hold open 9,095 visas past the fiscal
year-end—a number it viewed as a “reasonable estimate” of
how many additional visas the Department would have issued
but for the policies that it found likely to be unlawful. See id.
at 288–90. Later, the court granted summary judgment to the
selectees and ordered the Department to process their visa
applications in a random order until it granted all the reserved
visas—and to finish the processing by September 30, 2022.
See Gomez v. Biden, No. 20-cv-01419, 2021 WL 3663535, at
*24 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2021) (Gomez III); J.A. 2342. The
Department appealed, and the district court stayed its order
pending resolution of the appeal.
The Goodluck, Goh, and Rai cases followed a similar
pattern with FY 2021 selectees as plaintiffs. Each group of
plaintiffs sued between March and June 2021. In each case, the
district court followed the substantive and remedial rulings in
Gomez. See J.A. 1531 (reserving 6,914 visas in Goodluck and
481 visas in Goh); J.A. 1424 (reserving 966 visas in Rai).
The Department appealed each case, and we consolidated
the four appeals. By cross-appeal, the Goh plaintiffs argued
that the district court should have reserved more visas for them.
II
On appeal, the parties debate at length the lawfulness of
how the State Department responded to Proclamation 10014

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and more generally to the pandemic. The plaintiffs argue, and
the district courts held, that (1) a section 1182(f) proclamation
prevents entry into the United States but does not prevent the
issuance of visas; (2) the State Department guidance was
arbitrary; and (3) the Department unreasonably delayed the
processing of their visa applications. The government contests
these points. We need not resolve any of them because a fourth
contested issue is dispositive: The district courts had no
authority to require the Department to issue diversity visas past
the applicable statutory deadlines.
A
A court granting the equitable remedy of an injunction has
discretion to “mold its decree to meet the exigencies of the
particular case.” Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project,
582 U.S. 571, 580 (2017) (quoting 11A Wright & Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2947 (3d ed. 2013)). But
this discretion has limits. One is that courts cannot order relief
that conflicts with a clear and constitutionally valid statute.
See, e.g., Hedges v. Dixon Cnty., 150 U.S. 182, 192 (1893)
(“Courts of equity can no more disregard statutory and
constitutional requirements and provisions than can courts of
law.”); Rees v. City of Watertown, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 107, 122
(1874) (“A court of equity cannot, by avowing that there is a
right but no remedy known to the law, create a remedy in
violation of law ….”).1 Another limit is that, unless Congress
expressly provides otherwise, equitable remedies must track
remedies traditionally afforded by the equity courts. See Grupo
Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527
U.S. 308, 318–19 (1999).
1 Because the plaintiffs here assert no constitutional claims, we
do not address equitable remedies for constitutional violations.

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Two cases highlight these points. INS v. Pangilinan, 486
U.S. 875 (1988), involved a statute that made citizenship
available to aliens who had served in the United States military
during World War II, but only if they filed naturalization
petitions by December 31, 1946. Id. at 877–80. The plaintiffs
were Filipino nationals who had met the service requirement
but not filed timely petitions. See id. at 880–82. They argued
that for nine months before the statutory deadline, the United
States had unlawfully refused to appoint anyone in the
Philippines with authority to accept and process the required
petitions. See id. The Ninth Circuit agreed. See id. at 882.
Then, it asserted an “equitable authority to craft a remedy”
requiring the government to confer citizenship on the plaintiffs
despite the 1946 cutoff. Id. at 883.
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed this remedial
ruling. It stressed the longstanding principle that “[c]ourts of
equity can no more disregard statutory and constitutional
requirements and provisions than can courts of law.”
Pangilinan, 486 U.S. at 883 (quoting Hedges, 150 U.S. at 192).
Moreover, it reasoned, Congress had not conferred on the
federal courts “the power to make someone a citizen of the
United States,” unlike other expressly conferred equitable
powers “like mandamus or injunction.” Id. at 883–84. Thus,
the Ninth Circuit had erred by disregarding “the explicit cutoff
date” in the statute and ordering the conferral of citizenship
anyway. Id. at 884; see also id. at 885 (“Neither by application
of the doctrine of estoppel, nor by invocation of equitable
powers, nor by any other means does a court have the power to
confer citizenship in violation of these limitations.”).
Grupo Mexicano confirmed that equitable remedies must
be historically grounded absent express expansion by
Congress. As the Supreme Court explained, the federal courts’
general power to hear equitable claims is “an authority to

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administer in equity suits the principles of the system of
judicial remedies which had been devised and was being
administered by the English Court of Chancery at the time of
the separation of the two countries.” 527 U.S. at 318 (quoting
Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568
(1939)). Thus, the “prerequisites for obtaining an equitable
remedy as well as the general availability of injunctive relief
… depend on traditional principles of equity jurisdiction.” Id.
at 318–19 (quoting 11A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice &
Procedure § 2941, at 31 (2d ed. 1995)). Of course, Congress
may authorize new remedies in “departure from past practice,”
so long as the remedies are consistent with Article III. Id. at
322. But absent such clear legislative action, courts
considering an equitable remedy “must ask” whether it “was
traditionally accorded by courts of equity.” Id. at 319.
B
The remedy ordered here—instructing the Executive
Branch to reserve, process, and issue visas on terms devised by
the courts—is irreconcilable with these settled principles.
Most obviously, it conflicts with the governing statutes.
As noted above, selectees in the diversity-visa lottery become
“eligible” to receive visas “for the fiscal year involved.” 8
U.S.C. § 1153(e)(2). Moreover, selectees “shall remain
eligible to receive such visa only through the end of the specific
fiscal year for which they were selected.” Id.
§ 1154(a)(1)(I)(ii)(II). And “[n]o visa or other documentation
shall be issued to an alien” if “the consular officer knows or has
reason to believe that such alien is ineligible to receive a visa.”
Id. § 1201(g). State Department regulations confirm these
statutory limits: “Under no circumstances may a consular
officer issue a visa or other documentation to an alien after the
end of the fiscal year during which an alien possesses diversity

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visa eligibility.” 22 C.F.R. § 42.33(a)(1). In other words,
“when midnight strikes at the end of the fiscal year, those
applicants without visas are out of luck.” Yung-Kai Lu v.
Tillerson, 292 F. Supp. 3d 276, 282 (D.D.C. 2018). Or as the
Gomez court acknowledged, “[s]ection 1154 sets an absolute,
unyielding deadline by which selectees must receive their
visas.” Gomez I, 485 F. Supp. 3d at 196. And “this strict
interpretation of the diversity visa statute has been adopted by
every circuit court to have addressed the issue.” Yung-Kai Lu,
292 F. Supp. 3d at 282 (citing cases from the Second, Third,
Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits).2 The district courts
here thus made the same error as the Ninth Circuit in
Pangilinan—invoking a supposed equitable power to override
an “explicit cutoff date” established by Congress. See 486 U.S.
at 884.
Historical and contextual considerations also warrant
restraint. The Supreme Court has long held that “any policy
toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with” both
“the conduct of foreign relations” and “the war power”—and
so is “largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.”
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588–89 (1952).
More particularly, it is “not within the province of any court,
2 See Coraggioso v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 730, 734 (3d Cir. 2004)
(“The phrase ‘only through the end of the specific year’
unambiguously indicates Congress’s intent to impose a time deadline
on an applicant’s eligibility ….”); Nyaga v. Ashcroft, 323 F.3d 906,
914 (11th Cir. 2003) (“the phrase ‘shall remain eligible to receive
such visa’ plainly means that aliens … who have been randomly
selected to qualify for a visa under the diversity visa program cannot
be issued a visa after midnight of the final day of the fiscal year for
which they were selected”); accord Mohamed v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d
79, 80–81 (2d Cir. 2006); Carrillo–Gonzalez v. INS, 353 F.3d 1077,
1079 (9th Cir. 2003); Iddir v. INS, 301 F.3d 492, 500–01 (7th Cir.
2002).

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unless expressly authorized by law, to review the determination
of the political branch of the Government to exclude a given
alien.” United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S.
537, 543 (1950). Modern statutes, apart from the specific
deadline directly at issue here, point in the same direction. For
one thing, Congress has made decisions by consular officers to
deny visas to aliens outside the United States not reviewable
even by the Secretary of State. 6 U.S.C. § 236(b)(1). For
another, while Congress has provided for judicial review of the
removal of aliens present in the United States, 8 U.S.C. § 1252,
it has expressly refused to afford judicial review for aliens
outside the country “to challenge a decision of a consular
officer … to grant or deny a visa.” 6 U.S.C. § 236(f). This
general framework, plus the sensitivities noted above, undercut
any contention that courts may order the processing and
issuance of visas to aliens whom Congress has specifically
made ineligible.
In sum, the statutory deadline is clear, and neither history
nor context affords any basis for departing from it. The district
courts had no authority to order the State Department to keep
processing applications for diversity visas and issuing the visas
beyond the end of the relevant fiscal years.3
C
The plaintiffs make several arguments in defense of the
remedial orders, but none of them is convincing.
3 Before this Court, the government no longer presses an
argument that the doctrine of consular non-reviewability bars judicial
review in this case. Cf. Saavedra Bruno, 197 F.3d at 1159–62.
Accordingly, we do not consider that question.

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1. The plaintiffs seek to distinguish Pangilinan as a case
involving the conferral of citizenship, not the processing and
issuance of visas. It is true, as this Court once observed, that
the conferral of citizenship was the “only form of relief
specifically disapproved” in Pangilinan. In re Thornburgh,
869 F.2d 1503, 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1989). But the Supreme Court
reasoned more generally; its decision rested on the broad
principle that “[c]ourts of equity can no more disregard
statutory and constitutional requirements and provisions than
can courts of law.” Pangilinan, 486 U.S. at 883 (quoting
Hedges, 150 U.S. at 192). Moreover, the rule that equitable
relief cannot violate statutes is amply supported by other cases
outside the citizenship and immigration context. See, e.g.,
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop, 532 U.S.
483, 497 (2001) (“a court sitting in equity cannot ignore the
judgment of Congress, deliberately expressed in legislation”
(cleaned up)); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305,
313 (1982) (Congress may “guide or control the exercise of the
courts’ [remedial] discretion”). Furthermore, while the district
courts here did not order the granting of diversity visas to any
individual alien or group of aliens, the Gomez court did order
continued processing of visa applications “until all 9,905
[reserved] diversity visas have been granted.” Gomez III, 2021
WL 3663535, at *24. This order—entered on the last day of
the fiscal year—necessarily required the Secretary to violate an
unqualified statutory deadline, which Congress imposed in a
context where courts owe a high degree of respect to the
judgments of the political branches.
2. The plaintiffs invoke Almaqrami v. Pompeo, 933 F.3d
774 (D.C. Cir. 2019). In that case, selectees for fiscal year 2017
sought diversity visas despite a presidential proclamation
barring their entry into the United States. Id. at 777–78. On
September 29, 2017, the district court ordered the State
Department to reserve unused FY 2017 diversity visas so that

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the Department could process pending applications and issue
visas if the Supreme Court were to invalidate the proclamation.
Id. at 778. After the end of the fiscal year, the proclamation
expired, and the Supreme Court held that challenges to it were
moot. See id. at 779. The district court then dismissed the
claims for the diversity visas as moot, and the plaintiffs
appealed. Id.
In this Court, the government argued for mootness on the
ground that, once the plaintiffs lost their eligibility for diversity
visas at the end of the fiscal year, the courts could no longer
afford any meaningful relief. Almaqrami, 933 F.3d at 780. We
held that the case did not become moot on that basis. We
explained that arguments about “the legal availability of a
certain kind of relief” go to the merits—not mootness—unless
the remedy is “so implausible that it is insufficient to preserve
jurisdiction.” Id. at 781 (cleaned up). We noted two cases
where district courts had “invoked [an] equitable power to
enforce prior orders and instructed the government to issue the
plaintiffs [diversity] visas even though the selection FY had
ended.” Id. at 780. Given those cases, we held that the claim
for relief remained at least plausible enough to support Article
III jurisdiction. See id. at 782. We therefore remanded for the
district court to consider the merits. Id. at 784.
Our decision does not help the plaintiffs. We held only
that the validity of a visa-reservation remedy was not so
implausible as to moot a pending case. We did not decide the
merits question whether district courts may order such a
remedy despite the clear eligibility cutoff at the end of the fiscal
year. Now, we decide that question in the negative.
3. The plaintiffs also cite the district-court decisions
ordering the government to process diversity-visa applications
and issue the visas after the year-end deadline. See

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Przhebelskaya v. USCIS, 338 F. Supp. 2d 399, 403–06
(E.D.N.Y. 2004); Paunescu v. INS, 76 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902–
03 (N.D. Ill. 1999). These decisions reason that courts may
extend the eligibility deadline so long as they act before the
deadline has run. But we fail to see how the timing of a court
order can matter, for the deadline is keyed to receipt of a visa:
In unambiguous and unqualified terms, Congress provided that
diversity-visa selectees “shall remain eligible to receive such
visa only through the end of the specific fiscal year for which
they were selected.” 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(I)(ii)(II) (emphasis
added). Thus, it does not matter whether a selectee has
submitted the required documents, filed a lawsuit, obtained
some form of preliminary relief, or done anything else short of
receiving the visa; at the end of the fiscal year, “those
applicants without visas are out of luck.” Yung-Kai Lu, 292 F.
Supp. 3d at 282.
4. In Gomez, the district court analogized to the courts’
power to make government funds available beyond the end of
the relevant appropriation. Gomez II, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 285–
86. We have held that a court may “award funds based on an
appropriation even after the date when the appropriation lapses,
so long as the lawsuit was instituted on or before that date.”
City of Houston v. HUD, 24 F.3d 1421, 1426 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(cleaned up). Our decisions in this area trace back to an
assertion that courts may “suspend the operation of a lapse
provision” because their equitable powers “allow them to take
action to preserve the status quo of a dispute and to protect their
ability to decide a case properly before them.” Nat’l Ass’n of
Reg’l Councils v. Costle, 564 F.2d 583, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
But in the appropriations context, Congress has expressly
authorized courts to suspend the lapse of budget authority
while lawsuits play out. See 31 U.S.C. § 1502(b) (“A provision
of law requiring that the balance of an appropriation or fund be
returned to the general fund of the Treasury at the end of a

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definite period does not affect the status of lawsuits or rights of
action involving the right to an amount payable from the
balance.”). This authority has existed at least since 1973. See
Pub. L. No. 97–258, § 1502(b), 96 Stat. 877, 928 (1982); Pub.
L. No. 93-52, § 111, 87 Stat. 130, 134 (1973). Here, in
contrast, Congress gave the courts no analogous authority to
suspend visa-eligibility deadlines to accommodate pending
lawsuits, instead imposing an unqualified prohibition on the
issuance of visas past the deadline.
We recognize that our appropriations cases, which
originated in the mid-1970s, assert an equitable authority
unmoored from section 1502(b) or its antecedents. See, e.g.,
Nat’l Ass’n of Reg’l Councils, 564 F.2d at 588–89; Jacksonville
Port Auth. v. Adams, 556 F.2d 52, 55–57 (D.C. Cir. 1977). But
this reasoning provides thin support for the plaintiffs’ position.
These cases were decided during the “ancien regime” when
courts took a much more freewheeling approach to the law of
remedies. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 131–32 (2017);
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001). Since then,
the Supreme Court repeatedly has stressed the limits on the
federal courts’ equitable powers in cases like Pangilinan,
Grupo Mexicano, and Oakland Cannabis. And this more
recent guidance indicates that a court may not override clear
statutory limits on visa eligibility without some other statutory
authority—akin to section 1502(b)—for doing so.
5. The plaintiffs object that agency delay should not
frustrate their interest in obtaining diversity visas. Yet the
plaintiffs have nothing resembling a substantive entitlement to
such visas. Congress has imposed a ceiling, but not a floor, on
the number of diversity visas to be issued each fiscal year. See
8 U.S.C. § 1151(a)(3), (e). Selectees still must complete the
process of applying for an immigrant visa, see 22 C.F.R.
§§ 40.1(l)(2), 42.33(g), and must satisfy all admissibility

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requirements, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a). They must compete with
other selectees for the limited number of visas: In fiscal year
2020, the Department chose over 90,000 selectees (including
derivative beneficiaries) to compete for the 55,000 available
visas. J.A. 2353–54. In fiscal year 2021, the Department chose
over 137,000 selectees and beneficiaries. Id. The selectees
also must obtain a visa before the end of the fiscal year. 8
U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(I)(ii)(II). On the other hand, decisions
regarding the prioritization and processing of visa
applications—like decisions regarding the issuance or denial of
visas—implicate weighty concerns of foreign policy and
national security. See Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 588–89; Knauff,
340 U.S. at 543. Given all of this, we find it neither surprising
nor concerning that Congress left administration of the
diversity-visa program primarily in the hands of the Executive
Branch. And we see no basis for judges to invoke equity to
override the temporal or other limitations that Congress has
expressly built into the diversity-visa program.4
In a slight variation on this theme, the plaintiffs raise a
specter that enforcement of the statutory deadline would enable
the government “to avoid the full impact of court orders by
simply dragging its feet.” Joint Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees
at 83, Goodluck v. Biden, No. 21-5263 (June 9, 2022). But the
initial injunction in this case, entered before the end of the
4 The diversity-visa program is unlike the visa program at issue
in Afghan & Iraqi Allies v. Blinken, No. 23-5025 (D.C. Cir. June 7,
2024). There, instead of imposing a firm deadline by which
applicants had to obtain their visas, Congress imposed a presumptive
deadline by which the State Department had to adjudicate the
relevant visa applications. See id., slip op. at 3–4. We relied in
significant part on that deadline in affirming a decision regarding
unreasonable agency delay. See id., slip op. at 13–14. In both cases,
our decisions respect Congress’s judgment about the adjudication of
visa applications.

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relevant fiscal year, merely required the government to
“undertake good-faith efforts” to process diversity-visa
applications “expeditiously” and until the end of the fiscal year.
Gomez I, 485 F. Supp. 3d at 205. The plaintiffs here do not
contend that the government violated that obligation, much less
that they did so willfully. Accordingly, we need not consider
whether, if there were such a case of bad faith or undue delay
in complying with a timely entered injunction, the district court
could issue contempt sanctions against the government even if
it could not grant relief directly to visa applicants past the end
of the fiscal year.5
III
Once Fiscal Years 2020 and 2021 ended, the plaintiffs lost
their eligibility for diversity visas. The district courts erred in
asserting an equitable authority to override these clear statutory
deadlines, which foreclose the prospective relief sought in
these cases. Accordingly, we reverse the remedial orders
challenged by the government, reject the Goh cross-appeal, and
remand the cases with instructions to enter judgment for the
government.
So ordered.
5 Our holding that the district courts had no remedial authority
to order the government to process visa applications and grant visas
after the statutory deadlines disposes of the Goh plaintiffs’ argument
on cross-appeal that the district court there reserved too few visas.

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