United States of America v. Troy Sargent

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued December 15, 2023 Decided June 7, 2024
No. 23-3005
UNITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
APPELLEE
v.
TROY S ARGENT,
APPELLANT
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:21-cr-00258-1)
Judith Mizner, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued
the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.
Eric Hansford, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause
for appellee. With him on the brief were Chrisellen R. Kolb,
Nicholas P. Coleman, and Michael J. Romano, Assistant U.S.
Attorneys.
Before: M ILLETT, W ILKINS and GARCIA, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKINS .

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WILKINS , Circuit Judge: On January 6, 2021, Appellant
Troy Sargent joined the throngs outside the U.S. Capitol to
protest the certification of the 2020 election results. While
there, he smacked a U.S. Capitol Police officer in the head and
then tried to do it again after explicitly being ordered not to. In
connection with this conduct, Sargent was charged with
assaulting, resisting, or impeding law enforcement officers in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1). Sargent pleaded guilty and
the District Court sentenced him according to the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines (“the Guidelines”). To do so, however,
the District Court had to determine which of two guidelines
assigned to Section 111 convictions by the Statutory Index
(“the Index”) to the Guidelines was “most appropriate for the
offense conduct charged[:]” § 2A2.2, which applies to
aggravated assaults, or § 2A2.4, which applies to obstructing
or impeding officers. U.S. S ENT’ G GUIDELINES M ANUAL
§§ 1B1.2 cmt. n.1, 2A2.2, 2A2.4 (U.S. S ENT ’ G C OMM’N 2021);
see id. § 1B1.2(a).
The District Court determined § 2A2.2 was most
applicable to Sargent’s conduct. To make this selection, the
District Court relied on the commentary to § 2A2.2, which
designates “felonious assault that involve[s] . . . an intent to
commit another felony” as a qualifying “aggravated assault.”
Id. § 2A2.2 cmt. n.1. Notably, § 2A2.2 carries a higher base
offense level than § 2A2.4.
Sargent appeals to vacate his Section 111 sentence. On his
read, § 2A2.4, rather than § 2A2.2, was the guideline most
applicable to his conduct, which he argues does not fall within
the plain meaning of “aggravated assault” in the guideline text
of § 2A2.2. In support, Sargent relies on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Kisor v. Wilkie, which held that courts may apply
Auer deference to agency interpretations of their own
regulations only if the regulation is genuinely ambiguous after

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applying “all the standard tools of interpretation.” 588 U.S.
558, 573 (2019). Urging application of Kisor to the Guidelines
and commentary, Sargent argues that his conduct
unambiguously falls outside the § 2A2.2 definition of
“aggravated assault” and that the District Court erred in relying
on the commentary to conclude otherwise.
For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the
District Court was correct to apply § 2A2.2. We need not
address the degree of deference to afford the commentary to
the Guidelines writ large because the plain meaning of
“aggravated assault,” according to the text, structure, and
context of the Guidelines, unambiguously captures Sargent’s
conduct. Accordingly, we affirm.
I.
A.
i.
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“the Act”) created
the Sentencing Commission (“the Commission”), which is
charged by statute with “establish[ing the] sentencing policies
and practices for the Federal criminal justice system.”
28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1). In order to establish these policies and
practices, the Commission promulgates “guidelines . . . for use
of a sentencing court in determining the sentence to be imposed
in a criminal case” and “general policy statements regarding
application of the guidelines or any other aspect of sentencing
or sentence implementation that in the view of the Commission
would further the purposes set forth
in [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).]” 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1)–(2).
Although it is an agency within the judicial branch, and so
outside the purview of the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”), the Commission is subject, with regard to proposed

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sentencing guidelines and amendments, to the provisions of the
APA that relate to publication in the Federal Register and
public hearing procedure. Id. § 994(x). Beyond these
requirements, amendments to the Guidelines are promulgated
through submission to Congress for a six-month period of
review, during which period Congress can modify or
disapprove them. Id. § 994(p).
The Commission also publishes commentary to
accompany the Guidelines. While the Commission is not
directly required to promulgate commentary, courts are
directed by statute to consider it when applying the Guidelines.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (“In determining whether a
circumstance was adequately taken into consideration, the
court shall consider only the sentencing guidelines, policy
statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing
Commission.”). The Guidelines themselves additionally
provide that “[t]he Commentary that accompanies the
guideline sections . . . may interpret the guideline or explain
how it is to be applied” and that “[f]ailure to follow such
commentary could constitute an incorrect application of the
guidelines, subjecting the sentence to possible reversal on
appeal.” U.S. S ENT’ G GUIDELINES M ANUAL § 1B1.7
(U.S. S ENT’ G C OMM’N 2021) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3742).
While “[t]he Commission may promulgate
commentary . . . and amendments thereto[] without regard to”
the APA, it nevertheless “endeavor[s] to provide, to the extent
practicable, comparable opportunities for public input on
proposed . . . commentary considered in conjunction with
guidelines amendments.” U.S. S ENT’ G C OMM’ N, R ULES OF
P RACTICE & P ROCEDURE § 4.3 (2016). Similarly, the
Commission, again “to the extent practicable,” “endeavor[s] to
include amendments to . . . commentary in any submission of
guideline amendments to Congress[.]” Id. § 4.1. In accordance
with these policies, as an example, the Commission submitted

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amendments to the commentary along with the November 2023
Guidelines amendments for notice-and-comment. See Notice
of Submission and Request for Comment, Sentencing
Guidelines for United States Courts, 88 Fed. Reg. 28254 (May
3, 2023); cf. Notice and Request for Public Comment,
Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 88 Fed. Reg.
89142 (Dec. 26, 2023); Notice and Request for Public
Comment, Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 88
Fed. Reg. 7180 (Feb. 2, 2023). Thus, ordinarily and in practice,
the commentary undergoes the same congressional and public
review as the Guidelines.
For the purposes of judicial review, the Supreme Court has
directed that the Guidelines should be treated as “the equivalent
of legislative rules adopted by federal agencies” because “[t]he
Sentencing Commission promulgates the [G]uidelines by
virtue of an express congressional delegation of authority for
rulemaking[.]” Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 44–45
(1993). Extending this analogy, the Supreme Court has also
directed that the commentary should be treated like “an
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations” and, as long as
the commentary “does not violate the Constitution or a federal
statute,” must be “given ‘controlling weight unless it is plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’” Id. at 45
(quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410,
414 (1945)).
At the same time, the differences between agency
regulations and the Guidelines have grown dramatically since
Stinson was decided. In 2005, the Supreme Court invalidated
two provisions of the Act that previously made the Guidelines
mandatory on the courts. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220, 227 (2005). Following Booker, agency regulations retain
the force of law but the Guidelines do not—making Stinson’s
acknowledgement that “the analogy [between the commentary

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and an agency’s interpretation of its own legislative rule] is not
precise” all the more important now. Stinson, 508 U.S. at 44.
ii.
When sentencing, courts consider the “kinds of
sentence[s] and the sentencing range established for . . . the
applicable category of offense committed by the applicable
category of defendant as set forth in the [G]uidelines[.]”
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4). In order to identify the sentencing
range, courts first select the guideline that applies to the
relevant offense using the Index pursuant to § 1B1.2. See U.S.
S ENT’ G GUIDELINES M ANUAL § 1B1.1(a)(1) (U.S. S ENT’G
C OMM’N 2021); United States v. McKeever, 824 F.3d 1113,
1121 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Using the appropriate guideline for the
offense, courts next determine the base offense level and apply
any appropriate specific offense characteristics. See U.S.
S ENT’ G G UIDELINES M ANUAL § 1B1.1(a)(2) (U.S. S ENT’ G
C OMM’N 2021). Courts then adjust the offense level for
particular circumstances, like victim, role, obstruction of
justice, or acceptance of responsibility, in order to reach a total
offense level before adding the relevant criminal history
category to determine the advisory sentencing range. Id.
§§ 1B1.1(a)(3), (5)–(6), (8).
The Index sometimes lists more than one guideline for a
particular criminal offense. When that happens, courts are
directed to use the guideline “most appropriate for the offense
conduct charged in the count of which the defendant was
convicted.” Id. § 1B1.2 cmt. n.1. As relevant here,
18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) punishes with up to eight years of
imprisonment anyone who:
[F]orcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes,
intimidates, or interferes with any [law
enforcement officer] . . . while engaged in or on

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account of the performance of official
duties . . . where such acts involve physical
contact with the victim of that assault or the
intent to commit another felony[.]
18 U.S.C. § 111(a). The Index lists both § 2A2.2 and § 2A2.4
as applicable guidelines for Section 111. Section 2A2.2 applies
to “[a]ggravated [a]ssault[s]” and carries a base offense level
of 14, with level increases where the assault involved “more
than minimal planning,” use of a firearm or dangerous weapon,
or varying degrees of bodily injury. U.S. S ENT’G GUIDELINES
M ANUAL § 2A2.2 (U.S. S ENT’ G C OMM’N 2021). The § 2A2.2
commentary defines “aggravated assault” as “felonious assault
that involved (A) a dangerous weapon with intent to cause
bodily injury (i.e., not merely to frighten) with that weapon;
(B) serious bodily injury; (C) strangling, suffocating, or
attempting to strangle or suffocate; or (D) an intent to commit
another felony.” Id. § 2A2.2 cmt. n.1. Section 2A2.4, by
contrast, applies to conduct that involves “[o]bstructing or
[i]mpeding [o]fficers” and carries a base offense level of 10,
with level increases based on physical contact, dangerous
weapons, or bodily injury. Id. § 2A2.4(a)–(b). Additionally,
§ 2A2.4(c) instructs that § 2A2.2 should be applied “[i]f the
conduct constituted aggravated assault[.]” Id. § 2A2.4(c)(1).
B.
i.
On January 6, 2021, Sargent participated in the riot at the
Capitol building. On that day, he scaled a media tower, filmed
multiple videos of himself boasting about his involvement in
the assault, and then, ultimately, approached a faltering line of
U.S. Capitol Police officers on the West Plaza of the Capitol
building and smacked an officer in the head. In response,
another officer immediately instructed Sargent and others: “Do

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not start attacking people.” Ignoring this order almost
immediately, Sargent then swung his open hand towards the
same officer but, thankfully, missed. Following this
altercation, Sargent retreated into the crowd and left the riot.
Sargent’s subsequent Facebook messages revealed that he
had intended to strike the same officer twice and, indeed,
thought he had. In Facebook messages after January 6, he
reported to an online message group, “After I seen . . . [the
police] throwing them flash grenades into the crowd I had to
get off the ladder and go get me some.” A. 14. In another post-
riot message, he explained, “I got two hits in on the same rookie
cop and then he maced me,” and continued, “yeah every time
he came in his visor was all full of [mace so] I knew [he]
couldn’t see s*** so I just jumped out from behind somebody
[and] punched him as hard as I could [right] in his [visor].” Id.
(alterations in original). Further still, Sargent told others that
he “[p]unched the cop 3 times in their [visor]” and that he “Duff
that cop out twice.” Id.
ii.
In connection with this conduct, Sargent was charged with
six counts, including both assaulting, resisting, or impeding
certain officers in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1), which is
the centerpiece of this appeal, and civil disorder in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3), which is a felony. He pleaded guilty to
all counts.
At sentencing, the District Court applied § 2A2.2 to
Sargent’s Section 111 conviction over his objection. There, as
here, Sargent argued that Kisor required a finding that § 2A2.4
was the most applicable guideline, which in turn meant that his
advisory sentencing range should have been 8–14 months.
Responding to Sargent’s objection, the District Court relied on
Stinson to conclude that the “definition of aggravated assault

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found in the commentary is appropriate under [§] 2A2.2,”
reasoning further that “the commentary has to be given
appropriate weight and is not overruled by Kisor.” Id. at 120.
Assessing Sargent’s conduct directly, the District Court then
found Sargent’s assault was “not . . . just the obstruction of a
police officer[.]” Id. at 122. Instead, “[his] statements prior to
coming down to the riot,” his “climbing up the . . . media tower
. . . [and then] coming down and joining in [what he saw,]”
“mov[ing] to the front of the line through a huge crowd[,]”
“assault[ing] the police officer[,]” and then “later . . . tr[ying]
to do it again” was evidence of intent to commit the separate
felonious offense of engaging in civil unrest to interfere with
the process of Congress approving the Electoral College vote.
Id. Sargent’s intent to commit that additional civil unrest
felony qualified his conduct as an aggravated assault.
The District Court accordingly determined that the
appropriate advisory sentencing range for Sargent’s Section
111 conviction was 24 to 30 months. Upon consideration of
the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, however, the District Court
applied a downward variance and sentenced Sargent to a term
of 14 months, to be followed by 24 months of supervised
release. Notably, the District Court’s sentence matched the
higher end of the range for which Sargent advocated.
II.
Sargent now appeals to vacate this sentence, alleging that
the § 2A2.2 commentary is not entitled to deference under
Kisor. We review whether the District Court properly
interpreted the Guidelines de novo as a question of law. See
United States v. Turner, 21 F.4th 862, 865 (D.C. Cir. 2022)
(reviewing district court calculation of the Guidelines range de
novo); United States v. Cooper, 886 F.3d 146, 155 (D.C. Cir.
2018) (reviewing “purely legal” question of the “soundness of

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the court’s Guidelines interpretation” de novo). While the
parties focused their arguments on whether the definition of
“aggravated assault” in the § 2A2.2 commentary is entitled to
deference under Kisor, we conclude that this case is best
resolved on the narrower question of whether the term
“aggravated assault” in the § 2A2.2 guideline text
unambiguously applies to Sargent’s conduct. As shown below,
the text, structure, and context of the Guidelines reveal that the
term “aggravated assault” in the § 2A2.2 guideline text
unambiguously encompasses Sargent’s actions on January 6,
2021. For this reason, we affirm.
A.
The “first step in interpreting” a guideline “is to determine
whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous
meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.”
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997). To do so,
we “start with the text and structure of the Guidelines.”
McKeever, 824 F.3d at 1121; see United States v. Skinner, 70
F.4th 219, 230 (4th Cir. 2023) (per curiam) (“[Courts apply]
the ordinary rules of statutory construction and give a guideline
its plain meaning, as determined by examination of its
language, structure, and purpose”) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also United States v. Brock, 94 F.4th 39, 51 (D.C.
Cir. 2024) (interpreting a guideline based on its “plain, natural,
and ordinary meaning”).
In this case, neither the relevant criminal statutes nor the
guideline text of § 2A2.2 or § 2A2.4 provide a precise
definition of the term “aggravated assault.” The edition of
Black’s Law Dictionary in print at the time the Guidelines were
first promulgated included two entries for “aggravated assault.”
One, nested under the definition for “assault,” defined it as an
assault “committed with the intention of committing some

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additional crime; or one attended with circumstances of
peculiar outrage or atrocity.” Assault, Aggravated Assault,
B LACK’S LAW D ICTIONARY 105 (5th ed. 1979). The other,
listed independently, provided this definition:
A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he:
attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or
causes such injury purposely, knowingly or
recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life; or, attempts
to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily
injury to another with a deadly weapon.
Aggravated Assault, B LACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 60 (5th ed.
1979). “In all jurisdictions[,]” the entry continues, “statutes
punish such aggravated assaults as assault with intent to murder
(or rob or kill or rape) and assault with a dangerous (or deadly)
weapon more severely than ‘simple’ assaults.” Id. Today, the
same publication defines “aggravated assault” as “criminal
assault accompanied by circumstances that make it more
severe, such as the intent to commit another crime or the intent
to cause serious bodily injury.” Assault, B LACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Together, these definitions,
while indicative of potential contours for defining “aggravated
assault,” do not point to a single, unambiguous meaning.
That said, a provision may be “unambiguous without
addressing every interpretive theory[;]” instead, “[i]t need only
be ‘plain to anyone reading’” that it “encompasses the conduct
at issue.” Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 60 (1997)
(quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 467 (1991)).
Indeed, even if “[a] term may be ambiguous as applied to some
situations,” it may be unambiguous “as applied to others.”
Ass’n of Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency,
208 F.3d 1047, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 2000). This is why “the

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plainness or ambiguity” of a guideline’s text “is determined by
reference [not only] to the language itself,” but also to “the
specific context in which that language is used[] and the
broader context of [the guideline] as a whole.” Robinson,
519 U.S. at 341. “A provision that may seem ambiguous in
isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the . . . scheme”
because “only one of the permissible meanings produces a
substantive effect that is comparable with the rest of the law.”
King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 492 (2015) (quoting United Sav.
Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd.,
484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988)). In light of these principles, “[o]ur
inquiry ‘must cease’” if the relevant language is
“unambiguous” and the “‘scheme is coherent and consistent.’”
Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340 (quoting United States v. Ron Pair
Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989)).
Notwithstanding whatever ambiguity the § 2A2.2
guideline text may present in isolation, the text, structure, and
context of the Guidelines, taken together, supply the clarity
necessary to show that § 2A2.2 unambiguously encompasses
the conduct at issue here. The Guidelines instruct sentencing
courts to “[r]efer to the Statutory Index . . . to determine” the
applicable guideline for an offense. U.S. S ENT’ G GUIDELINES
M ANUAL § 1B1.2(a) (U.S. S ENT’G C OMM’N 2021). The Index
is therefore part of the “text and structure of the Guidelines,”
see McKeever, 824 F.3d at 1121, and courts must faithfully
apply it when calculating the guidelines range, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(4)(A); see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007) (“[I]mproperly calculating[] the Guidelines range” is a
“significant procedural error[.]”). The Index makes clear that
the intended heartland for § 2A2.2 was, and continues to be,
offenses that involve assault with intent to commit another
felony, assault with intent to cause injury, or assault that causes
injury. Accordingly, § 2A2.2 unambiguously applies to, and

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has always applied to, assaults with intent to commit another
felony.
The structure of the initial versions of the Guidelines
clearly demonstrates § 2A2.2 was designed to apply to offenses
that involve assault with intent to commit any felony from the
beginning. The original 1987 Guidelines provided three
guidelines to cover all assaultive conduct: § 2A2.1, which dealt
with assault with intent to commit murder, conspiracy or
solicitation to commit murder, and attempted murder; § 2A2.2,
which covered aggravated assault; and § 2A2.3, which covered
minor assault. U.S. S ENT’ G GUIDELINES M ANUAL, ch. 2, pt.
A.2 (U.S. S ENT’G C OMM ’N Oct. 1987). At that time, § 2A2.2
was one of multiple specified guidelines for 24 different
criminal statutes, but stood alone as the sole specified guideline
for only four offenses in the Index—18 U.S.C. §§ 113(b),
113(c), 113(f), and 114.1 As now, the then-contemporary
version of Section 113 concerned “[a]ssaults within maritime
and territorial jurisdiction[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 113 (1982). Section
113(b) punished “[a]ssault with intent to commit any felony,”
Section 113(c) punished “[a]ssault with a dangerous weapon,
with intent to do bodily harm, and without just cause or
excuse,” and Section 113(f) punished “[a]ssault resulting in
serious bodily injury.” Id. § 113(b), (c), (f). Section 114,
meanwhile, concerned “[m]aiming within maritime and
territorial jurisdiction” and applied where a person committed
an assault by certain specified means “with intent to maim or
disfigure.” Id. § 114. Temporary amendments to the
1 In 1987, § 2A2.2 was one of multiple guideline options for the
following statutes: 16 U.S.C. §§ 1029, 1030, 1857(1)(E),
1857(1)(H), 1859, 2435(5), 2435(6), 2435(7), 2438; 18 U.S.C.
§§ 32(b), 111, 112(a), 115(a), 115(b)(1), 351(e), 1153, 1751(e),
2116, 2118(c)(1), 2231; 21 U.S.C. § 675; 33 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(2);
and 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-13, 2283(b). U.S. SENT’ G GUIDELINES
M ANUAL , app. A (U.S. SENT ’ G COMM ’ N Oct. 1987).

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Guidelines were adopted in January 1988 and June 1988. See
Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 53 Fed. Reg.
1286 (Jan. 15, 1988); Sentencing Guidelines for United States
Courts, 53 Fed. Reg. 5104 (Feb. 19, 1988); Sentencing
Guidelines for United States Courts, 53 Fed. Reg. 15530 (Apr.
29, 1988). The temporary amendments became permanent in
October 1988 following submission to Congress for review.
See id. In that revision to the Guidelines, while § 2A2.2 had
grown to become one of the listed guidelines for 26 offenses,
Congress did not disrupt the Commission’s decision to leave
§ 2A2.2 as the only applicable guideline for the same four
offenses it covered by itself in 1987.2 U.S. S ENT’ G GUIDELINES
M ANUAL, app. A (U.S. S ENT’ G C OMM’N Oct. 1988).
While the original province of § 2A2.2 goes a long way to
confirm that the guideline was intended to cover assault with
intent to commit another felony, later changes and revisions to
the Guidelines bolster this conclusion. First, the contemporary
Guidelines list § 2A2.2 as the only guideline applicable to
violations of 18 U.S.C. § 113(b) that occurred prior to 1994. In
1994, Section 113(b) proscribed “[a]ssault with intent to
commit any felony[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 113(b) (1988). Congress
then moved Section 113(b) to Section 113(a)(2). The 2021
Guidelines provide that district courts should apply §§ 2A2.2,
2A3.2, 2A3.3, and 2A3.4 to a Section 113(a)(2) violation. The
latter three guidelines all concern sexual assault. So for a non-
sexual assault with intent to commit another felony, the
Guidelines require district courts to apply § 2A2.2. Section
2A2.2’s persistent coverage of assaults with intent to commit
another felony strongly suggests that “aggravated assault”
includes such assaults.
2 By October 1988, § 2A2.2 had been added as a guideline option for
18 U.S.C. § 1501 and 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a). U.S. SENT ’G GUIDELINES
M ANUAL , app. A (U.S. SENT ’ G COMM ’ N Oct. 1988).

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The text, structure, and context of the Guidelines are
equally clear that § 2A2.4 has historically applied and
continues to apply to offenses where the primary issue is
interference with law enforcement—a category of offense that
is distinct from the core conduct toward which § 2A2.2 is
geared. As explained above, §§ 2A2.1, 2A2.2, and 2A2.3 were
the guidelines that applied to all assaults between 1987 and
1988. By October 1988, however, the Commission added
§ 2A2.4 to the “assault” category in an effort to “make the
guidelines more comprehensive.” U.S. S ENT’G GUIDELINES
M ANUAL, app. C at 37–38 (U.S. S ENT’G C OMM ’N Oct. 1988);
see id. at ch. 2, pt. A.2. Then, as now, § 2A2.4 was designated
for conduct that involved “[o]bstructing or [i]mpeding
[o]fficers” and the two offenses for which § 2A2.4 was the sole
guideline each involved just such conduct as a primary
element. Id. § 2A2.4; app. A. One criminalized “knowingly
and willfully obstruct[ing], resist[ing], or oppos[ing] an
extradition agent . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1502 (1988). The other
proscribed the same conduct vis-à-vis “a Federal law
enforcement agent engaged in the performance
of . . . protective functions[.]” Id. § 3056(d). By 2021,
§ 2A2.4 maintained the same position; it was the lone guideline
applicable to over 30 different offenses and, of those offenses,
none included an element involving intent to commit another
felony, intent to cause bodily harm, or causing bodily harm.3
3 In the November 2021 edition of the Guidelines, § 2A2.4 was the
only guideline applicable to the following statutes: 16 U.S.C.
§§ 773e(a)(2)–(4) & (a)(6), 773g, 973c(a)(8) & (a)(10)–(12), 973e,
1029, 1030, 1417(a)(5)–(6) & (b)(2), 1437(c), 1857(1)(D)–(F) &
(1)(H), 1859, 2435(4)–(7), 2438, 3606, 3637(a)(2)–(4) & (a)(6),
5009(5)–(8), 5010(b); 18 U.S.C. §§ 758, 1502, 2237(a)(1) &
(a)(2)(A), 3056(d); 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a); 30 U.S.C. §§ 1461(a)(3)–
(5) & (a)(7), 1463; 33 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(2); and 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9151(2)–(5), 9152(d).

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As particularly applicable here, the Commission’s
decision to replace § 2A2.3 with § 2A2.4 for Section 111
offenses further confirms § 2A2.2’s applicability to Sargent’s
conduct. Between 1987 and 1988, § 2A2.2 and § 2A2.3
applied to Section 111 offenses. U.S. S ENT ’ G GUIDELINES
M ANUAL, app. A (U.S. S ENT’G C OMM ’N Oct. 1988). As
introduced, § 2A2.3 applied to “minor assault” offenses. U.S.
S ENT’ G G UIDELINES M ANUAL, ch. 2, pt. A.2 (U.S. S ENT’ G
C OMM’N Oct. 1987). At that time, § 2A2.3 was the sole
guideline for five offenses, two of which were assaults, see 18
U.S.C. § 113(d)–(e) (1982), but three of which concerned
refusal to permit an officer to board a vessel or resisting arrest,
see 16 U.S.C. §§ 1857(1)(D), 1857(1)(F), 2435(4) (1982). As
soon as § 2A2.4 was added in October 1988, it replaced
§ 2A2.3 as the second applicable guideline for Section 111
offenses and clearly instructed that § 2A2.2 should be applied
“[i]f [a] defendant is convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 111 and the
conduct constituted aggravated assault.”4 U.S. S ENT’G
GUIDELINES M ANUAL, ch. 2, pt. A.2 (U.S. S ENT ’G C OMM ’N
Oct. 1988). Meanwhile, § 2A2.3—which, again, applied to
“minor assault” offenses—maintained a virtually identical
footprint in the Guidelines; it remained the sole guideline for
the three obstruction and resisting arrest charges. Indeed, it
appears the only place where § 2A2.4 replaced § 2A2.3 was for
Section 111. These intentional changes lay bare that § 2A2.4,
as applied to Section 111, was supposed to do the same work
§ 2A2.3 had done previously—namely, apply to minor
4 This language remained in place until November 1992, when the
Commission removed the specific reference to Section 111 on the
grounds that “the[] specific offense characteristics [should]
apply . . . on the basis of the underlying conduct.” U.S. SENT ’ G
GUIDELINES M ANUAL , app. C, amend. 443 (U.S. SENT ’ G COMM ’ N
2003).

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assaults—while § 2A2.2 would be applied to assaults that were
aggravated by other, separate factors.
In light of this structure and context, the Commission and,
by virtue of the review structure, Congress have directly
spoken to the question of whether § 2A2.2 should apply to the
conduct at issue here—and their answer is yes.
B.
The arguments Sargent raises to urge a different result are
each unavailing.
To start, Sargent argues, relying on the analogies Stinson
draws between regulations, the Guidelines, and the
commentary, that Kisor “appl[ies] to the sentencing
guidelines” and, necessarily, the commentary.
Appellant’s Br. 8. Employing Kisor, Sargent next asserts that
the District Court’s deference to the commentary definition of
“aggravated assault” was improper because the “guideline is
not genuinely ambiguous.” Id. But as described above,
“aggravated assault” plainly captures Sargent’s conduct here
and that means any further inquiry “must cease.” Robinson,
519 U.S. at 340.
As to the guideline text, Sargent posits that the term
“aggravated assault” is unambiguously “limited to offenses
involving deadly or dangerous weapons or bodily injury.”
Appellant’s Br. 22. This argument fails for several reasons,
two of which are particularly prominent. First, Sargent relies
on the Model Penal Code, state statutes, non-contemporaneous
dictionary definitions, and treatises to suggest that the
“ordinary meaning” of the term “aggravated assault”
unambiguously excludes assault with intent to commit another
felony. Appellant’s Br. 21. While “the ‘judicial inquiry is
complete’” where “the words of the [text] are unambiguous,”

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Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99 (2003) (quoting
Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992)), the
sources Sargent cites are insufficient to support a finding of
unambiguousness that would give way to such finality. Indeed,
as already mentioned, more relevant sources for textual
interpretation, like entries in Black’s Law Dictionary that were
contemporaneous with the initial publication of the Guidelines,
included “assault with intent to commit another crime” within
the umbrella of acceptable definitions for “aggravated assault,”
directly refuting Sargent’s proposed definition.
Second, Sargent’s constrained construction of the
guideline text ignores its context within the larger structure of
the Guidelines, and so necessarily misses the clarity provided
by “the remainder of the . . . scheme[.]” Burwell, 576 U.S. at
492. Opting instead to focus on the structure of Section 111,
Sargent argues that the three tiers for punishment in the
statute—(1) simple assault, (2) assault that involves physical
contact or the intent to commit another felony, and (3) assault
that involves use of a deadly weapon or inflicts bodily injury—
and specifically the statutory scheme’s bifurcation of the third
tier, which carries a maximum penalty of twenty years, and the
first two tiers, which carry significantly lower maximum
penalties of one year and eight years, respectively, “support[]
defining aggravated assault in the guidelines as not including
an assault simply because it involved an intent to commit
another felony.” Appellant’s Br. 22. On our read, this
contention is not relevant to the text, structure, and context of
§ 2A2.2 specifically and is, thus, unpersuasive. Moreover, it is
a weak point when raised against the now decades-long,
congressionally-approved application of § 2A2.2 to offenses
that include assault with intent to commit another felony.
*****

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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s
sentence on Sargent’s Section 111 conviction.
So ordered.

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